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The objective of this study is to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
executive compensation plans in China. On one hand, it examines the determinants of 
compensation practices by supplementing the classical principal-agent theory with 
tournament theory and managerial power theory. On the other hand, it tests whether the 
adoption of equity-based compensation delivers better company performance for 
Chinese listed companies. 
Using compensation data from Chinese listed companies between 2006 and 2011, it is 
found that compensation level is strongly aligned with accounting-based performance. 
In particular, compensation and performance are more aligned at the higher hierarchical 
level. In addition, the level of compensation significantly rises with hierarchical level. It 
is also found that companies with the presence of the remuneration committee tend to 
use performance-based compensation. However, compensation and performance are 
less aligned when the size of the remuneration committee is smaller, and when the 
proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is higher. Finally, it is found that 
company accounting-based performance is improved one year after adopting equity-
based compensation.  
This study offers the following practical implications for policy makers and other 
practitioners. First of all, the board of directors and its remuneration committee should 
take account of market-based performance, as well as equity-based compensation, when 
designing compensation contracts for executives. In addition, policy makers may follow 
developed countries in implementing legal compulsion for constructing a remuneration 
committee through enacting laws. Finally, a clear and strong legal support for the 
appropriate composition and size of the remuneration committee is needed, in order to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“… being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well 
be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which 
the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards 
of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their 
master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 






As an important corporate governance approach to mitigate the interest-conflicts 
between executives and shareholders, mainly resulting from the separation of ownership 
and control, executive compensation has always been a hot topic which captures 
significant attention of policy makers, researchers, media and the public around the 
world. In particular, the global concern over the efficiency of corporate governance 
mechanisms such as the compensation scheme has risen considerably due to the more 
frequent occurrence of high profile bankruptcy and scandals of large companies during 
the past few decades. For instance, it has been argued that one of the weak corporate 
governance arrangements leading to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 is an 
inappropriate remuneration scheme. Specifically, even the firm has announced that it 
lost about four billion dollars in the third quarter; Richard Fuld, CEO and Chairman of 
the Lehman brothers, was awarded a total compensation of nearly 500 million dollars 
just four days before its bankruptcy (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Spamann, 2010). Disquiet 
over inappropriate pay arrangements is increasing in both developed countries as well as 
in emerging markets. For example, NJTC2, one of largest shipping companies in China, 
was delisted in 2014 due to the consecutive losses during 2010-2013. However, 
executive compensation in NJTC experienced sustained growth between 2010 and 2013 
(Wei, 2014). 
                                                          
1
 Smith, A. (1776). The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 
2
 Nanjing Tanker Corporation 
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Emerging markets have been playing significant roles in developing the global economy.  
Emerging markets also face the problem of interest-conflicts resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control as they have been constructing modern 
corporations following developed countries. However, emerging economies normally 
have large state ownership (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), weak laws as well as 
underdeveloped capital markets (Goergen, 2012), in contrast to developed countries. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate how companies in emerging markets implement 
financial incentives for their executives and to test the generalisability of influential 
theories in developed countries in the context of emerging markets. 
Academic research on executive compensation has experienced a long history. Existing 
literature on executive compensation appears to focus mainly on Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism, although studies outside the U.S. and the U.K. are strongly encouraged 
(Rosen, 1990; Sun, Zhao, & Yang, 2010). This study aims to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of executive compensation in China, one of the largest 
emerging markets in the world.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear introduction to this study. Specifically, 
section 1.2 describes the research background and motivation. The research questions 
are clarified in section 1.3, and section 1.4 discusses the contributions of the current 
study. Finally, as the conclusion section, section 1.5 briefly summarises this chapter and 
clearly outlines the structure of the whole thesis. 
1.2 Research Background and Motivations 
The interest-conflicts resulting from the separation of ownership and control has been 
introduced by Adam Smith in his noted book, “The Wealth of Nations” as early as 1776. 
The issue of interest divergences due to the separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations was then highlighted by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 1932. 
In their book named “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, Berle and Means 
(1932) argue that the control of corporations has become increasingly separated from 
their ownership, and self-seeking controllers may serve their own pockets at the expense 
of the company. The problem that controllers pursue their own benefits rather than the 
best interests of the owners is typically denominated as moral hazard. In particular, the 
asymmetric information between the controllers and the owners provides a prior 
condition for the existence of moral hazard (Holmström, 1979). 
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The interest-conflicts in the control-owner relationship are further theorised by Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling in 1976. They construct the classic principal-agent theory, 
where the principal and agent represent owners and controllers respectively. In modern 
corporations, the principals are normally referred to as shareholders, and the agents are 
usually denominated as executives. The principal-agent model provides remedies which 
could potentially alleviate the interest-conflicts between the shareholders and executives. 
On one hand, performance-based executive compensation is viewed as a financial 
incentive to motivate executives to maximise shareholder value as it aligns executives’ 
interests with those of the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, 
internal corporate governance mechanisms play important monitoring roles in 
mitigating the principal-agent problem (Holmström, 1979).  
In fact, studies on executive compensation date back to at least 1925 when Taussig and 
Barker investigated executive compensation in American corporations through 
questionnaires. The modern history of executive compensation studies started in the 
1980s and followed the principal-agent theory (Murphy, 1999). Based on the principal-
agent theory, most literature has been focusing on whether compensation has been 
positively linked to company performance to provide appropriate financial incentives 
for executives to work for the best interests of shareholders (e.g. Murphy, 1985; Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Conyon & Murphy, 2000), and whether compensation and monitoring 
by the board of directors or shareholders jointly mitigate agency problems (e.g., Core & 
Guay, 1999; Conyon & He, 2012).  
The principal-agent theory, although conceptually important, has provided limited 
empirically testable insights into the hierarchical structure of compensation for the 
organisation as a whole (Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993). Therefore, later studies 
have attempted to extend the classic principal-agent theory by considering the role of 
position hierarchy in determining executive compensation. In particular, the tournament 
theory provided by Lazear and Rosen (1981) offers empirically testable predictions on 
how compensation varies with executive hierarchical levels within the company. In 
addition, the weak pay-performance relation and the limitation of classic principal-agent 
theory motivate researchers to start to provide alternative views on incentive 
compensation. An influential view is the managerial power theory by Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003), who argues that as executives may achieve rent extractions through using 
their power to influence pay settings made by the board of directors or the remuneration 
committee, compensation is a part of the agency problem rather than an approach to 
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alleviate agency problems. Although a growing number of studies attempt to combine 
different theories in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of executive 
compensation (e.g. Lambert, Larcker, & Weigelt, 1993; Conyon & He, 2004; Chen, 
Ezzamel, & Cai, 2011), the majority of literature still lays is rooted in the standard 
principal-agent theory. In addition, an interesting number of researches have been 
focusing on the design of compensation not just the amount of compensation (e.g. 
Yermack, 1995; Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Jensen & Murphy, 2010). However, 
executive compensation literature in regions outside developed countries is still quite 
uneven (Boyd, Franco Santos, & Shen, 2012). 
As one of the largest emerging markets around the world, China started its economic 
reform since 1978. The rapid development of economy in the past few decades has 
made China become the second largest economy in the world. In the process of 
economic reform, China has been establishing a modern corporate system. This raises 
an important question as to whether executives in Chinese listed companies have been 
provided appropriate incentives such as performance-based compensation, in order to 
alleviate the agency problem in the modern corporation.  
In addition, executives at Chinese listed companies are selected by the board of 
directors or its sub-committee on the basis of executives’ business experience and 
performance record. They are allocated into different levels of seniority, and have 
opportunities to be promoted to higher hierarchical levels via internal labour market 
contests. Therefore, it is important to explore how executive compensation varies with 
hierarchical levels.  
Moreover, Chinese listed companies are gradually converging to the “best practice” 
corporate governance models, such as establishing the remuneration committee 
(Conyon and He, 2012). Increasingly more Chinese listed firms have established 
remuneration committees following the “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies”, especially after introducing the “Notice on the Matters concerning 
Carrying out a Special Campaign to Strengthen the Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies” by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2007. This 
raises important questions as to whether the remuneration committee plays an effective 
role in setting appropriate compensation for executives, in order to optimise the interests 
of shareholders, or whether its decisions on compensation plans are influenced by 
managerial power.  
5 
 
Finally, following developed countries such as the U.S. and U.K., Chinese listed 
companies have been using equity-based compensation to motivate its executives since 
2006. As suggested by Conyon and He (2012), the lack of equity-based compensation in 
the past and their emergence from 2006 provides a good opportunity to test whether an 
equity-based incentive indeed aligns the interests of executives and shareholders and 
leads to improved future performance.  
1.3 Research Questions 
This study aims to explain executive compensation in Chinese listed firms. On one hand, 
the main objective of this study is to examine the determinants of compensation plans 
by supplementing the classical principal-agent theory with insights gained from the 
tournament theory and the managerial power theory. Specifically, the standard 
principal-agent theory is applied to develop hypotheses regarding the relation of 
compensation level and company performance, and the role of a remuneration 
committee in setting executive compensation. In addition, hypotheses related to the 
impacts of hierarchical levels on executive compensation are based on tournament 
theory, while the managerial power theory is devoted to generate hypotheses in relation 
to the influences of the proportion of insiders serving on the remuneration committee, 
and the size of the remuneration committee on executive compensation plans. On the 
other hand, this study explores the causal effects of adopting equity-based compensation 
on company performance, based on the standard agency theory. Specifically, this study 
focuses on the following related questions: 
 First of all, has executive compensation been positively linked to performance in 
Chinese listed companies, as predicted in principal-agent theory literature?  
 Moreover, how does hierarchical level influence compensation level, pay-
performance link, and the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation?  
 Thirdly, does the presence of the remuneration committee affect compensation 
level, pay-performance link, and the likelihood of receiving equity-based 
compensation in Chinese listed companies?  
 Furthermore, how does managerial power, represented by remuneration 
committee size and the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee, 
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influence compensation level, pay-performance link, and the likelihood of 
receiving equity-based compensation?  
 Finally, does the adoption of equity-based compensation produce better future 
performance for Chinese listed companies?    
1.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
This study contributes to the executive compensation literature in different ways. First 
of all, it examines the executive compensation in emerging markets, given the large 
amount of literature focusing on developed countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. 
Studies in the context of regions outside developed countries enhance the literature to 
explore whether executive compensation globalises along the lines of developed 
countries (Cheffins, 2003; Conyon and He, 2012). In particular, the unique corporate 
governance and the evolution of executive compensation during the economic reform in 
China motivate this study to select samples from China, one of the largest emerging 
markets in the world.  
In addition, this study supplements the classic principal-agent theory with the 
knowledge gained from the tournament theory and the managerial power theory, in 
order to provide a more comprehensive view of the determinants of executive 
compensation in Chinese listed companies. This is different from most previous 
literature relying on a single theory. First of all, the principal-agent theory provides the 
theoretical foundation for hypotheses related to the relation of compensation level and 
company performance, and the influence of the presence of the remuneration committee 
on compensation plans. In addition, the tournament theory is employed to explore the 
effect of hierarchical levels on executive compensation. Finally, the managerial power 
theory is applied to generate hypotheses in relation to the influence of the composition 
and the size of the remuneration committee on compensation plans. Empirical findings 
in this study suggest that executive hierarchical levels, the presence of the remuneration 
committee, the proportion of insiders serving on the remuneration committee, and the 
remuneration committee size indeed do play important roles in determining executive 
compensation plans in China.   
Another contribution of this study is that it sheds light on the role of the remuneration 
committee in designing executive compensation in China. Prior literature in the context 
of developed countries has empirically suggested that the remuneration committee plays 
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an important role in designing executive compensation (e.g. Main & Johnston, 1993; 
Conyon & Peck, 1998; Sun & Cahan, 2009). However, the influences of the 
remuneration committee on compensation plans are typically ignored by previous 
Chinese literature with the exception of Zhu, Tian, and Ma (2009) and Conyon and He 
(2011; 2012). This study makes novel contributions through examining the impacts of 
the presence of a remuneration committee on pay structure. It also contributes to the 
literature by testing the influences of the proportion of insiders and the total number of 
directors serving on the remuneration committee on pay practices in China from the 
managerial power perspective. 
Moreover, this study involves equity-based compensation which has been omitted by 
most prior literature in the context of China with the exception of Conyon and He 
(2012). Conyon and He (2012) estimate the influences of a set of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the propensity of receiving equity-based compensation for CEOs in 
Chinese listed companies. This study uses a dummy variable to measure the adoption of 
equity-based compensation grants following Conyon and He (2012). However, it differs 
from Conyon and He (2012) in the following aspects: 
 It extends the sample to multi-level executives; 
 It makes a novel contribution by empirically testing how the likelihood of 
receiving equity-based compensation varies with hierarchical levels;  
 It also makes a novel contribution by estimating the role of managerial power in 
determining the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on the influences of hierarchical 
levels and managerial power on the likelihood of receiving of equity-based 
compensation in China. 
In addition to the determinants of equity-based compensation, this study also 
contributes to the literature by testing the causal effects of adopting equity-based 
compensation on company performance in China. As far as I’m aware, this is also the 
first study which combines the propensity score matching method with the difference-




Furthermore, this study employs compensation data of individual executives through 
taking advantage of the improved pay disclosure system in China. Earlier Chinese 
compensation literature usually measures executive compensation as the average of the 
top three highest-paid executives, due to the weak pay disclosure system. However, this 
approach might result in a biased estimation of the pay and performance relationship as 
it cannot control the effects of individual managerial attitudes (Conyon & He, 2012). In 
particular, highly paid executives might change over time and they may have different 
individual effects.  
Seventhly, the sample included in this study consists of both the CEOs and non-CEO 
executives. Prior literature focusing on CEOs alone is not comprehensive as firms are 
operated by the executive team, and thereby have limited explanatory powers for overall 
pay practices of executives. Including non-CEO executives also allows this study to 
estimate how the level and structure of pay varies within the executive team. Yet again, 
to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on the variation of compensation 
structures across executive position hierarchies within Chinese listed firms.  
Finally, one important methodological contribution of this study is the use of the fixed-
effect two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS) instrumental variables (IV) estimator. An 
advantage of this method is that it accounts for endogeneity of company performance, 
as well as correlated unobserved heterogeneity (Semykina & Wooldridge, 2010). 
Previous studies on the influences of performance on executive compensation typically 
ignore the potential endogeneity of company performance. However, in Buck, Liu, and 
Skovoroda (2008), it is found that executive compensation and company performance 
mutually affect each other, suggesting that simply regressing compensation on 
performance without considering the endogeneity of performance might produce biased 
results.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
This Chapter starts with an overview of the research background and motivations, 
followed by an outline of the research questions and a summary of contributions. The 
remaining of this thesis is organised as follows:  
Chapter 2 offers a proper understanding of the institutional background for this study. 
Specifically, it describes the Chinese economic reform with an emphasis on the 
evolution of corporate governance and executive compensation in the process of reform. 
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It also identifies the features and problems of the current corporate governance system 
in China.  
Chapter 3 reviews prior theoretical and empirical literature in the field of executive 
compensation. In particular, it reviews three important theories in developing 
hypotheses in this study, namely the classical principal-agent theory, the tournament 
theory, and the managerial power theory. It then reviews empirical literature with 
reference to the pay-performance relationship, the influences of position hierarchy on 
pay practices, the role of the remuneration committee in designing pay settings and the 
effects of equity-based compensation on performance, in the context of both China and 
developed countries.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the research methodology and hypotheses in this study. It starts 
with the research philosophy, and then identifies that this study employs the deductive 
approach, the quantitative method and longitudinal secondary data. Next, it then 
develops a set of hypotheses based on the principal-agent theory, the tournament theory, 
and the managerial power theory, and presents a range of models utilised to test these 
hypotheses. This is followed by an identification of potential econometric issues and 
appropriate estimators. Finally, this chapter provides a description of variables and 
summarises sample selection in this study. 
Chapter 5 presents and discusses empirical findings regarding the relation of pay and 
performance in the context of China. It starts with the descriptive statistics for executive 
pay, company performance, managerial attributes, firm attributes and economic 
characteristics, and corporate governance characteristics during the sample period, 
followed by a correlation matrix for key variables. The VIF tests are also presented, 
before discussing regression results, in order to identify whether independent variables 
suffer from a potential collinearity problem. It then compares empirical evidence on 
pay-performance relation obtained from the fixed-effect two-stage squares (FE-2SLS) 
estimator, with the normal ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the standard 
fixed-effect (FE) regression, and relates findings to previous literature.  
Chapter 6 focuses on empirical analysis of the influence of hierarchical levels on 
executive compensation in Chinese listed companies. Similarly to Chapter 5, it presents 
descriptive statistics at the beginning. VIF tests are also reported before analysing 
regression results. It then reports and discusses empirical findings in relation to the 
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influence of hierarchical levels on compensation level, pay-performance link, and the 
likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation. 
Chapter 7 places emphasis on the role of remuneration committee in determining 
executive compensation in China. Like Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, both descriptive 
statistics and VIF tests are reported before analysing the regression results. The 
regression results could be divided into two parts based on theoretical foundations. On 
one hand, based on principal-agent theory, this chapter discusses empirical evidence on 
the influence of remuneration committee presence on the level of pay, pay-performance 
link, and the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation. On the other hand, 
from a managerial power perspective, this chapter analyses how the pay level, pay-
performance relation, and the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation vary 
with the proportion of insiders and the total number of members serving on the 
remuneration committee. 
Chapter 8 pays close attention to empirical results in relation to the causal effect of the 
adoption of equity-based compensation on company performance in Chinese listed 
companies. Like chapter 5, this chapter starts with descriptive statistics for a matched 
sample by propensity score matching (PSM), followed by a correlation matrix for key 
variables and VIF tests for independent variables. It then reports and discusses empirical 
results gained from the difference-in-difference (DID) regression.  
The thesis ends with chapter 9, the conclusion chapter. This chapter restates the research 
questions and contributions of this study. It also summarises empirical findings which 
have been presented in previous chapters. Based on these findings, this chapter provides 
some academic and practical implications which may potentially enhance research and 
practice of corporate governance and executive compensation in both China and 
perhaps other emerging markets, for researchers, policy makers, the board of directors, 
the remuneration committee, and other practitioners. Finally, it highlights limitations of 




Chapter 2: Institutional Background 
 
“China’s reform and development will bring more business opportunities to the world.” 





China’s economic reforms since 1978 have been experimental and gradual (Morck & 
Yeung, 2014). China has gradually transformed from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy through a series of reforms taken by the government. During the 
transition period, corporate governance in China has emerged and pullulated 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2011), and the 
role of executive compensation in providing financial incentives for executives in 
Chinese listed companies becomes more and more significant.  
Chapter 2 aims to draw a picture of the institutional background related to economic 
growth, corporate governance framework and executive compensation in China. The 
rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 divides the history of Chinese 
economic reform into five phases, and reviews the development of corporate 
governance and the evolution of executive compensation in the process of economic 
reform. Section 2.3 offers a proper understanding of the current corporate governance 
model in China. Specifically, it explores the special board structure, the role of 
remuneration committees in determining executive compensation, and the power of the 
independent directors. Section 2.4 reviews the components of a typical executive 
compensation package in Chinese listed companies, and discusses the current problems 
associated with executive compensation in China. 
2.2 The Development of Corporate Governance and the Evolution of Executive 
Compensation in China 
China has gradually transformed from a ‘planned economy’ to a ‘market economy’ 
during the past few decades. During the economic reform, Chinese enterprises have 
                                                          
3
 Li Keqiang, Premier of the People’s Republic of China delivers a speech during the plenary session ‘The 
Global Impact of China’s Economic Transformation’ during the Annual Meeting 2015 of the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, January 21, 2015. 
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successfully evolved from government affiliates to modern corporations, corporate 
governance in China has emerged and developed, and executive compensation has 
become to be one of the major incentives for executives in Chinese listed companies 
(OECD, 2011). In general, the history of Chinese economic reform, together with the 
development of corporate governance and the evolution of executive compensation 
embedded in the process of reform, can be divided into at least five phases. 
2.2.1 Phase I: Before 1978 
Before the 1978 Chinese economic reform, all of the economy’s activities were 
centrally planned and controlled by the state rather than the market. For instance, the 
government planned the production objectives, product type and product prices 
centrally for the companies, based on the macro economy plans. Corporate business 
performance was measured by the number of planned targets met instead of the market 
value (OECD, 2011).  
In this ‘planned economy’, companies were called ‘state owned enterprises (SOEs)’ as 
they were owned and operated by the state. The SOEs were characterised by their 
‘administration-driven, unified and collective governance’ (OECD, 2011). Managers of 
these SOEs were nominated and dismissed by government agencies, and their 
achievements were evaluated by the enterprises' performance in satisfying the plans 
made by government agencies rather than the SOEs' financial performance (Schipani 
and Liu, 2002). Executives’ compensation was mainly based on their qualification and 
ranks but unrelated to business performance. In addition, pay differences across 
hierarchical levels were extremely small (Lin, Shen, & Su, 2011). Therefore, executives 
were motivated by political entitlement (OECD, 2011), and there was a lack of financial 
incentives for them to improve business performance (Bai, Lu, & Tao, 2006). 
2.2.2 Phase II: From 1978 to 1983 
The second phase was characterised by decentralisation (OECD, 2011), which was 
motivated by promoting markets and gradually phasing out the central planning 
function by the government (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). The decentralisation started 
with the Chinese economic reform launched by The Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978. This reform aimed at 
gradually relaxing the role of the government central planning, introducing a free 
market system and various kinds of profit-sharing schemes, and increasing decision 
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making autonomy granted to SOEs (Huang & Duncan, 1997). In the process of 
decentralisation, the state’s direct control over SOEs was supplemented with economic 
incentives (OECD, 2011), and SOEs’ executives were released more autonomies. For 
example, SOEs were allowed to retain 3% of their profits as the economic incentives to 
improve productivity and efficiency (Sun & Tong, 2003). 
2.2.3 Phase III: From 1984 to 1992 
Separation of state ownership and SOEs management was the core of this phase. The 
idea of separating SOEs management and state ownership was proposed for the first 
time in 1984 (OECD, 2011), and it was implemented through SOEs reform. As the 
major part of economic reform in this phase, SOEs reform aimed at making SOEs enjoy 
full management authority and full responsibility for their own gains and losses in the 
market (Schipani & Liu, 2002), thus providing a more effective incentive scheme for 
managers in Chinese companies (Naughton, 1994).  
From 1987, the government implemented the Contract Management Responsibility 
System (CMRS) in most SOEs. In the CMRS, a typical contract sets up negotiated 
profit-sharing rules between the management team and the government (Kang, Shi, & 
Brown, 2008). In other words, the government gave SOEs a free hand to run their 
operations, while SOEs had to promise a certain amount of tax to the government in 
return (Sun & Tong, 2003). Specifically, the government stipulated specific targets (e.g. 
profitability) in the contract, and managers of the SOEs are committed to fulfil the 
targets (Choe & Yin, 2000). Managers could be either awarded with a bonus or 
punished with a penalty, depending on SOEs performance. For instance, the manager 
would share the above-target profit with the government at a fixed rate in the contract if 
the realised profit exceeded the profit target
4
, or the manager had to pay a penalty
5
  if 
the target was not met.  
The CMRS played a positive role in China in the process of transforming from a 
planned economy to a market-based economy (OECD, 2011). For instance, it resulted in 
a stable increase in marginal profit retention rates over the 1980s (Groves, Hong, 
McMillan, & Naughton, 1995). In addition, managers had been given considerable 
                                                          
4
 If the realised profit exceeds the profit target subject to certain restrictions on fixed capital depreciation 
and total wage payment (Choe & Yin, 2000). 
5
 The penalty is either fixed or an amount proportional to the difference between the target and realised 
profit, or the performance bond forfeited (Choe & Yin, 2000). Normally, the penalty should be no more 
than a half of the annual salary of the managers (Groves et al., 1995). 
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freedom and autonomy in operating SOEs (Kang et al., 2008). However, the CMRS was 
also associated with some limitations. First of all, it had been widely observed that the 
manager would normally blame external factors such as bad market conditions and 
bargain with the government to soften the penalty if the profit target was not met, so 
there was no doubt that this “soft penalty” phenomenon undermined managerial 
incentives (Choe & Yin, 2000). Moreover, the CMRS could not avoid the short-term 
performance oriented behaviours (OECD, 2011).  
Data Source: National Bureau Statistics of China  
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was established in China in December 1990, 
followed by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in April 1991. Both of them have 
been growing fairly quickly (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005). Figure 2.1 above represents 
the stock market growth and the economic growth in China. The figure shows that there 
has been a sustainable growth of GDP in China between 1992 and 2011, and there has 
been a significant increase of the aggregate value of the stock market since the mid-
1990s. In addition, although the ratio of aggregate market value and GDP undulated 
during the period 1992-2011, it showed an overall increase. Specifically, the ratio has 
increased by 41.52 percent by the end of 2011, comparing with the ratio in 1992. This 
indicates that the stock market plays an important role in contributing to the economic 
growth in China. 
Known as the official regulatory institution to monitor the stock market, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was set up in 1992. Also in this year, the 















































Figure 2.1: Annual GDP and Total Market Capitalisation, 1992-2011 
GDP Total Market Capitalisation Total Market Capitalisation/GDP
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socialism market economy, and thus accelerated the speed of shifting from ‘planned 
economy’ into ‘market economy’. 
Executive compensation also experienced a reform in the process of SOEs reform. In 
particular, the government introduced several relevant policies to encourage 
performance-based compensation. In 1985, the State Council of the People's Republic 
of China issued “Notification about State-owned Enterprise Salary Reform” (hereinafter, 
“Notification”). The “Notification” stipulated that salary should be floated in proportion 
to enterprise performance. In the same year, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
(MOL) decided that wages would be linked to SOEs’ economic performance measured 
by enterprise profitability or a combined indicator of economic returns (Yueh, 2004),  in 
order to promote managerial incentives. 
In prior literature, it has been found that the improved managerial incentive system has 
effectively enhanced the performance of SOEs. Groves et al. (1995) suggest that SOEs’ 
productivity was positively driven by introducing managerial incentives in the 1980s. Li 
(1997) demonstrates that the improved managerial incentive is one of the important 
factors resulting in the total factor productivity growth in China in 1980s. Firth, Fung, 
and Rui (2006) also demonstrate that management incentive schemes have gained a 
toehold. However, Choe and Yin (2000) argue that the reform of SOEs in China did not 
effectively provide incentives for SOEs’ managers to maximise profits as firms faced an 
extremely uncertain macroeconomic environment in the transitional period (Choe & Yin, 
2000).  
Kato and Long (2006) argue that substantive executive compensation reforms in 
Chinese SOEs did not really start until the pilot implementation of the annual 
compensation system in 1992. Shanghai was the first city which adopted the pilot 
annual compensation programme, followed by 100 large SOEs around the country. 
Annual compensation then became prevalent in China. There were two components 
included in the annual compensation: a fixed basic salary and a floated compensation. 
The former depended on the average wage of ordinary employees and the size of the 
enterprise, and the latter depended on the performance of the firm in the year (Kato & 
Long, 2006). It is worth noting that the State Council has permitted enterprises to 
establish their own wage structures within the overall wage budget controlled by the 








































































































































Figure 2.2:  
Annual Number of Listed Firms, 1991-2011 
Number of Listed Firms Annual Growth
2.2.4 Phase IV: From 1993 to 2003 
This phase was characterised with SOEs privatisation and establishing a modern 
enterprise system. Developed countries experiences have shown that share issue 
privatisation plays an important role in the success of SOEs privatisation (Megginson & 
Netter, 2001). Thus, a large number of Chinese SOEs went into the process of 
privatisation through selling their shares to the public on either SSE or SZSE (Firth, 
Fung, and Rui, 2007). Figure 2.2 below describes the annual number of Chinese listed 
companies and its annual growth during the period 1991-2011. The number of listed 










Date Source: China Finance Information (CFI) Data Engine 
 
In 1993, the government issued the “Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China” 
(hereinafter, “Companies Law”) in order to monitor the listed firms and to maintain the 
stock market. As the first comprehensive law that fully stated the rights and 
responsibilities of modern companies in China (Kang et al, 2008), the “Companies Law” 
provided a legal foundations to establish a modern enterprise system (OECD, 2011). 
The Company Law also played an important role in building up the corporate 
governance system in China. Chinese listed firms established the shareholders’ 
meetings, the board of directors, the supervisory board and the senior management team, 
according to the requirement of the “Company Law”.  
17 
 
Although the government had made efforts to transform the traditional SOEs to modern 
corporations with the support of the “Company Law”, the corporatised SOEs still faced 
a lot of corporate governance problems. For instance, Schipani and Liu (2002) argue 
that the excessive overlaps between directors and executives lead to insider control and 
managerial corruption problems in some companies. In addition, as most listed 
companies in 1990s were transformed from traditional SOEs, the state was still the 
dominant shareholder in a large number of Chinese listed companies. However, non-
state institutional investors and individual investors were lacking in the power in 
governance and the legal systems were too weak to protect them, so they engaged in 
speculative behaviour instead of investment behaviour (Kang et al, 2008). Therefore, 
the Chinese government issued the “Securities Law” in 1998 to strengthen the legal 
support of corporate governance, and to protect the minority shareholders. 
The CSRC became more active in monitoring and regulating corporate governance of 
public companies after introducing the “Securities Law” in 1998 (Kang et al., 2008). 
For example, the CSRC issued “Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of the System of 
Independent Directors in Listed Companies” in August 2001. In November 2001, China 
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Joining WTO motivated China to accept 
the “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” and to further improve corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies (OECD, 2011). Therefore, based on the 
“OECD Principles of Corporate Governance”, the CSRC and the National Economic 
and Trade Commission (NETC) jointly issued the “Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies” (hereinafter, “Code of Corporate Governance”) in January 2002. As 
the first standard code in corporate governance, the “Code of Corporate Governance” 
was introduced to complement the “Company Law”. In particular, this code concerned 
the protection of shareholders and paid attention to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders (Kang et al., 2008). 
This privatisation process gives managers an opportunity to own shares in their listed 
companies. Therefore, managers have a much stronger incentive to enhance company 
performance because it is tied to their own wealth (Kang et al, 2008). 
2.2.5 Phase V: From 2004 to Present 
Previous obstacles to good corporate governance have been gradually mitigated in 
China since 2004 (OECD, 2011). In 2004, the State Council officially proposed the 
split-share reform, and then, this reform was formally launched by the CSRC in 2005. 
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The split-share reform was aimed at converting non-tradable shares into tradable shares, 
and hence, improving the stock market liquidity. It also addressed the concerns of price 
volatility and the price pressures resulting from the massive future supply of shares 
(Yeh, Shu, Lee, & Su, 2009). In order to govern the procedures of the split share 
structure reform in the individual firms, the government introduced two official 
documents in 2005: “Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed 
Companies”, and “Administrative Measures on the Split Share Structure Reform of 
Listed Companies”.  
Prior to the split-share reform, the ownership structure in Chinese listed companies was 
a split-share structure with a large portion of non-tradable shares and a small part of 
tradable shares. Non-tradable shares were normally held by the state and the legal-
person (namely, the domestic institution) investors which were partially owned by the 
central or local government, while tradable shares were typically held by domestic and 
foreign individual investors as well as domestic institutional investors (Li, Wang, 
Cheung, & Jiang, 2011). Although both the non-tradable and tradable shares had the 
same cash flow and voting rights (Firth, Lin, & Zou, 2010), this disproportional split 
share structure had been a big problem since the Chinese stock market was established. 
Yeh et al. (2009) argued that there were two problems resulting from the lack of market 
trading: a difficulty in measuring firm values and manager performance, and an 
obstruction of adopting incentive-based compensation contracts to align the managers’ 
interests with shareholders. Firth, Lin, et al. (2010) also pointed out that the split share 
structure could result in divergent interests and incentive conflicts between tradable and 
non-tradable shareholders. According to Yeh et al, (2009), by the end of 2006, more 
than 80 per cent of the listed firms in China had successfully participated in the reform 
program. The success of the split-share reforms played a positive and important role in 
the development of Chinese economy and corporate governance as it ensured all the 
shareholders had equal rights to trade shares. In addition, it enabled all categories of 
shares to be priced by the market mechanism (Firth, Lin, et al., 2010). Moreover, Gao et 
al. (2008) found that ownership concentration was significantly mitigated after the 
shareholding reform, and the reduction of ownership concentration positively affected 
performance of Chinese listed companies. As shareholder values started to be more 
closely tied to company share price after the split-share reform, shareholders preferred 
to use firm performance to assess executive performance. Therefore, the role of 
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company value in determining executive compensation became more significant after 
split-share reform.   
As Chinese lawmakers worked to imitate corporate governance of developed countries 
(Kang et al., 2008), both the “Company Law” and the “Securities Law” were revised in 
2006. The amended “Company Law” ‘improved companies’ governance structure and 
mechanisms to protect lawful shareholders’ rights and public interests’ (OECD, 2011, 
p.17), and the revised “Securities Law” ‘improved the system of governing the issuance, 
trading, registration and settlement of securities and provided for the establishment of 
multi-tiered capital-market architecture’ (OECD, 2011, p.17). 
After successfully completing the split-share reform and revising the “Company Law” 
and the “Securities Law”, the CSRC introduced the “Notice on the Matters concerning 
Carrying out a Special Campaign to Strengthen the Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies” (hereinafter, “Corporate Governance Special Campaign”) in March, 2007. 
The CSRC divided this special campaign into three stages: the self-check stage, the 
public comment stage, and the rectification and improvement stage, and required all the 
Chinese listed firms to complete all work in three stages before the end of October in 
2007 (China Securities Regulatory Commission [CSRC], 2007). Specifically, all 
Chinese listed companies shall allocate their own corporate governance problems 
through self-check, gather the investors and general public’s comments and the CSRC 
and stock exchanges’ appraisals, and take actions to improve their corporate governance. 
This special campaign effectively improved the corporate governance quality of 
individual firms. In particular, the role of board independence and diversity had started 
to become more important, the specialised committees of the board of directors had 
been strengthened, the information disclosure became more in-depth and extensive, and 
investors and management teams started to pay more attention to corporate social 
responsibility (OECD, 2011). 
2.3 Current Corporate Governance System in China 
2.3.1 Overview 
The systems of corporate governance in western countries are normally represented by 
two models, namely the Anglo-American Model and the German Model. The former is 
characterised by a unitary board, and the latter has a two-tier board. The unitary board 
structure, which is prevalent in companies in the U.S. and the U.K., includes internal 
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directors and external directors sitting on a single board. The internal directors on the 
unitary board are full-time executives who are responsible for the day-to-day operations 
of the companies. Although the external directors do not have responsibility for day-to-
day operations in this company, but may be employed in other organisations.  In 
contrast, the German two-tier board consists of an executive board and a separate 
supervisory board. The supervisory board has the monitoring power and includes 
representatives of shareholders and employees but is normally dominated by 
representatives of the large shareholders (Goergen, Manjon, & Renneboog, 2008). 
Chinese listed firms have a unique corporate governance framework which is different 
from both the Anglo-American Model and the German Model.  
Figure 2.3 below represents the special corporate governance framework in China. As 
shown in Figure 2.3, the general meeting of shareholders, the board of directors, the 
supervisory board, and the senior management team are four functional organs which 
constitute a corporation’s structure. The general meeting of shareholders is empowered 
to be the ultimate decision making organ in a corporation by the “Company Law” (Kang 
et al., 2008). The board of directors de facto has the decision making power under the 
authority of general meeting of shareholders (OECD, 2011). It includes the executive 
directors, non-executive directors and independent (external) directors, and could 
establish specialised committees. According to the “Code of Corporate Governance”, 
the board of directors “may establish a corporate strategy committee, an audit 
committee, a nomination committee, a remuneration and appraisal committee and other 
special committees in accordance with the resolutions of the shareholders’ meetings” 
(CSRC, 2002, p.7). The management team consists of full-time executives appointed by 
the board of directors, and they take part in the day-to-day operations of the company. 
As the supervision organ of a corporation, the supervisory board supervises whether 
directors and executives violate laws or articles of association of the company and 
inspects company’s finance (OECD, 2011), and it is made up of shareholder 
representatives and employee representatives. Both directors and supervisors are 
appointed or dismissed (Schipani & Liu, 2002) by - and are required to report to - 
shareholders (Dahya, Karbhari, & Xiao, 2002), while the executives are appointed or 
dismissed by the board of directors (Standing Committee of the National People's  
Congress [NPCSC], 2006). However, the directors and senior executives shall not sit 














Table 2.1 below summarises the characteristics of the board of directors and the 
supervisory board in Chinese listed firms. It is worth noting that the supervisory board 
in China is different from the supervisory board in the German model because it does 
not have the power to appoint and dismiss executives (Xiao, Dahya, & Lin, 2004). 
Instead, the appointing and dismissing power belongs to the board of directors. In 
addition, the size of the supervisory board in China is much smaller than that in the 
German model. The “Company Law” states that the supervisory board shall be 
composed of not less than three members (CSRC, 2006), but the supervisory board in 
German model normally has up to twenty members (Cromme, 2005). Previous literature 
suggests that the efficiency of the supervisory board in Chinese listed firms is 
questionable. Xiao et al. (2004) find that in the majority of companies in their sample, 
supervisors serve as honoured guests, friendly advisors or censored watchdogs
6
. Clarke 
(2006) also supports the fact that the supervisory board does not seem to play an 
important role in corporate governance in China due to its ineffectiveness, and a number 
of companies only keeping the supervisory board with just the legal minimum number 
of members.  
  
                                                          
6
 According to Xiao et al. (2004), the roles of the supervisory board could be divided into four categories: 
it is considered to be a ‘honoured guest’ if it performs a nominal or honorary role; it is a ‘friendly advisor’ 
if it provides consultancy and advice to the board of directors, but it does not confront directors and senior 
managers even when there are problems; it is viewed as a censored watchdog if it performs its monitoring 
duties but the monitoring is censored or internalised; and finally, it is named an ‘independent dog’ if it 
performs its monitoring duties ‘largely’ independently of any interference and/or sanctions from the board 
of directors, the CEO and large shareholders. 
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Table 2.1  
Comparison of the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board 
 
Characteristic Board of Directors Supervisory Board 
Accountable to the shareholders’ meeting Yes Yes 
Size 5 to 19 No less than 3 
Employee representative 
May have employee 
representative 
No less than one third 
Meeting frequency 
At least two meetings 
per year 
At least one meeting 
every six months 
Is an executive allowed be a member Yes No 
Appoint or dismiss managers Yes No 
       Source: Information Collected from the “Company Law” and the “Code of Corporate Governance” 
2.3.2 Remuneration Committee 
According to the “Code of Corporate Governance” (CSRC, 2001), the board of 
directors of listed companies shall establish a remuneration and appraisal committee. 
The remuneration and appraisal committee shall be chaired by an independent director 
and has the following two main duties:  
1. “to study the appraisal standard for directors and management personnel, to 
conduct appraisal and to make recommendations” (CSRC, 2001, p.7); and  
2. “to study and review the remuneration policies and schemes for directors and 
senior management personnel” (CSRC, 2001, p.7).  
 
 
However, Conyon and He (2012) argue that before 2002, no companies established 
remuneration committee. Figure 2.4 describes the growth of firms with a remuneration 
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companies with the remuneration committee dramatically increased from 56.48 percent 
in 2005 to 97.91 percent in 2011. In particular, the most significant growth happened 
from 2006 to 2008. Specifically, the number of companies which had established the 
remuneration committee increased from 63.95 percent in 2006 to 87.55 percent in 2007, 
an increase of 13.60 percent. The number increased by 12.88 percent in 2008. The 
significant increases during the period 2006-2008 might benefit from the “Corporate 
Governance Special Campaign”, launched in March, 2007. 
2.3.3 Independent Directors 
According to the article 123 of the “Company Law” (2006), “A listed company shall 
have independent directors. The specific method of appointing such independent 
directors shall be formulated by the State Council.” However, the “Company Law” does 
not provide detailed information regarding the requirements and duties of the 
independent directors.  Instead, the “Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of the 
System of Independent Directors in Listed Companies” (hereinafter, “Guidance on 
Independent Directors”) introduced by the CSRC in 2001, is viewed as the most 
comprehensive guidance on regulating internal corporate governance through 
establishing the independent directors (Clarke, 2006). According to the “Guidance on 
Independent Directors” (2001), listed firms should have at least two independent 
directors who make up at least one third of the board of directors. Independent directors 
are required to have a minimum of five years’ experience in law, business or other 
relevant fields, and at least one independent director needs to be an accounting 
professional. The “Guidance on Independent Directors” also empowers independent 
directors to veto related party transactions in Chinese listed firms, to recommend 
engagement or dismissal of the company's accounting firm, to recommend the holding 
of interim shareholders' meetings and the holding of board meetings, to hire outside 
auditors and consultants at the company's expense; and to solicit proxies prior to a 
shareholders' meeting (Clarke, 2006). 
China has been following the example of developed countries to adopt corporate 
governance models. In particular, the current corporate governance model in China 
seems to combine the Anglo-American one-tier board with the German two-tier board. 
However, China should develop its institutional environment that leads to effective 
corporate governance rather than copying a fixed set of governance models from 
developed countries (Chen, 2005). 
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2.4 Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Firms 
 
As mentioned earlier, compensation has become one of the main incentives for 
executives in Chinese listed companies. This section provides a clear understanding of 
the executive compensation portfolio and identifies the problems associated with 
executive pay in China. 
2.4.1 The Composition of Executive Compensation Package 
At present, an executive compensation package in Chinese listed companies typically 
includes basic salary, performance-based bonus and allowance. Since 2006, a small 
number of companies have started to offer equity-based compensation for their 
executives. Cash compensation is the most important component of total compensation 
for top executives in Chinese listed companies, and it corresponds to a typical cash 
compensation package in Western companies (Kato & Long, 2006). Table 2.2 
summarises compensation components for executives in Chinese listed companies. Both 
the basic salary and allowance have low flexibility and provide living security for 
executives, while bonus floats with company performance (accounting and/or stock-
based performance) and provides incentives for executives. Specifically, the higher the 
company performance in a fiscal year, the greater the annual bonuses for executives will 
be in the same period. Finally, a small number of executive received equity-based 
compensation in the form of stock options, restricted stocks or stock appreciation rights 
in Chinese listed firms (Conyon & He, 2012).  
Table 2.2  
Components of Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies  
 
Compensation Component Variability Features 
Basic Salary (Cash) Small Fixed, Stability, Security 
Performance-based Bonus (Cash) Big Performance-related, Floated, Incentive 
Allowance (Cash) Small Satisfaction, Security 
Equity-based Compensation  Big Performance-related, Floated, Incentive 
 
2.4.2 Problems of Executive Compensation in China 
In general, executive compensation in China has the following three problems: 
1. China has a relatively weaker compensation disclosure system. 
25 
 
2. There are a small number of executives who get paid from resources other than 
the companies in which they are currently holding positions.  
3. Equity-based compensation is emerging but still far from prevalent within 
Chinese listed companies.  
2.4.2.1 Transparency 
The disclosure of executive compensation is more developed and transparent in western 
countries. For instance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued 
regulations regarding the compensation disclosure since the 1930s. In 1938, the SEC 
required registered companies to disclose information on their executives’ 
compensation to the public (Lo, 2003). The rules have been revised and improved 
several times (e.g. in 1992, in 2006) by the SEC, in order to improve the transparency of 
executive compensation for investors and the public. The latest amendment in the SEC 
disclosure requirements was made in August 2006 (Faulkender & Yang, 2012). 
According to the SEC (2014), “In the annual proxy statement, a company must disclose 
information concerning the amount and type of compensation paid to its chief executive 
officer, chief financial officer and the three other most highly compensated executive 
officers”. In contrast to the U.S., disclosure requirement of executive compensation has 
a relatively shorter history and is less developed in China. Chinese listed companies 
have been required to disclose the compensation of the highest paid executive since 
1998 (Firth et al., 2007). Since 2001 the CSRC has required all listed companies to 
disclose the aggregated sum of total compensation of the top three highest-paid 
executives in their annual reports (Conyon & He, 2012). Only after 2005, Chinese listed 
companies are required to report the level of compensation for individual executives.  
Although the CSRC issued the “Regulations on Listed Companies’ Information 
Disclosure” in 2007 to further improve the disclosure system, executive compensation 
disclosure is still lacking transparency. First of all, Chinese listed companies are not 
required to disclose the component of executive compensation. In addition, the 
disclosure of equity-based compensation is not complete. Specifically, companies only 
need to disclose the type of equity-based compensation and its implementation in the 
fiscal year. The lack of information constrains the study of executive compensation in 
China. For instance, one cannot estimate the pay-performance sensitivity based on 
equity-based compensation as there is not enough disclosed information to calculate the 
value of equity-based compensation. As compensation disclosure could increase the 
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transparency of the compensation process at companies, force the board of directors to 
monitor executives more effectively, and prevent executives from self-seeking through 
setting their own pay (Faulkender & Yang, 2012), the compensation disclosure needs to 
be further strengthened in China. 
2.4.2.2 Phenomenon of ‘Zero-paid’ Executives 
In a small number of Chinese listed firms, there are some executives who are ‘zero-
paid’. After manually checking annual reports of those listed companies, it is found that 
those executives do not really receive ‘zero pay’. Instead, they are paid by another 
organisation. According to the information disclosed in the annual report, there are three 
main pay sources for those ‘zero-paid’ executives: controlling shareholders, controlling 
shareholders’ other subsidiaries, and the current listed companies’ subsidiaries. Based 
on these three pay sources, table 2.3 below summarises companies with ‘zero-paid’ 
executives.  
Table 2.3  
Number of Companies with ‘Zero-paid’ Executives, 2006-2011 
 
Pay Sources Number of Listed Firms 
Controlling Shareholder 23 
Other Subsidiary of Controlling Shareholder 8 
Listed Firm’s Subsidiary 21 
Total  52 
 
The phenomenon of ‘zero-paid’ executives is questionable. In particular, those 
executives may not be provided effective financial incentive to improve the 
performance of listed companies. In this study, those ‘zero-paid’ executives are deleted 
from the final sample as their compensation is not determined by the listed company 
they are currently holding positions. 
2.4.2.3 Insufficient Equity-based Compensation 
The dramatically improved regulations, financial market conditions and the legal 
environment have made it possible for Chinese listed firms to adopt equity incentive 
plans (Lian, Su, & Gu, 2011). At the end of 2005, equity-based compensation was 
introduced by the CSRC through releasing the “Regulations on Equity Incentives of 
Listed Companies (Trial)” (hereafter, “Regulations”). According to this “Regulations”, 
Chinese listed companies which have completed split-share reform are allowed to 
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implement equity incentives from 2006 (CSRC, 2005). Although there has been an 
appetite for granting equity-based compensation in China, it is still not as prevalent as in 
developed countries (e.g. the U.S. or the U.K.). Figure 2.5 presents the annual number 
of companies starting to use equity-based compensation during the period 2006-2011. 
As shown in Figure 2.5, there were a limited number of companies starting to adopt the 
equity-based compensation before 2010, while there were no more than 15 companies 
per year. The figure dramatically increased to 40 in 2010, and rose to 57 in 2011. By the 
end of year 2011, the number of companies which have adopted equity-based 
compensation has increased to 145. However, those companies only take up 2.43 
percent of all Chinese listed companies, still a very small proportion. 
 
Data Source: CSMAR Database Developed by the GTA Company 
2.5 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 offers a proper understanding of the institutional background for this study. 
China has gradually transited from a centrally ‘planned economy’ to a market economy 
through the economic reform since 1978, and the corporate governance in China has 
been growing up with establishing a modern enterprise system. Section 2.2 in this 
chapter divides the history of Chinese economic reform into five phases. The first phase 
is pre-1978. In this phase, China was characterised with centrally ‘planned economy’, 
and there were a lack of financial incentives for executives in SOEs. 1978-1983 is the 
second phase. The major feature of this phase was decentralisation. The government 
gradually phased out its central planning function via releasing more autonomy to 
individual SOEs and their executives. During this period, the profit-sharing schemes 


















































Figure 2.5:  







1992. The SOEs reform in this phase aimed at separating SOEs management and state 
ownership, and the managerial incentive system was improved through aligning 
executives’ annual compensation with company performance. 1993-2003 is the fourth 
phase. This phase was characterised with SOEs privatisation and the establishment of a 
modern enterprise system. The introducing of the “Company Law” and the “Code of 
Corporate Governance” empowered the board of directors and its remuneration 
committee to decide on compensation packages for executives at individual companies. 
The final phase is from 2004 to present. During this phase, China successfully 
completed the split-share reform, and a few Chinese listed companies had started to 
adopt equity-based compensation for their executives. 
Section 2.3 explores the current corporate governance model in China. The board 
structure in Chinese listed companies differs from the one-tier board in Anglo-American 
model, and it is also distinct from the two-tier board in the German model. Specifically, 
Chinese listed companies have a board of directors including executive directors, non-
executive directors and independent directors, and a separated supervisory board. Both 
the board of directors and the supervisory board are appointed or dismissed by 
shareholders, while the executives are appointed or dismissed by the board of directors. 
The “Code of Corporate Governance” encourages the board of directors at individual 
companies to establish the remuneration committee chaired by an independent director 
to set and assess executive compensation.  
Section 2.4 reviews components and current problems of executive compensation in 
China. Cash compensation is the most important component in the compensation 
package for top executives in Chinese listed companies, and it normally includes basic 
salary, performance-based bonus and allowance. A small number of companies have 
started to adopt equity-based compensation since 2006. Although the role of 
compensation in providing financial incentives for executives has become more 
significant, it still has problems. First of all, the disclosure of executive compensation is 
less developed and transparent when compared with western countries. Secondly, the 
existence of ‘zero-paid’ executives creates obstacles to providing effective financial 
incentives for those executives. Finally, the equity-based compensation is far from 
prevalent in China. 
The next chapter will provide a comprehensive literature review in the fields of 
executive compensation. In particular, it will explore the determinants of executive 
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compensation from three important theories: the principal-agent theory, the tournament 
theory, and the managerial power theory. By reviewing prior literature, the next Chapter 




Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 





The previous chapter described the institutional context of this study. This chapter 
documents the research background and research gaps through reviewing prior 
theoretical models and empirical literature in the fields of executive compensation. It 
begins with a review of three important theories in executive compensation literature, 
namely the principal-agent theory, the tournament theory and the managerial power 
theory. It goes on to empirical studies on the relation between compensation level and 
company performance, the influence of hierarchical levels on executive compensation 
plans, the role of the remuneration committee in determining compensation plans, and 
the effectiveness of adopting equity-based compensation in improving company 
performance.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: 
 Section 3.2 reviews the classical principal-agent theory, the tournament theory, 
and the managerial power theory.  
 Section 3.3 contrasts empirical studies on pay-performance relation in the 
context of China to those in developed countries.  
 Section 3.4 reviews empirical literature regarding executive compensation and 
hierarchical level in the context of both developed countries and China.  
 Section 3.5 discusses empirical evidence on the influence of the remuneration 
committee on executive compensation.  
 Empirical literature regarding the effectiveness of equity-based compensation in 
improving firm performance is reviewed in section 3.6.  
 Section 3.7 is the conclusion section, and it identifies research gaps and how this 
study contributes to the existing literature. 
                                                          
7
 Isaac Newton is an English physicist, mathematician, astronomer, alchemist, inventor and natural 
philosopher. The quote is from a letter written to fellow scientist, Robert Hooke in February 1675. 
Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/learningenglish/movingwords/shortlist/newton.shtml 
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3.2 Review of Theories 
Known as the predominant theory in executive compensation literature, the principal-
agent theory suggests that performance-based compensation provides financial 
incentives for executives because it aligns executives’ interests with those of 
shareholders, and thus, alleviates the interest-conflicts. As a reduced form of an agency 
model, the tournament theory supplements the classical principal-agent theory by 
looking at the role of position hierarchy in explaining executive compensation. 
However, the managerial power theory holds an opposite view that executive 
compensation might be part of the agency problem itself as executives might extract 
rent through their power to influence compensation plans. Although the managerial 
power approach takes a very different view from the classical principal-agent theory, 
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that the former is not viewed as a complete 
replacement for the latter, and compensation practices could be explained both by the 
managerial power and by the classical principal-agent approach. 
The classical principal-agent approach suggests that compensation packages are 
optimally designed to provide incentives for executives to maximize shareholder value. 
However, in practice, there is no optimal contract that would perfectly align the interests 
of managers and shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Therefore,, the classical principal-
agent theory, tournament theory and managerial power theory are viewed as 
complementary theories to form the theoretical foundation for this study.  
3.2.1 Principal-agent Theory 
The principal-agent theory plays a foundational and important role in executive 
compensation literature. This theory focuses on the principal-agent problem resulting 
from the separation of ownership and control. The principal-agent relationship is 
defined as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent” by Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p. 308). However, the existence of interest-divergences between the principal and agent 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the moral hazard problem due to the imperfect 
information in a principal-agent relationship (Holmström, 1979) may lead to the fact 
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the principal could mitigate the agency problem through 
providing appropriate incentives for the agent and by establishing monitoring 
32 
 
mechanisms to limit the aberrant behaviours of the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Consequently, according to the principal-agent theory, the compensation plans need to 
be designed to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders in order to 
alleviate the interest-conflicts between shareholders (principals) and executives (agents) 
in modern companies. 
According to Murphy (1999), “the fundamental insight emerging from the traditional 
principal-agent models is that the optimal contract mimics a statistical inference 
problem: the pay-outs depend on the likelihood that the desired actions were in fact 
taken” (p.2519). The optimal pay-for-performance term based on the traditional 
principal-agent model has been addressed by a number of studies (e.g. Holmström & 
Milgrom, 1987; Rosen, 1990; Garen, 1994; Murphy, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 2001). 
Suppose that χ = e + ε represents the firm value, where e represents the effort of 
executive, and the random variable ε captures normally distributed uncontrollable noise, 
ε ≈N (0, σ2). Also, suppose that the contract of executive pay scheme p(χ) is a linear 
function, p(χ) = s + bχ, where s is the fixed salary, and b is the pay-for-performance 
term (i.e. optimal sharing rate, according to Murphy (1999)). As the principal-agent 
theory assumes that the agent is risk adverse, the exponential utility function is given by 
U(χ) = exp[ρ(Wc(e))], where ρ is the absolute risk aversion of the agent and c(e) is the 
convex disutility of effort, then the pay-for-performance term can be given by: 




1+ c (e) 
                                              (3.1) 
As can be seen from the model, pay for performance sensitivity negatively depends on 
the agent risk aversion ρ, the cost-of-effort of agent c(e), and the corporate performance 
variability σ2. Specifically, the optimal pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) increases as 
the uncertainty of firm value and/or the agent’s risk version decreases. In particular, the 
optimal pay-performance sensitivity will be equal to one when there is no performance 
volatility (σ2 = 0) and/or executives are risk-neutral (ρ = 0). 
However, as the traditional principal-agency model does not provide clear guidance on 
exact specification or identification (Doucouliagos, Haman, & Stanley, 2012), prior 
literature normally relies on the reduced-form linear models to estimate the pay-
performance relation. In general, there are three approaches largely applied in previous 
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ln(pay) = performance X                              (3.2) 
 
Where ln indicates the natural logarithm, pay represents either cash compensation or 
total compensation. Performance is measured by either accounting-based performance 
or stock returns, and β is the coefficient of pay-performance link. X represents a set of 
control variables which potentially influence the level of executive compensation, and γ 
is the corresponding coefficient; ε is the error term.  
Model 3.2 could be estimated separately by executives (e.g. Janakiraman, Lambert, & 
Larcker, 1992; Jensen & Murphy, 2010) or for pooled executives if time trends and pay-
performance relations are assumed to be constant across executives (e.g. Lambert et al., 
1993; Conyon & He, 2011). In addition, as argued by Murphy (1999), researchers may 
have to choose whether to use compensation level directly or to take natural logarithms 
of pay, and whether to measure performance in value or in rates of return, when 
estimating how the changes of compensation respond to the changes in company 
performance. The choice will in turn lead to two different interpretations of the 
coefficients of pay-performance relation: pay-performance sensitivity (notably, Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990) or pay-performance elasticity (notably, Murphy, 1985; Coughlan & 
Schmidt, 1985). Consequently, the changes of compensation responding to the changes 
in company performance could be modelled in two different ways as follows: 
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(pay) = performance X                              (3.3) 
 
Where Δ is a first difference operator, so  i,t i,t i,t-1pay = pay pay , and
 i,t i,t i,t-1performance = performance performance  . However, Hall and Liebman 
(1998) suggest that directly using changes as the measurement might present a 
misleading picture of pay to performance relationships, because the change in firm 
performance  i,tperformance  is so large. In particular, a several million dollar 
change in CEO wealth seems to be very small when divided by the annual change in the 
market value (Hall & Liebman, 1998). The size effect could be better statistically 
controlled if pay-performance elasticity is estimated. Therefore, some literature replaces 
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  ,i tpay  and  i,tperformance  by   ,i tln pay  and  i,tln performance , 
respectively, in order to test the pay-performance elasticity. 
 
                                              
i,t i,t i,t
ln(pay) = + ln(performance) + X +                     (3.4) 
           
Equation 3.4 controls for the dominant effects of large value on estimates by taking the 
natural logarithm, comparing with Equation 3.3. However, pay-performance elasticity 
has no corresponding agency-theoretic interpretation (Murphy, 1999).  
This study relies on Equation 3.2 to estimate the role of firm performance and other 
determinants in influencing executive compensation, given that the direct use of 
arithmetical differences might result in biased estimation due to the effects of a large 
value, whereas pay-performance elasticity is lacking the corresponding agency-theoretic 
interpretation.  
3.2.2 Tournament Theory 
The classic principal-agent theory, although important and dominant, has offered 
insufficient empirically testable insights into the compensation schemes in hierarchical 
organisations (Gibbs, 1995; Lambert et al., 1993; Ortín-Angel & Salas-Fumás, 1998). 
Therefore, researchers develop supplementary theories such as tournament theory by 
considering the role of hierarchical levels in explaining executive compensation. The 
tournament theory, as developed by Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen in 1981, 
suggests that large differences of compensation across executive hierarchical levels 
within the same company might have to provide adequate incentives for executives. 
Specifically, the tournament theory considers the internal compensation schemes among 
executives as sequential tournaments where executives compete against one another at a 
given hierarchical level in order to be promoted to a higher hierarchical level and to get 
higher compensation associated with the promotion (Rosen, 1986).  
Below introduces a simply tournament model, following Lazear and Rosen (1981), 
Eriksson (1999) and Conyon and Sadler (2001). Consider a tournament with two 
identical vice-presidents, represented as j and k. Those two vice-presidents compete 
against each other for the CEO position. The winner of this tournament is promoted to 
the CEO position and is rewarded a fixed prize, W1, and the tournament has another 
fixed prize, W2, for the loser who will stay in the vice-president’s position. The 
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contestant’s output, denoted by q depends on each vice-president’s effort level, denoted 
by μ, and a random or luck component, denoted by ε, ε = (0, σ2). Then, the output of 
contestant j will be:                                                           
                                                                
 
j j j
q   
                                                 (3.4) 
Similarly, the output of contestant k will be:                                                                                                                     
                                                                
k k k
q                                                      (3.5) 
 
Let P be the probability of winning. Vice-president j will win if he/she produces more 
output than rival k. Therefore, for contestant j, the probability of winning is: 
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Where ξ =
k j
  , G denotes the cumulative distribution function of ξ.  
As can be seen in Equation 3.6, for vice-president j, the probability of winning 
positively depends on the effort level of j, negatively depends on the effort level of k, 
and is also affected by the distribution of the random variable, ε. Both contestants want 
to maximise their probability of winning. Then, for contestant j,  
















                                           (3.7) 
Let  C   denote the cost of effort function. According to Eriksson (1999), both the 
first order condition C
’
(μ) and the second order condition C”(μ) for effort level are 
assumed to be positive. The expected utility for contestant j is: 
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                     (3.8) 
The first order derivative is given by: 
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As each contestant aims to maximise his or her expected utility through their effort level, 
then:  
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Equation 3.10 can be also written as:    

















 in Equation 3.11 with )(
j k
g   , the best reaction function of 
contestant j is:  
                                                   ( )j1 k2
j
C






                                     (3.12) 
As mentioned before, contestant j and contestant k are assumed to be identical. In the 
Nash equilibrium, both of them choose the same level of effort. That is to say, 
0
j k
   . In addition, the outcome of the game is random in equilibrium. In other 
words, the probability of winning (P) is defined by the following equation: 
                                                       10 2P G   .                                                    (3.13) 
Consequently, Equation 3.12 can be rewritten as: 













                                 (3.14) 
Equation 3.14 shows that the equilibrium level of effort depends on differentials 
between winning and losing prizes. Specifically, vice-president j’s effort investment 
increases as the prize spread between moving up to CEO position and staying at the 
vice-president position also increases.  
According to Eriksson (1999) and Conyon and Sadler (2001), Equation 3.14 together 
with tournament theory, provides some testable predictions related to executive 
compensation. First of all, tournament theory predicts that compensation is an 
increasing function of hierarchical level within the company (Conyon & Sadler, 2001; 
Lambert et al., 1993). The higher pay is to compensate for the loss of promotion 
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opportunities at higher hierarchical levels. In addition, executives at the top should be 
given extra weight of rewards as there is no further promotion opportunity at the final 
stage of the game (Rosen, 1986). Therefore, tournament theory predicts that there 
should be an extraordinarily large difference in compensation level between the CEO 
and the managers at the next lower hierarchy, compared with pay differences across 
other adjacent hierarchical levels (Lambert et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999). Consequently, 
the function between executive compensation and hierarchical levels can be 
characterised as being convex (Lambert et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 
2001; Lin et al., 2011). As this study tests the role of hierarchical levels in determining 
executive compensation, it focuses on those two predictions.  
The tournament theory also predicts in production environments where contributions of 
luck or other random factors to output are more important, so that a larger compensation 
differential is used to substitute for the effort reducing the effect of randomness 
(Eriksson, 1999). Furthermore, the tournament model predicts that the size of 
tournament prize is an increasing function of the number of players (O'Reilly III, Main, 
& Crystal 1988; Main, O'Reilly III, & Wade, 1993). This is because each contestant 
implicitly gives up some of the expected compensation associated with his marginal 
product or performance, and then this becomes part of the overall tournament prize 
(Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2001). Finally, as shown in Equation 
3.14, the wider the compensation dispersion results in the higher the level of effort. 
Therefore, tournament theory suggests that large compensation dispersion has a positive 
effect on company performance (Bloom, 1999; Eriksson, 1999; Chen et al., 2011). 
3.2.3 Managerial Power Theory 
Known as an important economic model in the area of corporate governance, the 
classical principal-agent theory has offered a clear understanding that financial incentive 
such as performance-based compensation is crucial to alleviate the agency problem. 
However, some scholars argue that the classical principal-agent theory is too 
constrained (Lambert et al, 1993), and gives little consideration to the role of non-
economic factors such as sociological or psychological factors in explaining executive 
compensation. In particular, the ways in which individual agents obtain their 
preferences are normally negligent in agency theory-based literature (Grabke-Rundell & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2002). Therefore, researchers start to explain executive compensation 
from alternative perspectives such as the managerial power perspective. 
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The managerial power theory challenges the view of agency theory that executive 
compensation is set through arm’s-length contracting between executives and boards of 
directors (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). As an alternative approach to explain executive 
compensation, the managerial power theory views executive compensation as part of the 
agency problem itself because an executive might extract additional rent using 
managerial power (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). For instance, executives are able to take 
advantage of their power to influence both the level and structure of compensation 
(Murphy, 2002). To be specific, an executive might use his/her power to get the 
favourable higher compensation level but lower pay-performance link. Therefore, the 
power is normally defined as the ability of executives to influence pay decisions made 
by the board of directors or the remuneration committee (Finkelstein, 1992; Lambert et 
al. 1993). In particular, the managerial power model emphasises the power facilitated by 
the inefficient remuneration committee (Conyon, 2006).  
In fact, researchers related to the agency theory have alluded to managerial power as 
being a key variable in determining executive compensation, although they have not 
directly operationalised and tested the influence of managerial power on compensation 
(Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). For instance, it has been argued that a CEO 
will have less influence over compensation plans if the roles of the CEO and chairman 
of the board of directors are separated (Boyd, 1994; Conyon, 1997). In addition, as 
argued by Williamson (1985), firms with less independent remuneration committee 
provide opportunities for managers to write their own contracts with one hand and sign 
them with the other.   
It is worth noting that there are many different sources of managerial power, and they 
can be related to social influence. The theory of social influence argues that in the 
interpersonal contexts, the beliefs, attitudes, or behaviour of one person will be 
intentionally or unintentionally influenced by another person (Simpson, Farrell, Oriña, 
& Rothman, 2015). This theory of social influence can date back to 1959 when 
psychologist French and Raven discussed the relationship of social influence and power. 
According to French and Raven (1959), power is the potential ability of one person to 
influence another person, and there are five important bases of power: reward power, 
coercive power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power. Each power base is 
believed to be associated with the use of different influence strategies and tactics, each 




Organisations consist of individuals working both independently and interdependently 
on sets of coordinated tasks (Ferris et al., 2002). Executives in business organisations 
could influence the beliefs, attitudes, or behaviours of others, and the strength of their 
influence depends on the magnitude and source of their power. Specifically, executives 
can gain their power from a number of different sources, such as managerial job tenure 
(Ryan & Wiggins, 2004; Ryan, Wang, & Wiggins, 2009), executive ownership 
(Finkelstein, 1992), executive political power (Chen et al., 2011). Taking job tenure as 
an example, prior literature has shown that executives with longer job tenure will have 
greater social influence and are more likely to be able to influence the board of directors 
(Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990; Fiss, 2006).  
Although this study does not attempt to use tenure as a proxy of managerial power, I do 
believe that job tenure potentially determines managerial power. Therefore, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, job tenure is viewed as a control variable in regressions. 
3.3 Executive Compensation and Company Performance: Empirical Studies 
A central theme in the field of executive compensation is whether the level of 
compensation is positively related to company performance. This section reviews 
empirical studies on the relation of compensation level and company performance in 
developed countries, and then moves on to empirical literature in China. 
3.3.1 Empirical Studies in Developed Countries 
A majority of studies on the relationship of executive compensation and company 
performance has been focusing on developed countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. 
These studies benefit from the advanced compensation disclosure system in the Anglo-
American capitalism. Early studies normally focus on company’s objective function, 
and predict that managers would maximise profit if they make an effort to improve 
shareholders’ interests, but if the managers are self-interested, then they would enter the 
sales and assets amount into the firm’s objectives (Rosen, 1990). These studies test and 
compare the pay-sales relation and the pay-profits link based on Baumol (1959)’s 
statement: “Executive salaries appear to be far more closely correlated with the scale of 
operations of the firm than with its profitability” (p. 46). This is supported by McGuire, 
Chiu, and Elbing (1962) and Ciscel (1974) who find that the relation of executive 
compensation and sales is stronger than the compensation-profits relation. Lewellen and 
Huntsman (1970) expand the McGuire et al. (1962) study using a multivariate 
40 
 
regression model, in order to reduce various statistical and measurement biases. 
However, they find an opposite result that profits have a strong and persistent influence 
on executive compensation, whereas sales seem to have less effect. However, after 
further correcting the collinearity and heteroscedasticity of Lewellen and Huntsman’s 
1970 study, Smyth, Boyes, and Peseau (1975) and Ciscel and Carroll (1980) suggest 
that both sales and profits are influential factors which determine executive 
compensation. In addition to the above studies using data in the U.S., there are two 
representative empirical studies in the U.K., namely Cosh (1975) and Meeks and 
Wittington (1975). Both of these studies use a sample of British companies during the 
period 1969-1971. However, the former utilises a pooled data, and the latter employs 
data separated by year. Cosh (1975) finds that company size (measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets) is the major determinant of chief executive compensation, but 
profitability plays a minor role, while Meeks and Wittington (1975) suggest that both 
the profitability and firm growth significantly affect executive compensation. 
Consequently, early studies have not reached a consensus that executive compensation 
is more closely tied to sales or profit. 
Successors also argue that there are some limitations in these early studies. First of all, 
previous cross-sectional estimates of compensation and performance relationship suffer 
a serious omitted variables problem (Murphy, 1985). Ignoring unobserved individual or 
firm specific effects will generate biased and misleading results. In addition, early 
studies relying on accounting-based profitability may suffer measure errors and biased 
empirical results as the accounting-based profitability might be at the discretion of 
firm’s management (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985). Although accounting-based 
profitability may provide valuable information for assessing an executive’s 
unobservable actions, in the U.S. where equity-based compensation is relatively more 
prevalent, the changes in executive wealth might be exclusively determined by market-
based firm performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Therefore, stock market-based 
performance measure also needs to be involved in studies on pay-performance link. 
Executive compensation literature has stepped into a new stage since Michael C. Jensen 
and William H. Meckling put forward the principal-agent theory in 1976. A large 
number of studies have been rooted in this classical theory. According to the principal-
agent theory, executive compensation plans should be designed to align managers’ 
interests with those of shareholder (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). What estimated pay-
performance sensitivity has been reported in the literature?  
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Using a sample of individual executives during the period 1964-1981, Murphy (1985) 
re-examines the firm’s performance and managerial pay relation in the U.S. Comparing 
it with earlier studies, Murphy’s 1985 study has the following features. First of all, he 
includes equity-based compensation rather than cash compensation (salary plus bonus) 
alone. In addition, he uses the first difference model to avoid fixed-effects bias resulting 
from omitted variables. Murphy (1985) concludes that managerial compensation is 
strongly and positively affected by company performance measured by the rate of return 
realised by shareholders. In addition, compensation is positively and significantly 
influenced by sales growth when samples are restricted to CEOs (Murphy, 1985). This 
is inconsistent with Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) who indicate that there is an 
insignificant effect of sales growth on executive compensation. According to Coughlan 
and Schmidt (1985), one important reason for the different results might be that their 
sample includes a great proportion of executives who are first or final year CEOs, while 
the optimal compensation policy for a CEO’s initial or final year of career will be 
different from that of other years (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985). As suggested by 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), compensation for a CEO’s beginning or final year will 
be not linked to sales growth because such a link would reward him for the efforts of his 
predecessor in the first year and would encourage excessive advertising or marketing 
expenditures in his last year.   
An influential pay-performance sensitivity study has been constructed by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990). In their study, the pay-performance sensitivity is defined as the dollar 
change of CEO’s wealth associated with a dollar change in the shareholders’ wealth. 
However, Jensen and Murphy (1990) only observe a small relationship between the 
cash compensation of CEOs and company performance using a sample of companies in 
the U.S. from 1974 to 1986. To be specific, each 1,000 dollars change in shareholder 
wealth leads to only two cents increase of salary and bonus (Jensen & Murphy 1990). 
The pay-performance sensitivity is strengthened although it is still small when options, 
stockholdings and the performance related dismissal are added to the CEO’s wealth. 
According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), each 1,000 dollars change in shareholder 
wealth results in 3.25 dollars change of the CEO’s total wealth.  
This weak pay-performance relation is also indicated in the U.K. Following Murphy 
(1985) and Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993) are 
among the first to estimate pay-performance sensitivity in the U.K. using the first 
difference estimator. Using data on approximately three hundred large U.K. companies 
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in the 1980s and early 1990s, Gregg et al. (1993) indicate that the high growth in 
highest paid director’s cash compensation is weakly related to corporate performance. 
The weak relationship even disappears during the period of recession between 1989 and 
1991. During this period, top directors’ high compensation is related to neither company 
accounting-based performance nor stock market-based performance (Gregg et al., 1993). 
Similarly, using a sample of 213 large U.K. companies from 1988 to 1993, Conyon 
(1997) observes little evidence of the relationship between the compensation of the 
highest paid directors and pre-dated shareholder returns. However, Conyon (1997) find 
a positive relation of director compensation and contemporary shareholder returns.  
The relationship between compensation and performance tends to be relatively stronger, 
according to a number of empirical studies after the mid-1990s. For example, Murphy 
(1999) finds that pay-performance sensitivities have nearly doubled to 0.6% by 1996, 
and the increasing pay-performance sensitivities are driven primarily by stock options 
and stock ownership (see also Hall & Liebman, 1998). This is consistent with the 
finding in Jensen and Murphy (1990) that the pay-performance sensitivity is enhanced 
when stock options and stockholdings are added to the wealth of the CEO.  
Although Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) suggest that cash compensation is, 
statistically, a much better measure of executive compensation than the measure that 
includes all of the payments, compensation structure has changed a lot since their study 
(Conyon & Sadler, 2001). Equity-based compensation normally takes a larger 
proportion than cash compensation in both the U.S. (Murphy, 1999) and the U.K. 
(Conyon & Murphy, 2000). Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) were among the first to 
construct a broader measure of compensation in the U.K. They define compensation as 
the sum of the cash compensation and value of option holdings, where the option value 
is calculated by the Black and Scholes formula. Using a sample of 60 companies in the 
U.K. during the period 1981-1989, Main et al. (1996) observe that the broad measure of 
compensation is more significantly sensitive to corporate performance, comparing with 
cash compensation. Similarly, using a fifteen-year (1980-1994) panel data of CEOs in 
large publicly traded companies in the U.S., Hall and Liebman (1998) document a 
strong positive relationship between company performance and CEO compensation, 
while this significantly positive relation is generated almost entirely (about 98%) by 
changes in the value of equity incentives. 
43 
 
Recently, it appears that there is a growing body of studies on pay and performance link 
outside the U.S and the U.K. Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) provide the first 
empirical study on executive compensation in Italy. Using survey data consisting of 
2,996 executive-year observations from 107 firms in Italy during 1993–1996, they find 
a low sensitivity of incentive compensation to company performance. The weak link 
between top managerial compensation and corporate performance even disappears in 
Gigliotti’s study in 2013 in which a more recent sample of 153 Italian companies during 
the period 2004-2009 is employed. Differently, using a unique ten-year CEO-level 
panel data from 1986 to 1995, Kato and Kubo (2006) indicate that the Japanese CEO's 
cash compensation is positively and significantly related to accounting-based 
performance. More recently, in the context of a two-tier board system, Andreas, Rapp, 
and Wolff (2012) find a positive and significant pay-performance relation using a novel 
data set that covers German Prime Standard firms between 2005 and 2008.   
In addition to the abnormal return, the relative performance evaluation also captures the 
attention of some scholars. Holmström (1979) argues that the imperfect information in a 
principal-agent relationship will lead to a moral hazard problem for risk sharing agents 
so that the probability distribution of the outcome is affected by their private actions, 
but the welfare of both the principal and the agent can be improved by using any 
additional information about the agent’s action. As some shocks might be common to 
companies within the same industry or market, owners want to reward managers’ efforts 
by looking at the profit outcome of the company relative to other firms in the same 
industry or market (Conyon & Sadler, 2001). The relative performance evaluation 
model predicts that an executive will receive lower compensation if executives of rival 
firms provide higher shareholder returns when other things are equal (Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 1999). However, empirical evidence regarding the relation between executive 
compensation and relative performance is mixed. Using a sample of 1,668 CEOs from 
1,049 U.S. companies during the period 1974-1986, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find 
that CEO pay changes are positively related to the company’s stock return, but 
negatively to both industry value-weighted and market value-weighted relative 
performance. This is inconsistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990), who observe that pay 
changes are unrelated to market-based performance. Using data on 796 Japanese 
companies from 1968 to 1992, Joh (1999) suggests that executive compensation goes up 
when industry-based relative performance increases. In particular, this positive relation 
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is stronger in a competitive industry than a concentrated industry, and is closer in a 
slow-growing industry than a fast-growing industry (Joh, 1999).  
Although Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that pay for performance sensitivity should 
be different for different individuals or firms (see also Conyon & Sadler, 2001), most of 
the studies reviewed above estimate the average pay for performance sensitivity using a 
reduced form linear model. Alternatively, Jensen and Murphy (2000) estimate the 
individual pay-performance sensitivity for each CEO in a sample of 2,505 CEOs from 
1,400 companies from 1975 through to 1988, in order to conduct an in-depth statistical 
analysis of executive incentives. In contrast to prior studies, Jensen and Murphy (2000) 
focus on how each CEO is paid rather than how much they are paid. The empirical 
findings in Jensen and Murphy (2000) indicate that pay for performance is getting 
worse rather than better. In particular, there is a big difference between the CEO with 
the best incentive and the CEO with the worst incentive. For instance, the CEO ranks 
first has a 231.53 dollars increase in wealth for every 1,000 dollars increase in 
shareholder wealth, while for CEOs from companies with worst incentives, a 1,000 
dollars change in shareholder wealth leads to less than 1 dollar change in individual 
CEO wealth (Jensen & Murphy, 2000). Jensen and Murphy (2000) also argue that for 
most CEOs, the link between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth is contributed to by 
the stockholdings of CEO. 
Following Jensen and Murphy (2000), Garen (1994) employs the estimation of pay-
performance sensitivity for each CEO, in order to test the determinants of individual 
pay-performance sensitivities. Consistent with the implication of the principal-agent 
theory, Garen (1994) observes that the compensation plan involves a trade-off between 
incentives and insurance. Based on data for CEOs from 430 companies, he finds that 
company size has a negative impact on pay-performance sensitivity. Garen (1994) also 
finds a positive effect of CEO age on pay-performance sensitivity, consistent with 
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) who argue that more incentive pay is required when the 
CEO is closer to the retirement. 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) compare the pay for performance sensitivity in the U.S. to 
that in the U.K. Statistics based on individual pay for performance sensitivity of each 
CEO show that both the mean and median pay-performance sensitivities for CEOs in 
the U.S. are significantly higher than those in the U.K. Following Conyon and Murphy 
(2000), Conyon and Sadler (2001) compute the individual pay-performance sensitivity 
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for executives (including other top executives more than just CEOs) from the U.K. 
companies, in order to explore how pay-performance sensitivity varies with executive 
hierarchical levels within the company. They find that executives at the higher 
hierarchical level have greater pay-performance sensitivity, when compared with those 
at lower level hierarchy. 
3.3.2 Empirical Studies in China 
Studies on the relation of executive compensation and company performance in the 
context of China are emerging and relatively insufficient, comparing with the extensive 
literature in developed countries, primarily due to the data availability. Studies on the 
relation of executive compensation and company performance in the context of China 
normally follow models which have been widely applied in prior literature in the U.S. 
and the U.K. (e.g. Jensen & Murphy 1990; Murphy 1985; Murphy 1999). Overall, a 
positive pay-performance relation has been observed in most of Chinese literature, and 
the positive relation is moderated by other factors such as ownership structure. 
Early studies typically rely on survey data of SOEs during the period when the stock 
exchanges and publicly listed firms have not appeared in China. Many of the early 
studies aim to test the success of the managerial reform during the SOEs reform process, 
and most of empirical evidence shows a positive link between executive compensation 
and firm performance in Chinese SOEs. Using data drawn from a questionnaire survey 
carried out in collaboration with the Economics Research Institute of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Grove et al. (1995) examine the relationship 
between executive compensation and enterprise performance before and after the 
managerial reform. Using a sample of 769 Chinese SOEs during the period 1980-1989, 
they find that profit becomes an important factor in shaping managerial wages after the 
managerial reform. A similar result is found in a more comprehensive study by 
Mengistae and Xu (2004) who rely on the same data source and adopt the standard 
fixed-effect panel data model. However, Mengistae and Xu (2004) narrow their 
observations to CEOs only. Empirical evidences of the positive relationship between 
executive compensation and enterprise performance above support the success of 
managerial reform in Chinese SOEs. However, Choe and Yin (2000) question the 
efficiency of an incentive compensation system in maximising profit. Specifically, Choe 
and Yin (2000) theoretically suggest that if the government aims to provide incentives 
for SOEs to maximise profit, the targeted profit in the managerial contracts should be 
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reasonably low and the penalty has to be severe. In reality, however, profit targets are 
ambiguous in much of the managerial contracts in SOEs, and, under this uncertainty, 
those contracts fail to provide incentives for executives (Choe & Yin, 2000).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a large number of Chinese SOEs went into the 
process of privatisation through selling shares to the public on either Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) established in early 1990s. The 
emerging modern corporation era has motivated researchers to focus on pay-
performance relations in Chinese listed firms. Kato and Long (2006) are among the first 
to estimate both the pay-performance sensitivity and pay-performance elasticity for 
Chinese listed firms. They measure executive compensation as the average value of 
total annual cash compensation of the top three highest-paid executives over the period 
1998-2002. Both the pay-performance sensitivity and the pay-performance elasticity are 
statistically significant and positive in Kato and Long (2006), but the relation of pay and 
performance is negatively affected by state ownership.  
Similar to Kato and Long (2006), Firth, Leung, et al. (2010) also measure executive 
compensation as the average compensation of the three highest paid executives, and 
estimate both the pay-performance sensitivity and the pay-performance elasticity 
following Murphy (1999). Using a more updated sample consisting of 4,233 firm-year 
observations during 2000-2005, they find a positive but weak pay-performance relation. 
Specifically, an executive receives an additional 0.0039 Yuan in pay, resulting from a 
1000 Yuan increase in shareholder wealth. This is similar to that in the U.S. in the 
1970s as reported by Murphy (1999). According to Murphy (1999), a 1000 dollars 
increase in shareholder wealth will result in an additional 0.0042 dollars in CEO 
compensation at companies in the U.S. in the 1970s. Unlike Kato and Long (2006), 
Firth, Leung, et al. (2010) do not observe a significantly different pay-performance 
relation between privately-controlled and state-controlled companies. However, the 
relation of compensation and company performance tends to be affected by the 
development of region. According to Firth, Leung, et al. (2010), the pay-performance 
link is slightly weaker for companies located in less developed provinces. 
Consistent with Kato and Long (2006) and Firth, Leung, et al. (2010), Conyon and He 
(2011) defines executive compensation as the average compensation of the top three 
highest paid executives. In contrast to prior literature in the context of China, Conyon 
and He (2011) employ the fixed-effect panel data method to control for heterogeneity in 
47 
 
company and managerial quality. Using a sample of 5,928 firm-year observations 
covering 1,342 Chinese listed companies during the period 2001-2005, Conyon and He 
(2011) find that executive compensation is positively linked to company performance, 
consistent with agency theory and prior literature in the context of China (e.g. Kato & 
Long, 2006; Firth, Leung, et al., 2010). In addition, they observe that ownership 
structure and board composition appear to play important roles in determining the pay-
performance link. Specifically, the pay-performance link is higher at companies with 
more independent directors on the board, and in privately controlled companies 
(Conyon & He, 2011). A comparison of CEO compensation in China and the U.S. is 
also documented in Conyon and He (2011). In particular, the level of CEO cash 
compensation (i.e. salary and bonus) in the U.S. is found to be around seventeen times 
higher than that in China (Conyon & He, 2011). In addition, they find that company 
stock returns tend to have greater influence on CEO compensation in the U.S. than that 
does in China. 
A few studies on the relation of compensation level and company performance in the 
context of China focus on CEOs only. Firth et al. (2006) use two different regression 
models. They regress compensation levels on company performance, and they also 
regress changes in the compensation level on the change in company performance. 
Using a three year sample including 1,647 firm-year observations across 549 firms from 
1998 to 2000, they find a positive pay-performance relation for CEOs at Chinese listed 
firms, but the significance of the pay-performance link depends on the types of the firms’ 
dominant shareholders. To be specific, firms in which a SOE is the dominant 
shareholder tend to tie their CEO’s incentive pay to accounting-based performance, 
whereas firms with a private dominant shareholder prefer the stock market-based 
performance (Firth et al., 2006). In addition, Firth et al. (2006) demonstrate that the pay-
performance relation is weakened if the state agency (e.g. the state asset management 
bureaus and local finance bureaus) is the dominant shareholder.  
Firth et al. (2007) use the same sample to estimate the determinants of CEO 
compensation in Chinese listed companies. However, they employ the longitudinal 
regression rather than the cross-sectional regression in Firth et al. (2006). Firth et al. 
(2007) find that CEO compensation is significantly sensitive to company accounting-
based performance (i.e. ROA), but there is no significant relation between stock return 
and CEO compensation. In addition, companies with the presence of foreign 
shareholders, with a large proportion of non-executive directors, or with separated CEO 
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and board chairman, are more likely to adopt performance-related compensation scheme 
(Firth et al., 2007). 
It is important to know that both Firth et al. (2006) and Firth et al. (2007) use the 
compensation of the highest paid executive in the company as the proxy for CEO 
compensation, without controlling for any personal characteristics. However, one might 
argue that using firm-level data on the highest paid executive might be problematic if 
there is a different individual involved each time (Conyon, Gregg & Machin, 1995; 
Conyon & Sadler, 2001). In addition, Conyon (1997) argues that the definition of the 
highest paid director in company accounts may not be in accordance with the 
theoretically relevant CEO. For instance, a company may have a more highly paid 
chairman and a separate CEO (Conyon, 1997). This problem is eliminated by Conyon 
and He (2012) who employ data on individual CEOs to control for the effects of 
individual CEO’s attributes on compensation levels. Using a sample of 12,144 CEO-
year observations from 2,104 unique publicly traded companies in China from 2000 to 
2010, they find that CEO pay is positively related to both the accounting-based and 
stock market-based performance, but the pay-performance relation is much stronger 
when using accounting-based performance.  
3.3.3 Summary  
In summary, research on the relation of compensation level and company performance 
has been well developed in the U.S. and the U.K. Previous studies normally use a 
reduced-form linear model to estimate an average pay-performance link, and a low pay-
performance relation is found. However, empirical results show that this relationship 
has been strengthened due to the increased use of equity-based compensation. In terms 
of other transitional economies such as China, studies on the pay-performance relation 
are emerging, and seem to be insufficient. Empirical literature in the context of China 
has revealed a positive relation of compensation and performance, based on data either 
on SOEs before the establishment of the stock market (e.g. Groves et al., 1995; 
Mengistae and Xu, 2004) or on publicly traded companies (e.g. Kato and Long, 2006; 
Firth et al., 2006; 2010; Conyon and He, 2011; 2012). In addition, other factors such as 
board characteristics and ownership structure are found to play intervening roles in 
determining the pay-performance relation. In particular, large state ownership, which is 
unique in the context of China, has been found to influence the pay-performance 
relation negatively.  
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Prior literature regarding the pay-performance link in the context of China normally has 
the following features. First of all, a part of early literature is only able to use the firm 
level data. In particular, they either define compensation as the average compensation of 
the top three highest paid executives at each firm (e.g. Kato & Long, 2006; Firth, Leung, 
et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2011) or use the compensation of the highest paid person at 
individual firms to measure CEO compensation (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; 2007), due to the 
early weak compensation disclosure system in China. However, both of them might be 
potentially problematical in estimating pay-performance relation. On one hand, as 
argued by Buck et al. (2008), using average compensation of the top three highest paid 
executives may result in a limited power to estimate the complex pay-performance link, 
as this compensation measurement is lacking variation when compared with individual 
compensation. On the other hand, using the compensation of the highest paid person 
may also be a problem as the actual compensation time series might represent 
compensation to different individuals in different years (Conyon & Sadler, 2001), and 
the highest paid director in the company may not be the actual CEO. For example, a 
company may have a more highly paid chairman and a separate CEO (Conyon, 1997). 
Last but not least, it might be difficult to control for the potential influence of individual 
managerial attributes on compensation when using either the average compensation of 
the top three highest paid executives at each firm or the compensation of the highest 
paid person at individual firms.  
Secondly, a few of studies focus on CEOs only. However, focusing on CEOs alone may 
result in inconclusive results (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002) as companies are run by the 
executive team. As argued by Goldberg and Idson (1995), it might be misleading to let 
the CEO represent the whole executive group since agency effects are not uniform 
across executive groups. Finally, excluding non-CEO executives does not allow 
researchers to estimate how compensation level and pay-performance relation vary 
within an executive team.  
Finally, the potential endogeneity problem resulting from the two-way causality 
between compensation and performance is normally ignored by most studies in the 
context of China. However, ignoring the endogeneity of performance may overestimate 
the effects of performance on pay (Buck et al., 2008). Some studies use one year lagged 
independent variables to ameliorate statistical problems arising from joint endogenous 
determination. However, this solution may lead to precision loss in some cases and the 
interpretation will be a bit more difficult (Shepherd, 2009).  
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This study adds to the compensation literature by filling the research gap mentioned 
above. Firstly, compensation data for individual executives is used in this study. This 
enables the current study to control for the potential influence of individual managerial 
attributes on compensation, and to remove any bias resulting from the measurement 
error of the compensation that might affect estimating the pay-performance relation 
(Conyon & He, 2012). Secondly, it includes executives across different hierarchical 
levels within the company rather than CEOs alone. Including non-CEO executives 
allows this study to control for the different agency effects across executive groups, and 
to observe how pay-performance relation varies with different hierarchical levels. 
Finally, this study attempts to employ valid instrumental variables and the two-stage 
least squares estimator to control for the potential endogenous problem arising from the 
joint determination between compensation and performance. 
3.4 Executive Compensation and Hierarchical Levels: Empirical Studies 
In marked contrast to the large number of empirical papers on pay-performance link 
based on classical principal-agent theory, there have been few empirical studies 
attempting to explain executive compensation from the tournament perspective. 
However, a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that the pattern of incentives 
within companies may be explained by tournament related mechanisms (Conyon & 
Sadler, 2001).  
3.4.1 Empirical Studies in Developed Countries 
Leonard (1990) takes advantage of the survey data of 20,000 executives from 439 large 
U.S. corporations between 1981 and 1985 to examine the role of hierarchical structure 
in determining executive compensation. Leonard (1990) finds that executive 
compensation is highly hierarchically determined. Specifically, compensation of 
executives at flat companies (i.e. with only one subordinate level of management) is 32 
percent lower than executives at hierarchical companies (i.e. with five levels of 
subordinates). In addition, consistent with tournament theory, Leonard (1990) presents 
evidence to suggest that pay differentials across levels are an increasing function of 
organisational hierarchy.  
The evidence that pay differentials between adjacent positon levels increases as one 
moves up the organisational hierarchy found in Leonard (1990) is further supported by 
Lambert et al. (1993). However, Lambert et al. (1993) differ from Leonard (1990) 
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through using a more comprehensive measure of total executive compensation and a 
more comprehensive set of explanatory variables in the regression. Lambert et al. (1993) 
attempted to evaluate the ability of tournament theory to explain levels of executive 
compensation using a sample of executives across four levels of positions (including 
plant manager, divisional CEO, group CEO and corporate CEO) from 303 large 
publicly traded firms in the US during mid-year 1982-1984. They observe that the level 
of executive compensation and hierarchical levels has a convex relationship, as 
predicted by tournament theory. In addition, Lambert et al. (1993) present the evidence 
that the compensation differences between the corporate CEO and vice presidents are an 
increasing function of the number of vice presidents. This empirical evidence supports 
the prediction of tournament theory that the size of the prize should increase with the 
number of contestants. 
The operation of a tournament in the context of U.S. companies is also investigated by 
Main et al. (1993) who use survey data of more than 200 companies from 1980 through 
to 1984. Consistent with Lambert et al. (1993), Main et al. (1993) support the 
tournament theory through observing that moving up in hierarchical levels is associated 
with a marked increase of compensation, and there is a significant positive influence of 
the number of vice-presidents on pay gap between CEO and vice-presidents. 
Specifically, the size of increment in cash compensation is about 138,000 dollars with 
an additional contestant. However, the efficiency of compensation dispersion on 
improving firm performance as predicted by tournament theory receives less support 
from Main et al. (1993). Specifically, compensation dispersion is found to be positively, 
but only weakly, associated with company performance. 
Eriksson (1999) provides a more comprehensive test of multiple predictions of 
tournament theory through estimating the executive compensation in Denmark. Using a 
sample of around 2,600 executives from 210 Danish firms during a four year period 
from 1992 to 1995, Eriksson (1999) provides empirical findings in which almost all of 
them are in support of tournament theory. First of all, he finds that both the 
compensation level and compensation differences increase as one moves up the 
hierarchical levels. In particular, moving from a vice-president to CEO position results 
in a 37.2 percent increase of compensation. In addition, similar to Main et al. (1993), 
Eriksson (1999) provides an empirical result consistent with the prediction of 
tournament theory that there is a positive relationship between the number of 
contestants and the size of prize. Specifically, it is found that the wage spread becomes 
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larger if the number of managers considered to have significant responsibilities in the 
firm is getting larger. Eriksson (1999) also finds that larger pay dispersion exists at 
companies with that experience higher degrees of volatility in sales. However, in 
contrast to Main et al. (1993), Eriksson (1999) observes that larger managerial pay 
differentials significantly improve company performance.  
Following prior literature (e.g. Main et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999), Conyon et al. (2001) 
constructs the first study on the operation of tournaments in the context of U.K. In 
contrast to prior studies on executive compensation from tournament perspective, 
Conyon et al. (2001) measure the total executive compensation through combining cash 
compensation with the Black-Scholes valuation of stock option grants. Using a sample 
of a hundred U.K. companies during the period 1997-1998, Conyon et al. (2001) test all 
three predictions of tournament theory. First of all, it supports the tournament theory 
prediction that pay differentials between adjacent levels increase as an executive moves 
up the hierarchical levels. Specifically, Conyon et al. (2001) find that moving from the 
division CEO position to the corporate CEO means approximately a 60 percent increase 
in compensation level. In addition, consistent with tournament theory and prior 
literature, Conyon et al. (2001) observe that the tournament prize gap is increased by 
about 3.5 percent with one additional contestant. However, Conyon et al. (2001) do not 
find empirical evidence to support tournament theory’s prediction that compensation 
variation positively affects firm performance. They explain that the absence of such 
empirical support might be because of the exclusion of the measure of executive 
interdependence. 
The operation of tournament theory tends to be moderated by other factors. Vieito 
(2012) indicates that tournament theory is predominant in firms managed by males. 
Specifically, he finds that the total compensation gap between the CEO and vice-
presidents tends to be larger at companies managed by a male CEO than companies 
managed by a female CEO.  
Although a number of studies has offered strong empirical evidence in favour of a 
tournament model, some scholars question the use of tournament mechanisms in 
providing incentives for executives. One of the limitations of tournament model is that 
the interdependent work among executives may result in potential collusions to mitigate 
executives’ effort levels. As argued by Eriksson (1999), the senior executives within a 
company normally perform highly interdependent work through working as a team. 
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This may in turn lead to potential collusion among tournament contestants to reduce 
their effort levels (Dye, 1984). Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) argue that the single-
period tournaments framework produced by Lazear and Rosen (1981) masks many of 
the complexities and inherent disadvantages of actual promotion systems. For instance, 
the promotion-based incentive system depends on the probability of promotion which, 
in turn, depends on the identity and expected horizon of the incumbent superior, and it 
also requires organisational growth to feed the reward system (Baker et al., 1988).  
Empirical evidence also shows that tournament predictions regarding executive 
compensation may not be supported in real firms. As the pioneers who empirically test 
the tournament theory, O'Reilly III et al. (1988) estimate the operation of a tournament 
model in determining CEO compensation. Using data on 105 Fortune 500 firms, they 
find that CEO compensation is negatively influenced by the number of vice presidents, 
exactly the opposite to the prediction of tournament theory. 
The test of tournament theory conducted by Main et al. (1993) is re-examined by 
Bognanno (2001) who takes advantage of individual executives at more than 600 U.S. 
companies for eight years between 1981 and 1988. Consistent with Main et al. (1993) 
and the predictions of tournament theory, Bognanno (2001) finds that a large reward is 
associated with promotion to a higher position level within the same firm. However, the 
additional evidence that promoted executives appear to be compensated above average 
in their level before promotion challenges the tournament explanation of CEO 
compensation (Bognanno, 2001). In addition, Bognanno (2001) observes that both the 
level of CEO compensation and the compensation gaps between CEO and vice-
presidents increase with the number of competitors, but decrease with the square of the 
number of competitors, contradicting the prediction of the tournament model that the 
size of the winner’s prize should increase with the number of competitors.  
The tournament related literature reviewed above has been focusing on the relationship 
between compensation level and hierarchical levels, the effects of the number of 
contestants on prize size, the influence of pay dispersion on firm performance, and the 
role of other factors in intervening the validity of tournament. However, as the within-
firm variation in compensation level predicted by tournament theory, compensation 
structure may also vary among different hierarchical levels for the following reasons. 
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First of all, as argued by Gibbs (1995), within-job pay for performance
8
 should vary 
individualistically with differences in promotion opportunities. Specifically, to 
compensate for the lost promotion opportunities at higher hierarchical levels, 
compensation needs to be tied more closely to company performance (i.e. greater 
financial incentives) to provide an incentive for effort (Ortín-Angel & Salas-Fumás, 
1998; Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Boschmans, 2008). In addition, executive hierarchical 
level plays an important role in explaining compensation structures because the 
importance of decision making differs across executive hierarchical levels within the 
company (Barron & Waddell, 2003; Ederhof, 2011). Finally, financial incentives and 
internal labour markets are viewed as complements in which bonus payments increase 
upward alongside the hierarchical level within a company (Kräkel & Schöttner, 2012; 
Grund & Kräkel, 2012).  
Early empirical studies have been focusing on the relationship between bonus payments 
and promotion opportunities through combining agency theory and internal labour 
market theories. Gibbs (1995) presents a model that shows how the firm trades off the 
within-job pay for performance incentives and promotion-based incentives. In particular, 
the model predicts that with-job pay for performance will be smaller at hierarchical 
levels in which the promotion opportunities are important. Using personnel data on 
managerial employees ranging from entry management (i.e. Level 1) to CEO level 
(Level 8) at a typical large hierarchical company during the period 1969-1988, Gibbs 
(1995) attempts to test whether the likelihood of receiving a bonus and the size of the 
bonus vary with hierarchical levels. However, he does not find much support for the 
prediction that firms design individual incentive schemes to balance within-job 
incentive compensation and promotion incentives.  
Using the model proposed by Gibbs (1995), Ortín-Angel and Salas-Fumás (1998) 
employ a sample of 6,957 top and middle managers from 475 companies in Spain to test 
two predictions related to the relation of bonus payment and hierarchical levels. First of 
all, Ortín-Angel and Salas-Fumás (1998) argue that as the opportunities for further 
promotion are diminished at higher hierarchical levels, the size of bonus should increase 
as the hierarchical level rises. In addition, the costs of supervision tend to be higher at 
higher hierarchical levels because managerial tasks become less programmable and less 
structural as one moves up to the higher hierarchical level (Calvo & Welliz, 1979). 
                                                          
8
 Gibbs (1995) refers to 'within-job' rewards as merit raises and bonuses earned in the current job when 
there is no promotion. 
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Accordingly, managers at higher hierarchical levels tend to have a higher probability of 
receiving a bonus. Both predictions are supported in Ortín-Angel and Salas-Fumás 
(1998). 
Based on the multi-stage tournament model in Rosen (1986), Ekinci (2011) develops a 
dynamic tournament model which offers a rationale for why bonuses increase with 
hierarchical level. According to Ekinci (2011), bonuses increase with hierarchical levels 
because returns to effort increase with job level and pay tied to performance increases 
with returns to effort. In order to test the dynamic tournament model’s prediction that 
bonuses paid to workers of the same age group increase with hierarchical levels, Ekinci 
(2011) employs the personnel data previously used in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
(1994) and Gibbs (1995). Specifically, the sample consists of 6,809 individual-year 
observations at a hierarchical company in the financial services industry in the U.S. 
during the period 1969-1988. Ekinci (2011) produces empirical evidence to support the 
dynamic tournament model’s prediction that bonuses increase as one climbs up the 
hierarchical level. Specifically, bonuses increase by 33 percent if one moves up to one 
level above, and the differentials of bonuses increase dramatically at higher levels. In 
particular, bonuses at the highest hierarchical level are 267 percent higher than that at 
the bottom level. 
The positive relationship between bonus pay and hierarchical level is also supported by 
Grund and Kräkel (2012) who employ two measures of the intensity of bonus pay: 
1.  Whether an executive has a bonus contract or not;  
2. The fraction of bonus of an executive’s total annual compensation (i.e. bonus 
income relative to total compensation).  
Using a sample consisting of highly qualified professionals and executive staff from the 
German chemical industry, Grund and Kräkel (2012) find that executives at higher 
hierarchical level are more likely to have a bonus contract, and the fraction of bonus 
payments in total annual compensation is greater at higher executive position hierarchy.  
In order to investigate how pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) varies across executives 
at different position hierarchies within the firm, Conyon and Sadler (2001) utilise a 
sample consisting of 532 executives at a hundred large listed companies in the U.K. in 
the fiscal year 1997 and compute the aggregate PPS for each of the 532 executives 
separately. The empirical results in Conyon and Sadler (2001) show that executives at 
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the highest hierarchical level (i.e., Level 1) have higher PPS than executives at the 
second highest hierarchical level (i.e., Level 2), indicating that financial incentives 
increase with hierarchical levels.  
Using a sample of 76,977 executive-year observations at publicly traded companies in 
the U.S. between 1992 and 2000, Barron and Waddell (2003) find that as an executive 
moves up in hierarchical level within the same firm, compensation becomes more 
incentive-based. To be specific, the proportion of total compensation that is incentive-
based is increased by 49.1 percent as an executive moves from the bottom hierarchical 
level to the top level within the same firm. Barron and Waddell (2003) also observe that 
the incentive pay becomes more equity-based as one is promoted to a higher 
hierarchical level. In particular, moving from the bottom hierarchical level to the top 
level within the same firm increases the proportion of incentive pay that is equity-based 
by 70.9 percent. 
The complementary relationship between implicit promotion-based incentives and 
explicit incentive contracts is also found by Ederhof (2011) who used a sample of 1,151 
mid-level managers from fourteen countries largely for the year 2008. He shows that the 
incentives provided by the company’s bonus plan are stronger for managers at higher 
hierarchical levels. Ederhof (2011) also finds that executives facing weaker implicit 
incentives from getting promoted to the next level or the top of the organisation have 
less bonus-based incentives. 
3.4.2 Empirical Studies in China 
Studies on the role of the tournament in explaining executive compensation in China are 
rather limited. However, Lin et al. (2011) argue that it is of importance to test whether 
Chinese listed firms have started to design an executive compensation structure as seen 
in developed economies because the development of a managerial labour market is 
critical to a market-oriented economy.  
Lin et al. (2011) are among the first to comprehensively examine the operation of 
tournament theory in the context of China. Using a sample of 17,178 individuals 
(including executives, non-executive directors and members on the supervisory board) 
from 1,386 publicly listed companies in China during 1999–2006, Lin et al. (2011) 
provide empirical evidence to support predictions of the tournament theory. First of all, 
Lin et al. (2011) observe that compensation is an increasing function of hierarchical 
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levels. In addition, there is a skewed distribution towards the top of the firm, with the 
pay gap between the first level and the second level being the largest (Lin et al., 2011). 
Moreover, they find that the size of the compensation differentials between the first 
level and the second level increases with the number of contestants. Finally, in Lin et al. 
(2011), compensation dispersion is found to positively affect company performance.  
As mentioned early, Lin et al. (2011) put together executives, non-executive directors 
and supervisors in their sample. However, Chen et al. (2011) argue that the key 
predictions of tournament theory pertain to executives who make decisions, rather than 
non-executive directors who are supposed to only offer advice and supervision. 
Therefore, Chen et al. (2011) further test the predictions of the tournament model by 
focusing on executives only. Using compensation data for individual executives from 
Chinese listed companies during the period 1999-2009, Chen et al. (2011) find that 
there is a convex relationship between the level of compensation and the level of 
hierarchy. In addition, company performance is found to be positively influenced by 
compensation differentials. However, Chen et al. (2011) do not observe a direct 
relationship between the size of tournament prize and the number of contestants.  
Although the operation tournament in Chinese listed companies has been partly 
supported by empirical evidences, prior literature has shown that the validity of a 
tournament model is moderated by other factors which might be unique or emerging in 
China. In particular, ownership structure and enriched managerial power during the 
economic reform have significant effects on the efficiency of tournament related 
incentives.  
Using data covering more than 900 Chinese listed firms from 1998 to 2002, Kato and 
Long (2011) attempt to examine whether a promotion tournament serves as a potentially 
important incentive mechanism for executives in the context of China. In particular, 
they estimate whether ownership structure moderately influences three previously-tested 
predictions of tournament model. Kato and Long (2011) observe that the sensitivity of 
the size of prize to the number of the contestants is significantly greater at companies 
which have less state ownership. They also find that firms with a lower proportion of 
shares owned by the state have higher sensitivity of the prize size to the market 
volatility (measured by the coefficient of variation of sales over the last three years). 
Finally, the positive effect of compensation dispersion on company performance is 
found to be greater in companies that are less state-controlled.  
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The moderation effects of state ownership on validity of tournament theory are also 
supported by Chen et al. (2011) who employ compensation data of individual 
executives rather than the aggregate remuneration used in Kato and Long (2011). To be 
specific, Chen et al. (2011) find that pay differences between adjacent hierarchical 
levels are reduced by higher state ownership. In addition, consistent with Kato and Long 
(2011), Chen et al. (2011) observe that the relationship between the size of the prize and 
the number of contestants is significantly weaker in companies which are more state-
owned, and higher state ownership also mitigate the positive influence of compensation 
dispersion on company performance. As suggested by Kato and Long (2011), the 
negative influences of state ownership on the validity of tournament theory point to the 
necessity of ownership restructuring in the transitional economies, in order to develop 
efficient modernised corporations.  
Managerial power is also shown to have an effect on the operation of the tournament 
model in Chinese listed firms. Lin and Lu (2009) use three dummy variables to measure 
managerial power: whether CEO and the board chairman is the same person, whether a 
CEO have been in charge prior to IPO and four years after IPO, and whether the 
ownership of the largest shareholder is lower than the ownership of the remaining top 
ten shareholders. Using a sample of 3,110 firm-year observations in China between 
2001 and 2004, they find that companies with greater managerial power appear to have 
a larger compensation gap between the average pay for the top three highest paid 
executives and the average pay for the remaining senior executives. Lin and Lu (2009) 
also suggest that the positive effect of a compensation gap on firm performance is 
stronger at firms with higher managerial power, although managerial power itself has a 
negative effect on firm performance.  
3.4.3 Summary 
Tournament theory views an internal compensation scheme as a series of tournaments 
in which executives compete against one another at a given hierarchical level. The 
winner of the tournament is promoted to a higher hierarchical level and gets higher 
compensation associated with the promotion (Rosen, 1986). In particular, the higher 
compensation at higher hierarchical levels is to compensate for the lost promotion 
opportunities (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).  
Studies on the operation of the tournament in the context of executive compensation are 
relatively limited, compared with the extensive literature based on the classical 
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principal-agent theory. Within the limited literature, there are few empirical studies of 
China. Although empirical results regarding the operation of the tournament in the 
context of executive compensation are mixed, there have been a growing number of 
studies which provide empirical evidence in favour of predictions of the tournament 
model. Specifically, prior literature has been focusing on the following predictions of a 
tournament model:  
1. First of all, executive compensation should be an increasing function of 
hierarchical level (e.g. Lambert et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999; Conyon & Sadler, 
2001; Lin et al., 2011), and the increases of compensation and hierarchical level 
have a convex relationship (e.g. Main et al., 1993; Lambert et al., 1993; Conyon 
et al., 2011); 
2.  Secondly, the size of tournament prize should increase with the number of 
competitors (e.g. Eriksson, 1999; Main et al., 1993; Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Lin 
et al., 2011);  
3. Thirdly, compensation differentials among top executives should provide 
effective incentives to improve corporate performance (e.g. Main et al., 1993; 
Eriksson, 1999; Lin et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011).  
Other factors such as gender (Vieito, 2012), ownership structure (Kato & Long, 2011; 
Chen et al., 2011), and managerial power (Lin & Lu, 2009) are also found to play an 
intervening role in the operation of tournament in real companies.  
In contrast to the variation of compensation levels across various hierarchical levels, 
prior literature has theoretically and empirically suggested that compensation structure 
also varies across hierarchical levels (e.g. Gibbs, 1995; Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Barron 
& Waddell, 2003; Ederhof, 2011; Kräkel & Schöttner, 2012), but none related to the 
context of China.  
This study attempts to fill the research gap in two ways. First of all, it employs more 
complete and updated data on individual executives to test whether executive 
compensation is an increasing function of position hierarchy with the listed companies 
in China. In particular, it differs from Lin et al. (2011) by focusing on executives only. 
It is also different from Chen et al. (2011) as this study classifies the hierarchical levels 
depending on executives’ position titles and responsibilities, whereas Chen et al. (2011) 
classify the hierarchical levels based on executive’s compensation level. In addition, as 
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the variation of compensation structure across hierarchical levels in the context of China 
has been omitted by prior literature, this study is a preliminary step in the direction of 
filling this gap by estimating how the pay-performance link and the adoption of equity-
based compensation vary across executive hierarchical levels. 
3.5 Executive Compensation and Remuneration Committee: Empirical Studies 
Previous studies have examined the role of the remuneration committee in determining 
executive compensation level and structure. Although a group of studies argue that the 
remuneration committee should enhance corporate governance effectiveness through 
assisting in the board of directors’ monitoring and designing compensation scheme 
benefiting for mitigating interest-conflicts between managers and shareholders and 
reducing agency costs (e.g. Newman & Mozes, 1999; Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Sun & 
Cahan, 2009), the managerial power perspective argues that executives can get their 
favourable compensation packages by taking advantage of their power to influence the 
remuneration committee in setting a compensation plan (e.g. Conyon & He, 2004; 
O’Reilly et al., 1988). In particular, managerial power to influence over compensation 
settings is closely related to the makeup of the remuneration committee itself (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2004). Does prior literature show that the remuneration committee indeed 
aligns with executives as predicted by the managerial power model or does it work for 
the best interests of shareholders to design an optimal contract?  
3.5.1 Empirical Studies in Developed Countries 
The recommendations regarding the presence of the remuneration committee and its 
composition by the Cadbury Report (1992) motivate a number of researchers to test the 
practical role of the remuneration committee in determining executive compensation in 
U.K. companies. Main and Johnston (1993) test the influence of the remuneration 
committee on executive compensation levels and structure in a sample of 220 large 
publicly traded companies in the U.K. in 1990. The empirical evidence obtained from 
cross-sectional analysis shows that the highest paid directors in companies with the 
presence of a reported remuneration committee receive compensation which is 21 
percent higher than those in companies without a remuneration committee. However, 
the declared existence of the remuneration committee does not seem to play a 
significant role in increasing the proportion of total compensation which is in the form 
of stock options for the highest paid directors. In addition, both the compensation level 
and pay structure are not significantly influenced by whether the highest paid director 
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holds the remuneration committee membership, according to Main and Johnston (1993). 
In contrast, using a sample of 213 large U.K. listed companies during the period 1988-
1993, Conyon (1997) observe that top executives at companies with the presence of the 
remuneration committee tend to have lower growth rates of compensation. To be 
specific, the empirical results of first difference regression show that pay growth 
appears to be about 2.6 percent lower in companies which have adopted a remuneration 
committee during the sample period.   
Using a sample of publicly traded companies from the U.K. Financial Times Top 100 
companies, Conyon and Peck (1998) examine the role of the remuneration committee in 
shaping top management compensation via the panel data econometric technique. In 
addition to the effects of the adoption of the remuneration committee which has been 
tested by prior British literature, they also estimate whether the composition of the 
remuneration committee affects top management compensation. Following prior 
literature in the U.K. (e.g. Main & Johnston, 1993; Conyon, 1997), Conyon and Peck 
(1998) measure compensation as the total cash compensation including salary, bonus, 
and other earnings of the highest paid director within a company. Consistent with Main 
and Johnston (1993), Conyon and Peck (1998) observe that executives in companies 
with the remuneration committee appear to obtain higher compensation. In addition, the 
pay-performance link is stronger in companies in which a higher proportion of outside 
directors are on the remuneration committee (Conyon & Peck, 1998).  
The U.S. government intervention in designing remuneration committee structure 
through a series of regulatory reforms in the early 1990s motivates more researchers to 
focus on the relation of remuneration committee independence and executive 
compensation. Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton (1998) extend prior compensation 
literature by employing various measurements of the remuneration committee 
characteristics (including the proportion of affiliate directors, the proportion of 
interdependent directors, and the proportion of external CEOs on the remuneration 
committee) and multiple measures of compensation (including absolute pay levels, 
changes in pay, and pay ratios) to estimate the role of the remuneration committee in 
shaping CEO compensation. Using a sample of 194 U.S. publicly traded companies 
from the 1992 Fortune 500, they do not find a close relationship between CEO 
compensation and the composition of the remuneration committee. This empirical 
finding is robust to different measures of CEO compensation. Therefore, Daily et al. 
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(1998) suggest that certain types of directors such as affiliated and interdependent 
directors might be less likely to effectively execute obligations to shareholders. 
Newman and Mozes (1999) explore the relationship between the composition of the 
remuneration committee and CEO compensation practice in a sample of 161 listed 
companies from the 1992 Fortune 250. They observe that the pay-performance link for 
CEOs in companies with the insider-influenced remuneration committee (i.e. at least 
one insider serving on the remuneration committee) is weaker than that in companies 
with the outsider-influenced remuneration committee (i.e. no insiders serving on the 
remuneration committee), although they do not find significant differences of pay levels 
between those two groups of companies.  
Using a fourteen-year panel data including 1,376 firm-year observations in the U.S. 
between 1995 and 1998, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) also examine the influence of 
remuneration committee independence on CEO compensation. The empirical results of 
the two-way fixed-effect (i.e. industry fixed-effect and time fixed-effect) model indicate 
that both the compensation level and the pay-performance sensitivity are unrelated to 
the independence of the remuneration committee, but CEO ownership is greater when 
insiders serve on the remuneration committee. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) also expect 
lower levels of fixed pay, greater levels of equity-based pay, and closer pay-
performance link after CEO comes off the remuneration committee. However, those are 
not empirically supported.  
Vafeas (2003) further examines the relation of insider membership on the remuneration 
committee and CEO compensation using more than 1,500 firm-year observations for 
271 U.S. companies from 1991 to 1997. In contrast to Newman and Mozes (1999), who 
find that CEOs in companies with an insider-influenced remuneration committee have a 
weaker pay-performance link than those in companies with an outsider-influenced 
remuneration committee, Vafeas (2003) observes small differences in CEO pay level 
and pay-performance sensitivity between those two groups. However, significant 
differences are found before the reforms, given the regulatory reforms by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Specifically, Vafeas (2003) finds that before the reforms, companies with insiders’ 
participation in the remuneration committee provide more fixed compensation and less 
contingent compensation for CEOs, but for these companies, the pay-performance 
sensitivity and the proportion of contingent pay both increase after the reforms.  
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Using a sample of U.S. firms between 1998 and 2003, Conyon (2006) tests the relation 
of the involvement of affiliated directors in a remuneration committee and CEO 
compensation. Inconsistent with a managerial power based prediction that affiliated 
directors are more likely to set compensation more favourable to executives rather than 
shareholders, Conyon (2006) does not observe a relation between CEO compensation 
and the remuneration committee with affiliated directors. Specifically, both the level of 
total compensation and the aggregate incentive-based compensation are not influenced 
by affiliated directors’ participation in the remuneration committee.  
Most of the literature reviewed above examines the relation of the remuneration 
committee and executive compensation using data on large established companies. 
Conyon and He (2004) extended the literature by focusing on entrepreneurial companies. 
In particular, using a sample of 1,605 firm-year observations from more than 400 
entrepreneurial companies during the period 1998-2001, they tested the effects of the 
remuneration committee on CEO compensation by contrasting the three-tier agency 
theory and the managerial power model. According to Conyon and He (2004), the three-
tier agency theory argues that the principal (e.g. shareholders) delegate monitoring 
authority to a separate supervisor (e.g. the remuneration committee) who evaluates the 
agent (e.g. executives), and whether the remuneration committee works in the best 
interest of shareholders or colludes with the CEO depends on whether the remuneration 
committee’s interests are more tightly tied to those of shareholders or executives. The 
three-tier agency theory is supported in their study. Specifically, Conyon and He (2004) 
observe that the presence of large shareholders on the remuneration committee leads to 
lower total compensation and higher equity incentives for CEOs, whereas the 
remuneration committee with higher paid members is associated with higher total 
compensation and lower equity-based incentives for CEOs. However, insiders or CEOs 
from other companies serving on the remuneration committee is not found to be 
associated with a higher level of total compensation and lower equity-based incentives 
for CEOs, indicating that the managerial power model is not supported in Conyon and 
He (2004). 
More recently, Boyle and Roberts (2013) examine the influence of CEO-involved 
remuneration committee on CEO compensation in a sample of 447 firm-year 
observations covering 114 listed firms in New Zealand during the period 1998–2005. 
Inconsistent with the managerial power theory’s prediction that CEO membership on 
the remuneration committee leads to rent extraction by self-serving executives, Boyle 
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and Roberts (2013) observe that CEOs at firms with CEO-involved remuneration 
committee experience annual pay increments which are around 4 percent less CEOs at 
other companies.  
Sun and Cahan (2009) extend the literature by conducting a more comprehensive study 
on the effect of remuneration committee quality on the association between CEO cash 
compensation and accounting performance. In particular, the remuneration committee 
quality is measured by a composite score related to six characteristics of the committee.  
To be specific, the six characteristics of the remuneration committee include CEO 
appointed directors, senior directors (i.e. directors with more board experience), CEO 
directorship, director shareholdings, additional directorships, and the committee size 
(Sun & Cahan, 2009).  Using a sample of 812 U.S. listed companies with remuneration 
committees consisting solely of independent directors in 2001, Sun and Cahan (2009) 
find that the pay-performance sensitivity is more positive for CEOs at companies in 
which the remuneration committee quality is higher. However, the positive influence of 
the remuneration committee quality on pay-performance sensitivity is alleviated by 
greater growth opportunities and loss-making.  
3.5.2 Empirical Studies in China 
In contrast to the extensive literature focusing on companies in developed countries, 
there are limited studies on the relation of the remuneration committee and executive 
compensation plans in the context of China, due to the limited data availability. Zhu et 
al. (2009) are among the first to estimate the effect of the remuneration committee on 
executive compensation plans in China. In their conference paper, Zhu et al. (2009) 
suggest that board independence and the presence of the remuneration committee jointly 
influence CEO compensation. Specifically, using a sample of Chinese manufacturing 
firms during 2001-2007, they find that in companies with the remuneration committee, 
compensation and company performance are more aligned when the proportion of 
independent directors on the board is larger. However, the proportion of independent 
directors serving on the remuneration committee is not found to have any impacts on 
the pay-performance link for CEOs (Zhu et al., 2009).  
Later studies are confined to the presence of the remuneration committee. Using a 
sample of 5,928 firm-year observations from 1,342 Chinese listed companies from 2001 
to 2005, Conyon and He (2011) demonstrate that the presence of the remuneration 
committee is associated with a higher level compensation for executives. Specifically, 
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executives in companies with the remuneration committee are paid approximately ten 
percent more than executives in companies without the remuneration committee. 
Similar results are found by Conyon and He (2012) using a sample of 2,104 companies 
with 12,144 CEO-year observations during the period 2005-2010. According to Conyon 
and He (2012), the empirical results obtained from the OLS regression show that CEO 
compensation is about 10 percent higher in companies which have adopted the 
remuneration committee, but the results are not robust to the fixed-effect estimator. 
Conyon and He (2012) also observe that CEOs in companies with the remuneration 
committee are more likely to receive equity incentives. 
3.5.3 Summary 
Prior literature has estimated the relation of the presence of the remuneration committee 
and executive compensation in developed countries, but the results are mixed. On one 
hand, some researchers find that executives in companies with the remuneration 
committee appear to get higher compensation (Main & Johnston, 1993; Conyon & Peck, 
1998). On the other hand, companies with the remuneration committees are found to 
have lower growth rates of executive compensation (Conyon, 1997). In addition, prior 
studies provide inconclusive results on the influence of remuneration committee 
composition on pay-performance link. Some scholars observe that the remuneration 
committee which is more independent is associated with stronger pay-performance link 
(e.g. Newman & Mozes, 1999; Conyon & Peck, 1998), while others do not find a 
significant relation (e.g. Daily et al., 1998; Conyon & He, 2004; Conyon, 2006).  
Studies on the effect of the remuneration committee on executive compensation in the 
context of China are rather limited. In particular, most studies are confined to the 
presence of remuneration committee due to the data availability. Although Zhu et al. 
(2009) test the relation of remuneration committee independence and pay-performance 
link in China, their study focuses on CEOs in manufacturing companies. In addition, 
none of the studies relate the remuneration committee composition to managerial power. 
This study attempts to extend the literature by estimating the influence of remuneration 
committee composition on executive compensation in Chinese listed companies from 
the managerial power perspective. In particular, it measures executives’ power to 
influence the remuneration committee from the following two aspects: the proportion of 
non-independent directors on the remuneration committee, and the size of the 
remuneration committee.  
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3.6 Equity-based Compensation and Company Performance: Empirical Studies  
Executive compensation was mainly in the form of cash in the U.S. in the 1980s (Hall 
& Liebman 1998). According to Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003), there were only 30 
percent of CEOs receiving new option grants in 1980s. Equity-based compensation 
became more and more pervasive in the 1990s, with 70 percent of CEOs receiving new 
option grants by 1994 (Core et al., 2003). The dramatic increase in the use of equity 
incentive in executive compensation portfolio in the U.S. in 1990s has attracted much 
attention of scholars. However, there has not been a consensus on the performance 
consequence of equity incentives.  
3.6.1 Empirical Studies in Developed Countries 
The question regarding the efficiency of equity-based compensation offered to 
executives and directors has generated considerable controversy, due to the financial 
scandals over the past few decades. Although prior literature (e.g. Baker et al., 1988) 
has theoretically suggested that equity-based compensation could flourish company 
performance, the existing empirical findings are conflicting.  
A measurable body of literature finds a positive relation between equity-based 
compensation and company performance, consistent with the efficiency of equity 
incentives predicted by the economic theories. Using a sample of 153 randomly-selected 
manufacturing companies in the U.S. from 1979-1980, Mehran (1995) indicate that 
companies in which the percentage of executive equity-based compensation is greater 
tend to produce higher performance (measured by Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets).  
Using data on listed companies in the U.S in 1990s, Frye (2004) provides a more 
comprehensive estimation by testing the efficiency of equity-based compensation 
granted to all employees, rather than just executives. He divides the sample period into 
two parts: 1992-1994 and 1997-1999. For both sample periods, it is found that 
companies with a greater proportion of equity-based compensation for employees have 
the higher Tobin’ Q (Frye, 2004). However, different results are observed when 
performance is measured by accounting returns (i.e. ROA). Specifically, Frye (2004) 
finds that greater use of equity-based compensation results in better ROA in the earlier 
sample period, but for the later sample period, the relation becomes negative.  
In addition to the proportion of executive compensation that is equity-based, the value 
of granted stock option also seems to be associated with better future performance. 
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Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) test how the Black-Scholes’ value of stock 
options granted to the top five executives relates to future operating earnings, on the 
basis of 2,627 firm-year observations covering 1,069 firms from 1997 to 2000. The 
empirical results indicate that stock option grants result in the large increase of future 
operating income, strongly consistent with incentive alignment (Hanlon et al., 2003).  
The adoption of equity-based compensation tends to provide financial incentives for 
external directors, not just executives. Based on a sample of Fortune 1000 companies 
from 1997 to 1999, Fich and Shivdasani (2005) observe that the presence of outside 
directors stock option compensation indeed improves company performance in the U.S. 
Specifically, the market-to-book ratio and several accounting-based performance 
measures (i.e. return on assets, return on sales, and asset turnover) are higher in 
companies with the presence of stock option compensation for outside directors. In 
addition, the presence of outside directors stock option compensation produces positive 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Finally, the event study by Fich and Shivdasani 
(2005) shows that stock price has a significantly negative reaction to the appointments 
of independent directors without stock option compensation. 
Although a positive influence has been observed by a number of studies, some scholars 
argue that there is no simple ex-ante relationship between equity incentives and 
company performance because higher (lower) percentage of executive equities might be 
predicted and observed in companies where more (less) monitoring is required (Core et 
al., 2003). This perspective is empirically supported by Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker 
(2003), who examine both the accounting and stock-based performance consequences 
of equity-based compensation in new economic firms. Similar to Core and Guay (1999), 
Ittner et al. (2003) begin with a model to test the determinants of equity grants, and then 
regress the subsequent performance on the residuals estimated from that model. 
Specifically, positive (negative) residuals represent equity grants which are higher 
(lower) than predicted. Using survey data consisting of 217 new and unique economy 
firms in the U.S. during the period 1998-1999, Ittner et al. (2003) indicate that the 
subsequent accounting performance is lower when option grants for to CEOs, directors, 
and technical employees are lower than expected. In addition, lower than expected 
option grants by top five executives is associated with both higher accounting-based 
performance and stock returns. However, greater than expected equity grants have little 
influence on future performance. 
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Denis, Hanouna, and Sarin (2006) argue that equity-based compensation has a dark side. 
Using a sample consisting of 358 U.S. companies with fraud allegations between 1993 
and 2002, Denis et al. (2006) find that the likelihood of securities fraud allegations is 
greater at companies in which the option intensity of the CEO’s compensation is larger. 
Specifically, option intensity is defined as the sensitivity of the value of the executive 
stock option portfolio to changes in the company stock price. 
3.6.2 Empirical Studies in China 
Prior studies commonly focus on western countries, while studies on the influence of 
equity-based compensation on company performance in the context of China is far from 
sufficient and conclusive. One of important reasons might be the use of equity 
incentives in executive compensation portfolio is not as extensive as it would be in 
western countries. As mentioned before, there has been 70 percent of CEOs receiving 
new option grants by 1994 (Core et al., 2003). In contrast, the adoption of equity-based 
compensation just formally started in China in early 2006. In addition, the relatively 
weaker compensation disclosure system in China, although it has been improved, forms 
the obstacle to investigate the equity-based compensation.  
So far, Lian et al. (2010) might be the only study on the effectiveness of equity 
incentives plans on company performance in China. Lian et al. (2010) divide the sample 
into two groups. The treatment group includes Chinese companies which have adopted 
equity-based compensation in 2006 and 2007, and the control group consists of matched 
companies which have not adopted equity-based compensation during the same period. 
They then analyse the performance of those companies in 2008 and 2009. The empirical 
results of the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) in Lian et al. (2010) 
suggest that company accounting-based performance is improved by the adoption of 
equity incentives. Yet, the effectiveness is greater in private companies than in state-
owned firms. In addition, the effectiveness is stronger in companies with more 
diversified ownership. Finally, stock option incentive is more effective than other types 
of equity incentives in improving company performance. 
3.6.3 Summary 
Prior literature has not reached a consensus on the effects of equity incentives on 
company performance, although equity incentives are predicted to motivate executives 
to maximise shareholder value by the principal-agent theory (Core & Guay, 1999; Hall 
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& Murphy, 2003). On one hand, a measurable body of literature find a positive 
association between equity incentives and company performance to support the 
efficiency of equity incentives (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Frye, 2004; Core & Larcker, 2002; 
Fich & Shivdasani, 2005; Lian et al., 2011). On the other hand, it has been found that 
equity incentives have little influence on improving company performance (e.g. Ittner et 
al., 2003), and even has the dark side (Denis et al., 2006).   
In addition, prior studies on performance consequences of equity incentives have been 
focusing on western countries, whereas related literature focusing on Chinese listed 
companies is extremely limited. This study has a great incentive to empirically estimate 
the causal effects of the adoption of equity-based compensation on company 
performance for Chinese listed firms, given the inconclusive findings in this area and 
the insufficient studies in the context of China. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews three important theories in the field of executive compensation, 
namely the classical principal-agent theory, the tournament theory, and the managerial 
power theory. As a dominant theory in executive compensation literature, the principal-
agent model argues that executive compensation should be tied to performance to 
mitigate agency problem resulting from the potential interest-conflicts and the 
asymmetric information between executives and shareholders. However, the economic 
constraint of the classical principal-agent theory motivates scholars to consider the role 
of non-economic factors in explaining executive compensation. Two emerging theories 
have captured much attention. The tournament theory supplements to the agency theory 
through taking account of the role of hierarchical levels in explaining executive 
compensation. In contrast, the managerial power theory views executive compensation 
as a potential agency problem itself as managers may use their power to influence 
compensation plans to achieve rent extraction.  
There have been extensive studies on the relation of compensation level and company 
performance drawing from the principal-agent theory (e.g. Murphy, 1985; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995). However, the relatively weaker pay-performance link 
observed motivates researchers to explore other determinants of executive 
compensation. A number of studies have been focusing on the relation of hierarchy 
levels and the level of compensation (e.g. Lambert et al., 1993; Eriksson, 1999), and a 
limited number of studies capture how compensation structure varies with hierarchy 
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levels (e.g. Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Ekinci, 2011; Grund & Kräkel, 2012). The role of 
the remuneration committee in determining executive compensation has also been tested 
in developed countries (e.g. Main & Johnston, 1993; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Newman & 
Mozes, 1999; Conyon, 2006), although the results are inconclusive. Finally, consistent 
with the principal-agent theory, prior literature has provided empirical evidences to 
support the effectiveness of equity-based compensation in improving company 
performance (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Frye, 2004). 
In contrast to the plentiful literature in developed countries, executive compensation 
literature on China is less sufficient. Like studies in developed countries, the majority of 
studies in the context of China are rooted in the classical principal-agent theory and 
focus on the relation of compensation level and company performance. Although a 
positive pay-performance link has been observed in China (e.g. Conyon & He, 2011), 
the positive relation is found to be weak (e.g. Firth, Leung, et al., 2010), to be more 
robust to accounting-based performance (e.g. Conyon & He, 2012), and to be 
moderately influenced by ownership structure (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; Kato & Long, 
2006). However, the potential endogeneity problem resulting from the two-way 
causality between compensation and performance is normally ignored by prior literature. 
In addition, prior studies on the relation of compensation and performance normally 
measure compensation as the average compensation of top three highest paid executives 
(e.g. Kato & Long, 2006; Firth, Leung, et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2011), or use the 
compensation of highest paid director at individual companies to measure CEO 
compensation (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; 2007), because of the weak compensation 
disclosure system in China at early stage. This might be problematic if individual 
executive changes with time series as researchers are not able to control for the 
influence of managerial attributes on compensation. Moreover, some studies focus on 
CEOs alone (e.g. Conyon & He, 2012), but they may provide incomprehensive 
evidence which could not represent the whole executive group as agency effects are not 
uniform across executive groups (Goldberg & Idson, 1995). 
In terms of the relation of hierarchical levels and executive compensation, empirical 
literature in the context of China is rather limited. Based on tournament theory, studies 
have estimated whether compensation level increases with the hierarchical level (e.g. 
Lin et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011), and whether compensation differences incline with 
the rise of the hierarchical level (e.g. Lin et al., 2011) or the number of contests (e.g. 
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Chen et al., 2011). However, the question that how does compensation structure vary 
with hierarchical levels is omitted in prior literature in the context of China. 
With respect to the role of the remuneration committee in determining executive 
compensation, studies in the context of China are rather limited, due to the limited data 
availability. Although it has been found that executives at Chinese listed companies 
with the presence of remuneration committee are more likely to receive higher cash 
compensation (e.g. Conyon & He, 2011), and are more likely to receive equity-based 
compensation (e.g. Conyon & He, 2012), remuneration committee independence does 
not tend to significantly affect compensation plans (e.g. Zhu et al., 2009). However, 
none of the studies relate the remuneration committee to the managerial power theory. 
For the effectiveness of equity-based compensation in improving company performance, 
empirical literature in the context of China is very limited mainly for two reasons. On 
one hand, it might be because executive incentive in the form of equity-based 
compensation has a short history and is far from prevalent in China. On the other hand, 
the relatively weaker compensation disclosure system in China makes it more difficult 
to investigate the equity-based compensation.  
This study aims to extend the executive compensation literature through filling the 
research gaps mentioned above. Based on three theories and extensive literature 
reviewed in this chapter, hypotheses are developed in the next chapter. Research 




Chapter 4: Research Hypotheses and Methodology 
 
“All good intellects have repeated, sine Bacon’s time, that there can be no real 
knowledge but that which is based on observed facts.”   





Chapter 3 reviewed related literature in the fields of executive compensation and 
identified research gaps including methodology. This chapter aims to present the 
methodology and to develop hypotheses for this study. Figure 4.1 vividly presents the 
overview of the methodology used in this study. Specifically, the philosophical position 
of this study is the positivist epistemology (i.e. positivism) together with the objective 
ontology and functionalist paradigm. Based on this research philosophy, this study 
employs the deductive approach in which hypotheses are developed based on existing 
theories and previous literature about executive remuneration. In particular, the 
hypotheses are developed based on three theoretical perspectives: principal-agent theory, 
tournament theory, and the managerial power theory. In order to test those hypotheses, 
this study chooses the mono quantitative method and utilises longitudinal secondary 
data.  
In this study, the fixed-effect two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS) instrumental variables 
(IV) estimator is employed to test models regarding the determinant of compensation 
level and pay-performance link. An advantage of this method is that it accounts for 
endogeneity of company performance, as well as correlated unobserved heterogeneity 
(Semykina & Wooldridge, 2010). Standard errors are clustered by companies, and year 
dummies are included, in order to account for the cross-sectional dependence and the 
time-series dependence. In addition, logit models are employed to estimate determinants 
of the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation. Finally, the propensity score 
matching is combined with difference-in-difference regression, when estimating the 
causal effect of adopting equity-based compensation on company performance. The 
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selection and measure of variables are consistent with prior literature, in order to 
increase the reliability of the measurements.  





The rest of this chapter is organised as follows:  
 Section 4.2 identifies the philosophical position of this study;  
 Section 4.3 describes the research approach and method;  
 Section 4.4 presents the time horizon and data;  
 Hypotheses are developed in Section 4.5; 
 Regression models utilised to test those hypotheses are presented in Section 4.6; 
 Section 4.7 exposit estimating strategies;  
 All the variables are defined in Section 4.8; 
 Data source and sample selection is described in Section 4.9;  
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4.2 Research Philosophy and Paradigms 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009) define research philosophy as an over-arching 
term relating to the development of research knowledge and the nature of that 
knowledge. Understanding research philosophy is important because the philosophical 
assumptions implicitly and explicitly made by researchers will significantly affect 
researchers’ decisions on methodological issues (Morgan, 1983). In general, there are 
three ways to understand research philosophy: ontology, epistemology and 
methodology (Guba, 1990). Specifically, ontology is about what is out there to know, 
epistemology is about how do we come to know, and methodology means which tools 
(i.e. methods) we need to employ to know the reality (Grix, 2002). Normally, the 
ontology is divided into subjectivism and objectivism. The objectivism suggests that 
social entities exist independently of social actors, while the subjectivism advocates that 
social phenomena are attached to the perceptions and consequent actions of social actors 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The epistemology could be categorised into positivism, realism 
and interpretivism. The positivism supports the externality of the social world, and it 
holds the view that the properties of this external reality should be observed via 
objective methods (Easterby-Smith, 2002). Similar to positivism, the realism stems 
from the view that the reality is objective. Specifically, it argues that the true reality is 
exactly what the senses show us, i.e., what we know about an object exists 
independently of the human mind (Saunders et al., 2009). Standing opposite the 
positivism, the interpretivism (i.e. anti-positivism) believes that the reality is subjective. 
Accordingly, the interpretivists suggest that the researcher is part of what is being 
observed and science is mainly driven by human interests (Easterby-Smith, 2002). 
Kuhn (1962) defines a paradigm as a set of beliefs and agreements shared between 
scientists about how problems should be understood and addressed. A research 
paradigm is of importance as it determines how the research questions could be 
estimated and explained. Burrell and Morgan (1979) summarise four sociological 
paradigms which define fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis of social 
phenomena: radical humanist, radical structuralist, interpretive, and functionalist. These 
four paradigms can be adopted in the business study to gain fresh insights into real-life 
matters and problems (Saunders et al., 2009). Figure 4.2 presents the relationship 




Figure 4.2: Four Paradigms for the Analysis of Social Theory 
 
       The Sociology of Radical Change  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             




           The Sociology of Regulation 
Source: Developed from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.22) 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the four paradigms are associated with two dimensions:  
 The subjective and objective dimension; 
 The regulation and radical change dimension.  
The objective element in the first dimension, as mentioned earlier in this section, 
represents that social entities are independent of social actors, while the subjective 
supports the view that social phenomena are attributed to social actors’ perceptions and 
consequent actions (Saunders et al., 2009). In the regulation and radical change 
dimension, regulation refers to the writings of theorists who try to explain the society 
with emphasis on its underlying unity and cohesiveness. In contrast, the basic concern 
of radical change is to look for the explanations for radical change, deep-seated 
structural conflict, modes of domination and structural contradiction of modern society 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
Each paradigm aligns with its neighbour on one dimension but opposite to its neighbour 
on the other dimension, as shown in Figure 4.2. The radical humanist paradigm 
advocates the sociology of radical change from a subjectivist’s perspective. To be 
specific, it mostly focuses on “radical change, modes of domination, emancipation, 
deprivation and potentiality” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.32), based on the “human 
consciousness” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.33). Similarly, the radical structuralist 
paradigm is also embedded in the sociology of radical change. However, theorists 








as they stand from an objective perspective. The functionalist paradigm develops its 
sociological concerns from an objectivist standpoint as well, but it is committed to the 
sociology of regulation. This paradigm, in Burrell and Morgan (1979), states that the 
functionalist paradigm is “often problem-oriented in approach, concerned to provide 
practical solutions to practical problems” (p.26). In other words, by assuming the social 
entities are rational, researchers within this paradigm aim to solve the practical 
problems through offering explicit recommendations. The interpretive paradigm tends 
to advocate the sociology of regulation implicitly. Far from emphasising rationality, this 
paradigm seeks to discover irrationality (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Relating the research philosophy to the current study, the ontological position of this 
study is objectivism which asserts that knowledge exists independently of the human 
mind (Grix, 2002), and the epistemology embedded in this study is the positivism which 
holds the views that the external reality should be observed using objective methods 
(Easterby-Smith, 2002). This study examines the determinants and consequences of 
executive compensation, and provides implications based on objectively observed facts. 
Therefore, the research paradigm of this study is functionalist.  
4.3 Research Approach and Research Method 
Research approaches are typically classified into two categories: the deductive approach 
and the inductive approach. The deductive approach “is concerned with developing a 
hypothesis (or hypotheses) based on existing theory, and then designing a research 
strategy to test the hypothesis” (Wilson, 2010, p.7). By contrast, the inductive approach 
would collect data, analyse gathered data, and generate a theory to explain the results of 
data analysis (Saunders et al., 2009). In other words, the deductive approach moves 
from a more general level to a more specific one, whereas on the contrary, the inductive 
moves from the specific to the general level (Blackstone & Foundation, 2012). In the 
fields of corporate governance, researchers might only adopt either a deductive 
approach (e.g. Jensen & Murphy, 1994; Conyon & He, 2012) or an inductive approach 
(e.g. Samra-Fredericks, 2000; Parker, 2007), or they might combine two approaches 
(e.g. Currall, Hammer, Baggett, & Doniger, 1999). 
The approach chosen may depend on research questions or existing literature (Wilson, 
2010), and relates to the research philosophy (Saunders et al., 2009). As mentioned in 
the last section, positivism is the research philosophy embedded in this study. 
According to Crowther and Lancaster (2009), positivist studies normally adopt the 
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deductive approach. In addition, the current study focuses on research questions related 
to the determinants and consequences of executive compensation. Therefore, it is 
committed to estimate the causal relationships between variables. This is consistent with 
one of the features of the deductive approach, i.e., “the need to explain the causal 
relationships between variables” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.127). Moreover, prior 
theoretical and empirical literature has provided a firm foundation for estimating the 
research questions in this study. Therefore, this study adopts the deductive approach in 
which the hypotheses are generated from well-known theories, i.e. the principal-agent 
theory, the tournament theory, and the managerial power theory. It then tests the 
validity of those theories via testing hypotheses in the context of China. According to 
Wilson (2010), the deductive approach is commonly associated with the quantitative 
methods. Therefore, this study chooses the quantitative method to test the hypotheses. 
To summarise, this study adopts a deductive approach in which hypotheses are 
developed based on existing theories and previous literature and employs a quantitative 
method to test those hypotheses.   
4.4 Time Horizon and Data 
The time horizon could be either cross-sectional or longitudinal. Specifically, the former 
is committed to a particular phenomenon at a particular time, and the latter focuses on 
observations over a given period of time (Saunders et al., 2009). One advantage of the 
longitudinal study is that it allows researchers to study questions involving both within 
and between person variance (Avey, Luthans, & Mhatre, 2008). Therefore, researchers 
could analyse sequences of development and change over time. Because observations 
included in this study contain both within and between variances in terms of executive 
compensation, personal characteristics, and company financial and corporate 
governance characteristics, the current study adopts the longitudinal time horizon. 
Baker, Singleton, and Veit (2010) suggest that the data that has been previously 
collected by someone else for some other purposes is known as secondary data. This 
study involves data and statistics obtained from the professional database, company 
annual reports, government website and publications, and other public sources. 
Accordingly, this study utilises the type of secondary data. Using secondary data has 
both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the secondary data improves the 
feasibility of longitudinal study, saves time, and provides an unobtrusive measure, but 
on the other hand, researchers have no real control over the quality of the secondary 
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data (Saunders et al., 2009). For example, there might be some unobservable manual 
mistakes during the typing process of the original data. This study tries to mitigate the 
effects of the disadvantage of using secondary data via the following ways. First of all, 
it selects the data sources which have been widely used in previous literature and gained 
a good reputation. In addition, for any data with uncertainty, this study has double-
checked other sources for confirmation. 
4.5 Hypotheses Development 
Hypotheses tested in this study are developed in this section. Specifically, hypotheses in 
relation to the determinants of executive compensation are developed based on the 
principal-agent theory, the tournament theory, and the managerial power theory, while 
the hypothesis regarding the causal effects of adopting equity-based pay on company 
performance is developed from the principal-agent theory. 
4.5.1 Determinants of Executive Compensation: Principal-agent Perspective 
The principal-agent theory argues that executive pay should be tied to firm performance 
in order to mitigate interest conflicts between managers and shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In particular, cash compensation should be structured to provide big 
rewards for outstanding performance and meaningful penalties for poor performance 
(Jensen & Murphy, 2010). In China, the conflicts between shareholders and executives 
due to the separation of ownership and control have emerged since establishing the 
modern corporation system. In order to reduce those conflicts, Chinese listed companies 
follow developed countries in constructing compensation contracts which tie the 
interests of executives to those of shareholders. In addition, the market becomes more 
competitive through a set of market reforms. According to Holmström and Tirole 
(1989), the pay-performance link might be strengthened in a competitive market 
because this market provides more accurate information regarding company 
performance. The majority of empirical studies on the relation of compensation level 
and company performance in China support the principal-agent theory, and suggest that 
the level of compensation is positively tied to company performance (e.g. Kato & Long, 
2006). However, cash compensation seems to be more closely tied to accounting-based 
performance than stock-based performance (e.g. Conyon & He, 2012). Based on the 
principal-agent theory together with previous empirical literature, the first hypothesis in 
this study is: 
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Hypothesis 1: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation is 
positively related to company performance. 
In addition, one of the most important roles of the board of directors is to create 
incentives to align an executive’s best interest with that of the shareholders (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). In practice, the “Code of Corporate Governance” states that setting 
executive compensation is one of the critical responsibilities of the board of directors or 
its remuneration committee in Chinese listed companies (CSRC, 2001). According to 
the principal-agent theory, the absence of a remuneration committee will provide an 
opportunity for senior executives to award themselves pay rises that are not aligned with 
shareholder interests (Conyon & Peck, 1998). Therefore, boards without a remuneration 
committee are supposed to be less effective in setting executive compensation to 
ameliorate interest-conflicts between managers and shareholders (Conyon & He, 2011; 
Newman & Mozes, 1999). Consequently, the level of compensation is reversely 
influenced by the presence of a remuneration committee, whereas both the pay-
performance link and the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation are 
positively influenced by the presence of a remuneration committee. This study has been 
of the following three hypotheses regarding the effects of the presence of a 
remuneration committee on executive compensation plans:  
Hypothesis 2: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation is 
lower in companies with the remuneration committee; 
Hypothesis 3: Holding other controls constant, executive compensation and company 
performance are more aligned in companies with the remuneration committee; 
Hypothesis 4: Holding other controls constant, executives are more likely to receive 
equity-based compensation in companies with the remuneration committee. 
4.5.2 Determinants of Executive Compensation: Tournament Perspective 
Tournament theory views internal labour market and compensation schemes as 
sequential elimination tournaments in which managers compete against one another in a 
related series of tournaments (Lambert et al., 1993). In particular, the higher 
compensation is viewed as prize which motivates lower level hierarchy executives to 
compete for promotions (Leonard, 1990). However, the higher up the hierarchical level 
the executive moves, the less the opportunity for promotion left (Conyon & Sadler, 
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2001). Therefore, the level of compensation should be higher at higher hierarchical 
levels to compensate for the lost promotion opportunities and to keep contestants in the 
game (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Consequently, the compensation level is predicted to be 
an increasing function of hierarchical levels. Executives in Chinese listed companies are 
allocated into different levels of seniority and have opportunities to be promoted to 
higher hierarchical levels via internal labour market contests. Prior literature also 
provides empirical evidence that compensation schemes in China tend to be aligned 
with the predictions of tournament theory. Lin et al. (2011) argue that Chinese listed 
companies have a pay structure which is consistent with the predictions of tournament 
theory, and they observe that the level of compensation increases as executives are 
promoted to higher hierarchical levels. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 5: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation is an 
increasing function of hierarchical levels. 
However, Anabtawi (2005) argues that compensation differential motivates only 
potential CEOs, not the victorious CEO who has won the prize, so an approach other 
than internal labour market contests is needed to influence CEO behaviour. Therefore, it 
might be desirable to use incentive compensation as a device to motivate the victorious 
CEOs (Anabtawi, 2005). This idea is also supported by Ekinci (2011), who argues that 
incentives within a corporate hierarchy are provided in various forms: explicit 
incentives come with the compensation package a job entails (i.e. bonus payment), 
whereas implicit incentives are embedded in the job itself in the form of potential future 
benefits (i.e. incentives provided through the possibility of promotion). Ekinci (2011) 
develops a dynamic tournament model and predicts that the size of bonus payments 
increases with job level. The model also predicts that workers are offered the 
compensation contract that balances their incentives provided through bonus payments 
and the possibility of promotions (Ekinci, 2011). Therefore, as argued by Conyon and 
Sadler (2001), tournament theory can also explain how incentive compensation varies 
across hierarchical levels. Based on the tournament theory, Conyon and Sadler (2001) 
indicate a positive relationship between hierarchical levels and the pay-performance 
sensitivity in the U.K. That is to say, compensation and company performance are more 
aligned as the executive moves up to higher hierarchical levels within a company. 
Therefore, as there will be fewer promotion opportunities when an executive moves up 
to a higher hierarchical level within a company (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), more 
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performance-based compensation is needed to provide additional financial incentives 
for this executive to stay in the tournament and work best for shareholder interests. 
Therefore, the sixth and the seventh hypotheses are:  
Hypothesis 6: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation and 
company performance are more aligned at the higher hierarchical level; 
Hypothesis 7: Holding other controls constant, executives at the higher hierarchical 
level are more likely to receive equity-based compensation. 
4.5.3 Determinants of Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Perspective 
Managerial power theory holds a view that executives may influence pay settings to 
extract rent for themselves through their power (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). This may 
result in compensation contracts which are more favourable to executives rather than 
shareholder wealth maximization (Conyon & He, 2004). As suggested by Finkelstein 
(1992), CEOs may be paid less if their managerial power is reduced since they are not 
able to influence the compensation plan.  
Remuneration committees have the responsibility to set compensation schemes. 
However, more compliant remuneration committees result in excess compensation for 
executives and suboptimal compensation contracts from the shareholders’ perspective 
(Conyon, 2006). Therefore, an executive can extract rent at the expense of shareholders 
through influencing remuneration committee’s decisions on compensation plans 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002). That is to say, the compensation contracts will be more 
favourable to executives if the remuneration committee is controlled by executives. In 
particular, the strength of managerial power on influencing compensation plans depends 
on the composition and the size of remuneration committee (Sun & Cahan, 2009).  
First of all, the proportion of inside executives on a remuneration committee could be 
considered as an indicator of managerial power. Insider directors have the motivation to 
collude with CEOs and other executives to benefit themselves at the expense of 
shareholders’ interests (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). This sort of behaviour may lead to 
higher compensation for executives. Therefore the inclusion of insiders on remuneration 
committees may indicate the ineffectiveness of a board in protecting shareholder 
interests (Singh & Harianto, 1989). In particular, a higher proportion of insiders on the 
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remuneration committee will result in higher managerial power to influence 
compensation plans.  
Singh and Harianto (1989) suggest that a higher proportion of company executives on 
the remuneration committee results in a larger size of the golden parachute contract and 
a greater number of executives would be covered by the golden parachute contract. 
Newman and Mozes (1999) also observe that the pay-performance link is more 
favourable for the CEO when insiders are on the remuneration committee. Anderson 
and Bizjak (2003) indicate that the level of compensation is more sensitive to company 
performance as the remuneration committee independence increases. Based on the 
managerial power theory and prior studies, one can predict that:  
Hypothesis 8: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation is 
positively influenced by the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee; 
Hypothesis 9: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation and 
company performance are less aligned when the proportion of insiders on the 
remuneration committee is higher; 
Hypothesis 10: Holding other controls constant, executives are less likely to receive 
equity-based compensation when the proportion of insiders on the remuneration 
committee is higher. 
In terms of the remuneration committee size, it has been suggested that smaller 
remuneration committees are more easily influenced by executives (e.g. Sun & Cahan, 
2009). In addition, Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) argue that smaller boards 
may have fewer advisors and monitors of management. Song and Windram (2004) also 
point out that a larger board might be more effective as the company has greater 
resources to appoint directors and committee members with relevant and 
complementary expertise and skills. Accordingly, the monitoring role of smaller 
remuneration committees might be weaker due to the lack of enough professionals to 
monitor. Therefore, one can predict that it is easier for executives to influence smaller 
remuneration committees to get favourable compensation packages. For instance, Sun 
and Cahan (2009) empirically indicate that the relation of the level of CEO cash 
compensation and company accounting-based performance is positively affected by the 
remuneration committee size. Consequently, this study has the following hypotheses: 
83 
 
Hypothesis 11: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation is 
negatively influenced by the size of remuneration committee; 
Hypothesis 12: Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation 
and company performance are less aligned when the remuneration committee is smaller; 
Hypothesis 13: Holding other controls constant, executives are less likely to receive 
equity-based compensation when the remuneration committee is smaller. 
4.5.4 Equity-based Compensation and Company Performance: Principal-agent 
Perspective 
As mentioned earlier, the principal-agent theory views incentive compensation as an 
important mechanism to mitigate agency problems as it aligns executives’ interests with 
those of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Equity-based compensation should be 
included in an executive’s pay portfolio to contribute to the alleviation of agency 
problems (Core & Guay, 1999; Murphy, 1999), because equity incentives provide the 
most powerful link between shareholder wealth and executive wealth (Jensen & 
Murphy, 2010).  
As executives will experience a direct and powerful ‘feedback effect’ from changes in 
market value when they hold a meaningful percentage of total equities in their 
companies (Jensen & Murphy, 2010), equity-based compensation provides monetary 
incentives for executives to work hard at maximising the company value. This 
important role of equity incentives in boosting company performance has been 
empirically demonstrated by prior literature. For instance, Mehran (1995) indicates that 
firms in which the percentage of executive equity-based compensation is greater tend to 
produce higher accounting returns. Lian et al. (2011) empirically indicate that the 
adoption of equity incentives positively influence the accounting-based performance of 
Chinese listed companies.  
In summary, the principal-agent theory and prior empirical literature suggest that a 
fundamental reason for the use of equity incentives is to link changes in executive 
wealth directly to changes in a company’s performance, thereby offering executives 
with incentives to work hard at maximising shareholder wealth (Core et al., 2003). 
Therefore, if equity-based compensation provides such financial incentives for 
executives, the adoption of equity-based compensation should result in performance 
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improvements which are favourable for shareholders. Consequently, the last hypothesis 
is as follows: 
Hypothesis 14: Holding other controls constant, adopting equity-based compensation 
delivers better future financial performance of the firm. 
4.6 Regression Models  
4.6.1 Determinants of Compensation Level 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the level of executive compensation positively relates to 
company performance. Following equation 3.2 in Chapter 3, the following model is 
applied to test hypothesis 1: 
1 i, j,ti, j,t j,t i tj
Log(cash) = Performance X            
(4.1) 
Where, i represents an individual executive, j means a firm, t denotes a year. The 
dependent variable Log(cash)i,j,t is the natural logarithm of cash compensation for 
executive i in firm j in the fiscal year t. To be specific, the cash compensation is the sum 
of basic salary, bonus and stipends. The term Performancej,t means performance of firm 
j in the fiscal year t. In particular, the performance is measured in two ways. On one 
hand, an accounting-based performance is included. This is measured by return on 
assets (ROA), equal to net profits divided by the book value of total assets (Conyon & 
He, 2011). On the other hand, a market-based performance, defined as the annualized 
stock return derived using data of monthly return (Conyon & He, 2012), is used as an 
alternative measure. X denotes a set of control variables including attributes of 
individual executives, company economic characteristics, and corporate governance 
variables. The term ʋi means the unobserved time-invariant executive fixed effects, λj 
denotes firm fixed effects, and δt represents year effects. Finally, α is the constant term, 
and ε is the error term. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the presence of a remuneration committee has a negative 
effect on compensation level. This is tested using the model as follows: 
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Where, the term Committee Dummy,j,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to one if firm j has 
adopted a remuneration committee in the fiscal year t-1. C denotes a set of control 
variables including attributes of individual executives, company financial performance 
and other economic characteristics, and corporate governance variables. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that compensation level is an increasing function of hierarchical 
level. This is tested using the following regression model:  
, 1 2
1 2i, j,ti j,t i, j,t i t i, j,tj
Hierarchy HierarchyLog(cash) = C              
 (4.3) 
Where, Hierarchy1i,t is a dummy variable which is equal to one if executive i in firm j is 
at the highest hierarchical level in the fiscal year t. Hierarchy2i,j,t is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if executive i in firm j is at the second highest hierarchical level in 
the fiscal year t. Consistent with equation 4.2, C denotes a set of control variables 
including attributes of individual executives, company financial performance and other 
economic characteristics, and corporate governance variables. 
Hypothesis 8 and 11 predict the positive impacts of managerial power on the level of 
executive compensation. Specifically, the managerial power is measured by the 
proportion of insiders on remuneration committee and the size of remuneration 
committee. The following regression model is employed to test those hypotheses: 
, 2
,
  j,t-1i, j t 1 j,t -1
i t i, j tj
Log(cash) = + Committee Insider + Committee Size
+ C + + +
  
    
 
(4.4) 
Where, Committee Insiderj,t-1 represents the proportion of insiders on a remuneration 
committee for firm j in the fiscal year t-1. Committee Sizej,t-1 denotes the size of a 
remuneration committee for firm j in the fiscal year t-1. C denotes a set of control 
variables including attributes of individual executives, company financial performance 
and other economic characteristics, and corporate governance variables. 
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4.6.2 Determinants of Pay-performance Link 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the compensation and company performance are more 
aligned at firms with the remuneration committee. This hypothesis is tested using the 
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(4.5) 
Where, as has been noted the term Performance j, t means the performance of firm j in 
the fiscal year t. Committee Dummy,j, t-1 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if 
firm j has adopted a remuneration committee in the fiscal year t-1. The variable 
Performance j, t * Committee Dummy,j, t-1 is interaction term, defined as company 
performance times the dummy variable of the presence of a remuneration committee.   
Hypothesis 6 predicts that executive compensation and company performance are more 
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Where, both Performance j,t * Hierarchy1i,t and Performance j,t * Hierarchy2i,t are 
interaction terms. 
Hypotheses 9 and 12 relate to the moderation effect of the managerial power on pay-
performance link. Specifically, they predict that executive pay and company 
performance are less aligned when the managerial power is higher. To test those 
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Where, Performancej,t is interacted with Committee Insiderj,t-1 and Committee Sizej,t-1, 
respectively. 
4.6.3 Determinants of the Likelihood of Receiving of Equity-based Compensation 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that executives are more likely to receive equity-based 
compensation in companies with a remuneration committee. The following logit 
regression model is applied to test hypothesis 4: 
, 1 j, 1 ,
_  
i t t i t i, j tj
Equity based Pay = Committee Dummy + C + + +         
(4.8) 
Where, the dependent variable Equity_based Pay i,j,t is a dummy variable which is equal 
to one if executive i in company j has been granted equity_based compensation in the 
fiscal year t. Has been noted, the term Committee Dummyj,t-1 is a dummy variable which 
is equal to one if firm j has adopted a remuneration committee in the fiscal year t-1. C 
denotes a set of control variables including attributes of individual executives, company 
financial performance and other economic characteristics, and corporate governance 
variables. 
According to hypothesis 7, executives at a higher position hierarchy are more likely to 
receive equity-based compensation. This hypothesis is tested using the logit regression 
model as follows: 
,, 1 ,2
,
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Hierarchy ierarchyEquity based Pay =
C + + +
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Where, Hierarchy1i,t is a dummy variable which is equal to one if executive i in firm j is 
at the highest hierarchical level in the fiscal year t. Hierarchy2i,j,t is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if executive i in firm j is at the second highest hierarchical level in 
the fiscal year t. Consistent with equation 4.8, C denotes a set of control variables 
including attributes of individual executives, company financial performance and other 
economic characteristics, and corporate governance variables. 
Hypothesis 10 and 13 predict that the propensity of receiving equity-based 
compensation is lower when managerial power is higher. The following logit regression 
model is employed to test those hypotheses: 
, 2
,
_  j,t j,ti t 1
i t i, j tj
Equity based Pay = + Committee Insider + Committee Size
+ C + + +
  
    
 
(4.10) 
Where, as has been noted, Committee Insiderj,t-1 represents the proportion of insiders on 
a remuneration committee for firm j in the fiscal year t-1. Committee Sizej,t-1 denotes the 
size of a remuneration committee for firm j in the fiscal year t-1. As mentioned, C 
denotes a set of control variables including attributes of individual executives, company 
financial performance and other economic characteristics, and corporate governance 
variables. 
4.6.4 The Causal Effect of Adopting Equity-based Compensation on Company 
Performance 
Hypothesis 14 predicts that adopting equity-based compensation delivers better 
company performance. The following difference-in-difference (DID) regression model 
is employed to test the hypothesis 14: 
,
1 2 3j,t j j,t j j,t
t j tj
Performance = + Treated + After + Treated * After
+ V + +
   
   
 
(4.11) 
Where, Treatedj is a dummy variable equal to one if company j belongs to the treatment 
group (i.e. group with companies which have adopted equity-based compensation 
during the sample period). Afterj,t is a dummy variable equal to one if firm j in the post-
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treatment year (i.e. one year after adopting equity-based compensation). Treatedj*Afterj,t 
is the interaction term; Vincludes a set of firm level control variables. 
In this section, estimating strategies for the models presented above are discussed. In 
particular, estimators of the determinant of compensation level and pay-performance 
link, the determinant of the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation, and the 
effect of adopting equity-based compensation on company performance are discussed, 
respectively.  
4.7 Estimating Strategies 
4.7.1 Key Assumptions of the Linear Regression 
Checking and discussing the assumptions are important because, when estimation 
methods do not meet their assumptions, the significance and magnitude of coefficients 
might be over- or under-estimated (Osborne & Water, 2002). In this study, the multiple 
regression analysis is employed to test the hypotheses. Therefore, key assumptions of 
the multiple regression analysis, including linearity, normality, independence of the 
errors, and homoscedasticity, should be satisfied. Those five assumptions are discussed 
below. 
First of all, the multiple regression analysis requires a linear relationship between the 
dependent variable and independent variable. When the linearity assumption is not met, 
the true relation between the dependent variable and predictor might be under-estimated 
(Osborne & Water, 2002). Therefore, it is important and necessary to assess the linearity 
assumption. The linearity could be tested through the visual depiction of a sloping 
pattern. In particular, the STATA software offers the plot of residuals versus predicted 
values which could be used to assess the linearity assumption. According to Gujarati 
(2003), the transformation of variables could assist in dealing with non-linearity. For 
instance, the log transformation of executive compensation has been employed by a 
number of prior studies (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Conyon & He, 2012).  
Normality is another assumption of the multiple regression analysis. Specifically, it 
assumes that variables are normally distributed. The non-normally distributed variables 
can distort relationships and significance tests (Osborne & Water, 2002).  In practice, 
one can assess the normality via skewness and kurtosis. According to Park (2008), a 
normally distributed random variable should have skewness and kurtosis near to 0 and 3, 
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respectively. In addition, the STATA software provides a variety of approaches such as 
Skewness-Kurtosis test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and probability-probability plot (P-P 
plot) to assess the normality. Following prior literature, this study relies on the log-
transformation to increase the normality of variables.  
Thirdly, the multiple regression analysis assumes the homoscedasticity. To be specific, 
the homoscedasticity means that the error has the same variance for any value of the 
independent variable (Wooldridge, 2013). Oppositely, the phenomenon that the variance 
of errors varies with different values of the independent variable is called 
heteroscedasticity. In the econometric literature, two approaches are recommended to 
correct the standard errors for heteroscedasticity. First of all, transformation of variables 
could mitigate the issue of heteroscedasticity (Osborne & Water, 2002). In addition, the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors could also be employed (White, 1980; 
Peterson, 2009). Therefore, consistent with the above econometric literature and prior 
executive compensation studies (e.g. Conyon & He, 2012; Chen et al., 2011), the log 
transformation of executive compensation together with robust standard errors is 
employed to reduce the heteroscedasticity.   
Finally, the assumption of independence of errors means that data does not suffer from 
the autocorrelation problem. As will be discussed in the next section, the panel data 
utilised in this study is associated with both cross-sectional dependence and time-series 
dependence. Consistent with Petersen (2009), in this study, standard errors are clustered 
by firms and year dummies are jointly applied to deal with the cross-sectional 
dependence and time-series dependence. To be specific, the cluster approach allows for 
correlations between errors in the same cluster (Wooldridge, 2013), and including year 
dummies is helpful to absorb year effects (Petersen, 2009). 
4.7.2 Multi-collinearity Diagnosis 
It is important to take the potential multi-collinearity problem in the model into account. 
The term multi-collinearity refers to the inter-correlation among the independent 
variables in a multiple regression model (Wooldridge, 2013). As the degree of 
collinearity increases, the regression model estimates of the coefficients become 
unstable and the standard errors for the coefficients can get wildly inflated (Chen, Ender, 
Mitchell, & Wells, 2003). This study employs two approaches to test the collinearity. 
First of all, it applies the Pearson Correlation matrix. To be specific, the correlation 
coefficients of independent variables should be less than 1. In addition, the variance 
91 
 
inflation factor (VIF) test is a prevalent technique to test the degree of multi-collinearity. 
The multi-collinearity could be diagnosed via the VIF value computed by the VIF test. 
In particular, the multi-collinearity problem exists when the VIF value is greater than 10 




4.7.3 The Fixed-effect Two-stage Least Squares Estimator 
This study contributes to the compensation literature by applying the fixed-effect two-
stage least square (FE-2SLS) instrumental variables (IV) estimator. One advantage of 
this estimator is that it accounts for endogenous explanatory variables as well as 
unobserved heterogeneity (Semykina & Wooldridge, 2010). In the regression, standard 
errors are clustered by companies, and year dummies are included. The rationale of 
selecting this estimator is discussed in the following section. 
4.7.3.1 Panel Data: Cross-sectional Dependence and Time-series Dependence 
As has been noted, the time horizon of this study is longitudinal. In other words, panel 
data with both the cross-sectional and time series dimensions is employed in this study. 
To be specific, the sample spans six years from 2006 to 2011 inclusive (time series 
dimension), and the observations include individual executives from a wide range of 
listed firms (cross-sectional dimension). Using panel data has the following advantages: 
1. As panel data usually contain more degrees of freedom and more sample 
variability, it can improve the efficiency of econometric estimates and produce a 
more accurate inference of model parameters (Hsiao, 2007); 
2. Using panel data allows one to control for individual heterogeneity, whereas 
pure time-series data or pure cross-sectional data cannot (Baltagi, 2005). In other 
words, panel data is helpful to control for individual-specific unobservable 
effects which may be correlated with other explanatory variables by combining 
time-series and cross-sectional data (Hausman & Taylor, 1981);  
3. Finally, the additional variation generated by combining cross-sectional and 
time-series data will be helpful to reduce the potential multicollinearity problem 
if time series are modelled individually (Brook, 2008).  
However, using panel data also generates some econometric issues. In particular, when 
using panel data, both the time-series dependence and cross-sectional dependence may 
exist and result in correlated residuals so that failure to plan for these effects will lead to 
biased standard errors (Peterson, 2009). To be specific, the time-series dependence will 
lead to correlated residuals across time for a given section, and the cross-sectional 
dependence will result in interdependent residuals across sections within a single period. 
It is important to deal with the existence of cross-sectional dependence and time-series 
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dependence because they violate the assumption of independence of the errors of 
regression analysis, as has been noted in the last section. 
In this study, both the time-series dependence and cross-sectional dependence might be 
problematic. First of all, an executive may be repeatedly observed so that observations 
for a given executive are likely to be dependent during the sample period. This implies 
that standard errors may be correlated for a given executive at different points in time 
due to the existence of unobserved individual effects. In addition, there might be 
observed and unobserved correlations between different executives in a single year. In 
particular, the panel data involved in this study is characterised by consisting of both the 
individual-level and firm-level information (i.e. multi-level data), which is a natural 
nested grouping (i.e. individuals are grouped by company). As an individual executive 
may come from the same company, there are multiple observations per company-year. 
These observations may share observable characteristics and unobservable 
characteristics that would lead the regression disturbances to be correlated (Moulton, 
1990). In this study, economic and corporate governance variables are lacking 
independence across different executives from the same company within the same year. 
Ignoring the clustered nature of the data will lead to underestimated standard errors and 
overestimated statistical significance of the coefficient (Moulton, 1990; Primo, 
Jacobsmeier, & Milyo, 2007).  
Petersen (2009) suggests that a common approach which accounts for two dimensions 
(i.e. the cross-sectional dependence and the time-series dependence) is to combine 
clustered standard errors with dummy variables for different points in time. Primo et al., 
(2007) also argue that a popular method to adjust the standard errors affected by intra-
cluster correlation is the clustered standard errors approach. This approach accounts for 
both the intra-cluster correlation and the general form of heteroskedasticity. In particular, 
researchers are typically encouraged to cluster statistical inferences at the level of key 
aggregated regressors (Moulton, 1986; Cameron & Miller, 2010). As key regressors are 
at the company level in our panel data set, the standard errors are clustered by 
companies. Therefore, this study employs the individual fixed-effect model with 
clustered standard errors by companies and includes year dummies, in order to deal with 




4.7.3.2 Instrumental Variables and Two-stage Least Squares 
4.7.3.2.1 Potential Endogeneity  
The two-way causality between executive compensation and company performance 
may result in the potential endogeneity problem in this study. On one hand, executive 
compensation could be considered as the reward which is on the basis of company 
performance (performance→compensation), but on the other hand, it can be viewed as 
the finance incentives for executives to improve further performance (compensation→ 
performance). Using a sample of Chinese listed companies, Buck et al. (2008) 
empirically indicate that executive compensation and company performance mutually 
affect each other. Accordingly, prior studies on the reward effect of performance on 
Chinese executive compensation (performance→compensation) may provide biased 
estimates without taking into account the reverse motivation influence of compensation 
on performance (Buck et al., 2008).  
4.7.3.2.2 Instrumental Variables 
The instrumental variable (IV) estimation is the standard solution to alleviate 
endogeneity problems in the econometric textbook. However, it is challenging to select 
and justify instrumental variables as the appropriate instrumental variables should be 
correlated with the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with the dependent, and IV 
methods can produce highly biased or even wrong estimates even if the instrumental 
variable is slightly endogenous (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). That is to say, the 
instrumental variable can only affect the dependent variable through its effect on 
endogenous explanatory variable. In this study, the instrumental variable must be 
significantly correlated with firm performance but uncorrelated with ‘executive 
compensation’. In other words, the instrumental variable z in this study should be 
satisfied with the following econometric requirements:  
(1) z is uncorrelated with error term u, that is: 
                                                    Cov (z, u) = 0;                                     (4.12) 
(2) z is correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable x, that is: 
                                                   Cov (z, x) ≠ 0;                                     (4.13) 
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This study selects the relative market share and the large shareholder stock transfer 
announcement dummy as the instrumental variable for accounting performance (i.e. 
return on assets) and stock-based performance (i.e. stock return), respectively. 
Specifically, the large shareholder stock transfer announcement is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if firm j makes an announcement that its large shareholder transfer stocks to 
other shareholders in a given fiscal year t and equal to 0, otherwise, while the relative 
market share is the ratio of a firm’s market share to the sum of the market share of its 
three largest competitors. In fact, absolute market share and the relative market share 
are two different measures of market share which are commonly used in business 
studies. However, Szymanski, Bharadwaj, and Varadarajan (1993) suggest that the 
absolute market share is preferred when a specific industry is used, while the relative 
market share is preferred when pooled cross-section data across industries is employed. 
One of the important reasons is that relative market share could better capture the 
business’ scale and bargaining effects in its industry (Buzzell & Gale, 1987). To be 
specific, the relative market share is calculated using equation 4.14 as follows: 















                  (4.14) 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010) argue that researchers must use economic theory to support 
the selection of instrumental variables. This study chooses the market share and the 
large shareholder stock transfer announcement dummy as the instrumental variables 
based on the market power theory and the efficient market hypothesis theory, 
respectively. First of all, the market power theory suggests that large market share 
creates market power advantages, and the market power enables firms to make profit 
through raising product prices or offering inferior products because their rivals cannot 
provide customers with a reasonable alternative (Jacobson, 1988). Secondly, according 
to the efficient market hypothesis theory (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969), if the 
announcement conveys vital information in an efficient market, then it is assumed that 
such information will be reflected by stock price movements (Hussin, Ahmed, & Ying, 
2010) when the information is publicly released to the market.  
However, there is little reason to think that the relative market share has a direct 
influence on executive compensation. The relative market share of companies will be 
related to the level of executive compensation only through its influence on ROA. 
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Similarly, there is little reason to consider that shareholding transfer announcements 
directly affect the level of executive compensation. Shareholding transfer announcement 
dummy will be associated with executive compensation only through its influence on 
the company stock-based performance. 
Bun and Harrison (2014) suggest that when an endogenous variable is interacted with 
an exogenous variable, the instrumental variable of the endogenous variable ought to be 
interacted with the exogenous variable of the interaction term to achieve identification. 
This is also supported by other statisticians such as Balli and Sørensen (2013). 
Therefore, the instrumental variable of performance is interacted with the exogenous 
part of the interaction term, in order to construct the instrument for the interaction term. 
4.7.3.2.3 Two-stage Least Squares  
After selecting the instrumental variables, the next step is to apply an appropriate 
estimator. One of the most common instrumental variable estimators is the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS). Theoretically, in the first stage, the predicted value of firm 
performance is obtained from regressing firm performance on the instrumental variable 
Z and all the other independent variables, as shown by equation 4.14 below. 
 First stage:          
1 2, , ,j t j t j tperformance Z controls                            (4.14) 
In the second stage, the estimated value of firm performance from stage one is in place 
of the original firm performance so that one can estimate how executive compensation 
responds to the predicted value of firm performance ( performance

) and all the other 
independent variables, as shown by equation 4.15 as follows. 
Second Stage:        
1 2j,ti,t i,tlog(cash) = + performance + controls+   

             (4.15) 
However, Wooldridge (2013) argues that manually performing the 2SLS will result in 
invalid standard errors and test statistics. Therefore, this study relies on STATA to 
directly perform the 2SLS estimation. In addition, the strength of the instrumental 
variable could be identified through the statistics obtained from the 2SLS estimation. In 
particular, for exactly identified models with one endogenous variable, a common rule 
of thumb to reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are irrelevant is: the 
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F-statistic in the first-stage regression should be larger than 10 (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010).  
4.7.3.3 Omitted Variable Bias and Remedies 
The concern of an omitted variable may also result in the potential endogeneity problem. 
The omitted variable bias may be due to the factors which are difficult to measure 
and/or the unobserved factors consisting of time-constant factors and time-varying 
factors (Wooldridge, 2013). Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) indicate that the majority of 
executive compensation variations can be explained by these time-invariant firm and 
managerial effects resulting from differences in corporate culture and in managers’ 
latent traits (e.g. innate ability, personality and risk aversion) which may not be easily 
observed or measured, so accounting fixed effects represents an advance in modelling 
the determination of executive compensation.  
As mentioned earlier, an important benefit of panel data is that it is able to control for 
individual-specific unobservable effects which may be correlated with other 
independent variables (Hausman & Taylor, 1981). In addition, the within-groups 
estimator (e.g. fixed-effect panel data method) is a good approach to control for the 
potential omitted variable bias resulting from unobserved time-constant factors 
(Hausman & Taylor, 1981; Wooldridge, 2013; Abdallah, Goergen, & O'Sullivan, 2015). 
Therefore, in this study, the time-constant factors which might affect executive 
compensation will be eliminated via the executive fixed-effect panel data method. 
Wooldridge (2013) also suggests that another possible solution is to try to include more 
control variables in the multiple regression analysis. This study selects and measures 
possible factors based on previous literature, in order to mitigate the omitted variable 
bias. 
In summary, when testing models regarding the determinants of compensation level and 
pay-performance link, the fixed-effect two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS) instrumental 
variables (IV) estimator is applied to take account of endogeneity of company 
performance, and correlated unobserved effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
companies, and year dummies are included, in order to account for the cross-sectional 




4.7.3.4 The Logit Regression 
Following previous studies such as Tzioumis (2008) and Conyon and He (2012), this 
study employs the logistic regression with standard errors clustered by companies to 
estimate the determinants of the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation. 
Similar to the estimation of the determinants of cash compensation, the independent 
variables related to company financial and corporate governance characteristics are 
lagged by one year in logistic regression. One of the reasons is that the influence of 
those corporate governance mechanisms on executive compensation settings might take 
time to take place. In addition, the logistic model includes the lagged performance 
measure as this study predicts that companies might be motivated by previous 
performance to adopt equity-based compensation, based on agency theory. Using lagged 
independent variables will be helpful to mitigate the potential endogenous problem. 
4.7.4 The Propensity Score Matching Method 
Stuart (2010) suggests that it is desirable to replicate a randomised experiment as 
closely as possible by obtaining treated and control groups with similar covariate 
distributions, when estimating causal effects using observational data. Matching 
attempts to mirror a randomised experiment where two groups are almost identical 
except that one of the groups receives a certain treatment (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). 
Therefore, before estimating the causal effect of the adoption of equity-based 
compensation on company performance using the difference-in-difference (DID) 
regression, this study employs the propensity score matching technique to construct the 
treatment and matched control groups. The propensity score matching was first 
introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and has been increasing popular in 
different research areas such as corporate finance (e.g. Armstrong, Jagolinzer, & 
Larcker, 2010; Murphy & Sandino, 2010), social science (e.g. Young, 2008), and 
medical science (e.g. Lu, Zanutto, Hornik, & Rosenbaum, 2001).  
As has been noted, the treatment group includes listed companies which have started to 
adopt equity-based compensation between 2006 and 2010, while elements in the 
matched control group are selected from companies which never adopt equity-based 




4.7.4.1 Steps in Implementing Matching Methods  
In general, there are four key steps in implementing matching methods (see also Stuart 
and Rubin, 2008), including choosing covariates used in the matching procedure, 
defining a distance measure, selecting a matching algorithm, and diagnosing matches. 
Figure 4.3 summarises these four steps in implementing matching methods. 
 
Figure 4.3  
Steps in Implementing Matching Methods  
 
 
4.7.4.2 Choosing Covariates 
The first step is to choose covariates used in the logistic regression model of propensity 
score matching. Stuart (2010) suggests that including all variables related to both 
treatment and outcome in the matching procedure is important (see also Rubin & 
Thomas, 1996). However, variables which may have been affected or modified by the 
treatment of interest should not be included in the matching process (Stuart, 2010; 
Austin, 2011). When employing the propensity score matching, the conditional 
probability of being a treated company (i.e. the propensity score) is assumed to be based 
on a set of economic and corporate governance covariates which also affect company 
performance. Definitions of those covariates are presented in Table 4.3 in Section 4.8. 
4.7.4.3 Defining a Distance Measure 
The second step is to define a distance measure in matching. The distance measure 
represents the similarity between two individuals (Stuart, 2010). Popular distance 
measures include propensity score, exact, and Mahalanobis distance. As combining 
exact matching with propensity score matching can result in large reductions in bias 
Step 1 
•Choose Covariates  
Step 2 
•Define A Distance Measure 
Step 3 





(Stuart & Rubin, 2008), this study combines the propensity score matching with exact 
matching on a couple of covariates (i.e. industry and year). Specifically, matched pairs 
should be from the same industry in the same year and have the closest propensity score. 
This study does not use the Mahalanobis distance for two reasons. First of all, there are 
more than 10 covariates in the current study, and Rubin and Thomas (2000) suggest that 
propensity score matching performs better than Mahalanobis matching when more than 
five covariates are used. In addition, Mahalanobis matching works best with continuous 
variables (Stuart, 2010), but the current study includes both the continuous variable and 
binary variable.  
A propensity score is the conditional probability of a unit being assigned to a particular 
treatment given a set of observed covariates, where the probability is normally 
estimated through a logit or probit model (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). The distance 
between two individuals is the absolute value of the difference of propensity scores 
between those two individuals.  
Let Di, j represent the distance between individual i and j, then:  
                                                       
,i j i jD e e                                                (4.15) 
Where ei represents the propensity score for individual i, i.e. the probability of receiving 
the treatment T given the observed covariates X:   Pr( 1| )i i i ie X T X  ; similarly, e j is 
the propensity score for individual j:   Pr( 1| )j j j je X T X  . In order to calculate the 
propensity score in the matching procedure, this study employs the following simple 
logit regression model: 
                                                     i itreated X                                          (4.16) 
Where itreated  is a dummy indicator equal to 1 if company i belongs to the treatment 
group (i.e. the group with companies which have adopted equity-based compensation 
during the sample period); iX  includes those covariates, as has been noted.  
4.7.4.4 Selecting a Matching Algorithm 
The third step is to select a matching algorithm. This study uses the nearest neighbour 
matching, which is considered to be relatively unbiased and simple (Frisco, Muller, & 
Frank, 2007). The 1: k (k>1) nearest neighbour matching chooses multiple closest 
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controls for each treated individual. The question is, “How do we determine k?” Rubin 
and Thomas (1996) suggest that when the size of the treated group is smaller, a 
somewhat larger k is desirable, and the somewhat larger matching ratio can minimise 
differences in the sample variance of the estimated propensity score. They select 10 
controls for each treated individual when the size of pre-matched control group (i.e. 
7,848) is more than 80 times (i.e. 7,848/97) larger than the treated group size (i.e. 97). 
Their empirical results suggest that this 1:10 propensity score matching performs very 
well, removing almost all of the expected difference in the sample means of each 
matching variable (Rubin & Thomas, 1996). Table 4.1 below shows that the size of 
treated group in the current study is relatively smaller than that of the untreated group. 
Consistent with Rubin and Thomas (1996), this study constructs a 1:10 matching. 
Table 4.1  
Comparison of the Size of Treatment and Control Group before Matching 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total  
Treated 15 2 10 4 10 41 
Untreated 1,215 1,215 1,215 1,215 1,215 6,075 
Total 1,230 1,217 1,225 1,219 1,225 6,116 
 
4.7.4.5 Diagnosing Matches 
The final step is to diagnose matches. Checking covariate balance is important as it 
diagnoses the quality of matching results obtained from a matching method (Stuart & 
Rubin, 2008). Covariate balance is achieved when both the treatment and control groups 
appear to be similar along their observable dimensions except for the treated variable 
(Armstrong et al., 2010). In the current study, covariate balance is achieved if both the 
treatment and control groups have a similar distribution of the covariate except for the 
treatment of interest (i.e. the adoption of equity-based compensation).  
One of the important approaches of assessing the quality of matches is the standardised 
difference test. It is equal to the difference in means of each covariate divided by the 
standard deviation in the full treated group. The results of the standardised difference 
test are presented in Appendix A. Tables in Appendix A show that the 1:10 nearest 
neighbour matching perform well in reducing variance and achieving balance between 
the treated and control groups, and none of the covariates are significantly imbalanced 
(i.e. p<0.05, according to STATA) after matching.   
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4.7.5 The Difference-in-Difference Regression 
The next step after propensity score matching (PSM) is to estimate the treatment effect 
using balanced matched samples. Matching and regression adjustment have been shown 
to work best in combination (e.g. Rubin, 1973; Rubin, 1979; Abadie & Imbens, 2006). 
In particular, as noted by Stuart and Rubin (2008), the matching method is applied to 
reduce large covariate bias between the treated and control groups, and the regression is 
employed to adjust for any small residual bias and to increase efficiency. Therefore, 
based on the adequately balanced matched samples, this study utilises the basic 
difference-in-difference (DID) regression model (as shown by Equation 4.11 in Section 
4.6.4) to test the causal effect of adopting equity-based compensation on company 
performance. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Becker & Hvide, 2013), the year of 
adopting equity-based compensation is excluded due to the potential endogeneity 
between the adoption of equity-based incentive and company performance. 
4.8 Variables and Measurements 
In this section, the description of variables is divided into two groups. Variables 
included in estimating the determinant of executive compensation are explained in the 
first group. In the second group, the variables involved in examining the performance 




4.8.1 Variables Included in the test of the Determinants of Executive 
Compensation 
Table 4.2 describes variables included in models refer to the determinant of executive 
compensation. As shown in Table 4.2, the dependent variable is executive 
compensation, and it is measured in two ways. The first measure is the level of total 
cash compensation for individual executives. Secondly, it is measured by a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if an executive has received equity-based compensation 
in a given fiscal year. Key predictors include company performance, hierarchical levels, 
presence of a remuneration committee, proportion of insiders on the remuneration 
committee, and size of the remuneration committee. In particular, these predictors 
interact with company performance, respectively, in order to explore the moderation 
effects of these variables on the relation of pay and performance. Control variables 
include executive attributes, economic factors, and corporate governance characteristics. 
Finally, year dummies, industry dummies and regional dummies are included to control 
for year effects, cross-industry heterogeneity and cross-region variation, respectively. In 






Table 4.2  
Description of Variables Included in the Test of the Determinants of Executive Compensation  
Variable Name Code Definition 
Dependent Variable: Executive Compensation 
Total Cash Compensation Log(Cash) 
Log transformation of total cash 
compensation for individual executives 
Equity-based Pay Equity-based Pay 
Dummy variable;  
=1 if the executive has been granted 
equity-based compensation in a given 
fiscal year; =0 otherwise 
Predictors 
Firm Performance 
Return on Asset ROA =Net profit / total assets 
Stock Return Stock Return 
Annualized stock returns calculated using 
monthly stock return 
Executive Position Hierarchy 
Hierarchy 1 Hierarchy1 
Dummy variable;  
=1 if the executive is at the highest 
hierarchical level within a company; 
=0, otherwise 
Hierarchy 2 Hierarchy2 
Dummy variable;  
=1 if the executive is at the second 
highest hierarchical level within a 
company; =0, otherwise 
Hierarchy 3 Hierarchy3 
Dummy variable; 
=1 if the executive is at the third highest 
hierarchical level within a company; 
=0, otherwise 
Remuneration Committee 
Presence of Remuneration 
Committee 
Committee Dummy  
Dummy variable; 
=1 if the company has established a 
remuneration committee in a given fiscal 
year; =0 otherwise 
Proportion of Insiders on a 
Remuneration Committee 
Committee Insider 
Number of internal members/total 
number of members serving on the 
remuneration committee 
Remuneration Committee Size Committee Size 






Table 4.2  
Description of Variables Included in Testing the Determinants of Executive Compensation 
(Continued) 
Variable Name Code Definition 
Control Variables 
Individual Executive’s Characteristics  
Female Female  
Dummy variable; 
=1 if the executive is a female;  
=0, otherwise 
Age Age  Age for each executive 
Tenure Tenure  
Number of years at a given hierarchical level 
in a given fiscal year 
Executive Ownership Executive Ownership 
Outstanding shares held by individual 
executive /Total number of shares of the 
company 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size Firm Size Log transformation of total annual assets  
Firm Age Firm Age Established years for the company 
Volatility  Volatility  
Stock return volatility, measured as the 
standard deviation of annualized monthly 
stock returns over the prior fiscal year 
Leverage Leverage  Debt /Total assets 
Firm Growth Opportunity Growth Opportunity Market-to-book Ratio 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Board Independence Board Independence 
Number of independent directors/ Total 
number of directors 
Board Duality Duality  
Dummy variable; 
=1 if the board of directors is chaired by the 
company CEO; =0 otherwise 
Size of the Board of Directors Board Size Total number of directors on the board 
Supervisory Board Size Supervisory Size Total number supervisors 
State Ownership State Owned  
Dummy variable; 
=1 if the state is the largest shareholder in a 
company;  
=0 otherwise 




Percentage of shares owned by the largest 
shareholder 
Other Controls   
Year Dummy Year Dummy 
Dummy variable for each year during 2006-
2011 
Industry Dummy Industry Dummy 
Dummy variable for each industry; based on 
5 industries classified by CSRC, including 
Manufactory, Public Service, Real Estate, 
Conglomerate, and Commerce  
Region Dummy Region Dummy 
Based on 7  geographically-based regions in 
China, including North, Northeast, East, 





4.8.1.1 Executive Compensation  
The level of the executive compensation is one of the dependent variables in this study. 
Chinese listed companies are required to disclose the total cash compensation for 
individual executives after 2005. Therefore, in this study, the level of the executive 
compensation is measured as the individual executive’s total cash compensation 
published in annual reports of Chinese listed companies. Such compensation is defined 
as the sum of salary, bonus and stipend. This is consistent with most prior literature in 
the context of China (e.g. Conyon & He, 2011, 2012; Chen et al., 2011). The use of 
cash compensation is also consistent with early literature in the context of developed 
countries (e.g. Main, 1991; Conyon, 1997). As mentioned before, skewed distributions 
can result in weak statistical relationships and heteroscedasticity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996). This problem could be mitigated by using log transformation of the 
compensation level in most compensation literature (e.g. Andreas et al., 2012; Linn & 
Park, 2005). Similarly, in this study, the log transformation of the cash compensation is 
employed. 
Another dependent variable is the equity-based compensation. Normally, executives in 
Chinese listed companies are offered the equity-based compensation in the form of 
stock options, restricted stocks and stock appreciation rights. However, it is not possible 
for this study to measure the value of those equity incentives due to the data limitation 
resulting from weak compensation disclosure system in China. As Chinese listed 
companies are asked to report whether a given executive has been granted an equity-
based incentive in a fiscal year, this study could take this opportunity to examine 
determinants of the likelihood of receiving the equity-based compensation for 
individual executives. Following prior studies (e.g. Tzioumis, 2008; Conyon & He, 
2012), the equity-based compensation in this study is measured by a dummy variable 
equal to one if the executive has been granted equity-based compensation in a given 
fiscal year.  
4.8.1.2 Company Performance  
There are two types of company performance measures which are widely used in the 
literature. On one hand, accounting-based performance is considered to be the standard 
performance measure (Lambert & Larcker, 1987). On the other hand, some scholars 
argue that stock market-based return seems to be a more appropriate measure for 
performance because in the principal-agent relationship within modern corporations, the 
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shareholder is the principal who asks for returns (Murphy, 1985; Conyon & Sadler, 
2001). Although a consensus has not reached as to which is the better performance 
measure, Mehran (1995) argues that the choice of measurement should not influence the 
qualitative nature of the results. In addition, using different performance proxies and 
comparing estimations are helpful to get a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between pay and firm performance. Therefore, in this study, both 
accounting-based performance and stock-based performance are employed, consistent 
with previous literature (e.g. Firth, Leung, et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2011; 2012). 
Specifically, the former is measured by return on assets (ROA), and the latter is 
measured by annualised stock return calculated using data from monthly returns. 
Prior studies normally empirically compare the effects of accounting-based performance 
and stock-based performance on executive compensation. Conyon and He (2011) 
demonstrate that CEO pay in Chinese listed firms is more closely linked to accounting 
performance, although it is positively influenced by both accounting and stock-based 
performance. Firth et al., (2006) find that in contrast to SOE dominant shareholders, 
private dominant shareholders are more likely to link incentive pay to stock-based 
performance rather than accounting-based performance.  Consistent with prior literature, 
this study compares the pay-performance link for accounting-based and stock-based 
performance.   
4.8.1.3 Hierarchical Levels 
The hierarchical level is another important predictor in this study. Job titles and roles of 
each executive are identified first of all. Next, on the basis of prior literature (e.g. 
Lambert et al., 1993; Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Lin et al., 2011) and features of 
organisational structure in Chinese listed companies, executives are classified into three 
hierarchical levels as follows: 
 Level 1: Company CEO. This is the highest hierarchical level. Executives with 
the highest authorities are allocated in this group.  
 Level 2: Divisional CEO. This is the second highest hierarchical level. It 
includes company vice general managers who are the president of divisions, 
such as Chief Finance Officer (CFO).  
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 Level 3: Other executives. This is the lowest hierarchical level in this study. 
Company secretaries and directors of subsections within a division are included 
in this group.  
4.8.1.4 Presence of the Remuneration Committee 
The remuneration committee plays an important role in compensation practices.  In 
particular, companies with the remuneration committee might be more effective at 
monitoring executive compensation. Consistent with Main and Johnston (1993), 
Conyon and Peck (1998), Conyon and He (2011; 2012), the presence of the 
remuneration committee is measured as a dummy variable equal to one if a company 
reports an established remuneration committee in its annual report in a given fiscal year, 
and zero otherwise.  
4.8.1.5 Proportion of Insiders on the Remuneration Committee 
Williamson (1985) argues that in a firm without an independent remuneration 
committee, the contract between the firm and manager could be interpreted as the fact 
that managers write their own contracts with one hand and sign them with the other.  
Prior literature measures the composition of the remuneration committee in different 
ways. Vafeas (2003) employs a proportion of insiders sitting on the remuneration 
committee. Similarly, Singh and Harianto (1989) use a proportion of executives on the 
remuneration committee. Reversely, Conyon and Peck (1998) use a proportion of non-
executives on the remuneration committee as the proxy for committee independence. 
Daily et al., (1998) employ both the proportion of affiliated directors and proportion of 
independent directors on the remuneration committee, while Newman and Mozes (1999) 
use a dummy variable equal to one if at least one insider is serving on the remuneration 
committee. Similar to Vafeas (2003), in this study, the proportion of non-independent 
directors sitting on the remuneration committee is employed. 
4.8.1.6 Size of the Remuneration Committee 
As mentioned early, prior literature has suggested that a smaller board might be more 
easily influenced by company executives (Sun & Cahan 2009; and Sun, Cahan, & 
Emanuel, 2009), and may also have insufficient advisors and experts in monitoring 
(Bushman et al., 2004). Similarly, one can expect that compensation decisions of the 
remuneration committee will be more likely to be influenced by executives if the 
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committee is smaller. As the board size is normally measured as total number of 
directors sitting on the board (Yermack, 1996; Firth et al., 2007), this study measures 
the size of the remuneration committee as total number of members serving on a 
remuneration committee,  consistent with Sun and Cahan (2009) and Sun et al., (2009) 
4.8.1.7 Executive Attributes 
Effects of an individual executive’s attributes including gender, age and tenure are 
controlled in this study. First of all, gender is one of the important managerial attributes 
which might determine executive compensation. In prior studies, empirical findings 
regarding compensation differences between males and females are mixed. On one hand, 
female executives are found to be paid less than male executives (e.g. Mohan & 
Ruggiero, 2007; Elkinawy & Stater, 2011). Elkinawy and Stater (2011) argue that the 
observed pay differences between females and males might be partly due to the male-
dominated governance structures. On the other hand, there is no association between 
executive compensation and gender, according to literature such as Bowlin, Renner, and 
Rives (2003) and Bugeja, Matolcsy, and Spiropoulos (2012). Consistent with prior 
literature, this study employs a dummy variable to measure gender. Specifically, the 
dummy variable is equal to one if the executive is a female, and zero otherwise. 
In addition, age is normally employed to measure experience and the potential horizon 
problem of executives in prior literature. In particular, executives who have a short 
horizon might boost their short-term compensation through improving short-term 
earnings performance (Dechow & Sloan, 1991).  Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue 
that older CEOs require more incentive compensation as their time horizons are shorter. 
This is supported by Garen (1994) who observes a positive effect of age on pay-
performance sensitivity. However, Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2001) observe that both 
cash bonuses and restricted stocks have a concave relationship with CEO age, while 
stock options are negatively linked to CEO age. The concave relationship is consistent 
with horizon problems among younger CEOs who want to build their reputations and 
older CEOs facing retirement, according to Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2001). In this 
study, this variable is defined as the length of time that an executive has lived, and is 
measured in years. 
Similarly, tenure is also considered as a proxy of potential horizon problems (Core & 
Guay, 1999). It is also viewed as a human capital of executives by prior literature 
(Williamson, 1985; Singh & Harianto, 1989; Guay, 1999). In particular, executives with 
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longer tenures are more capable of pursuing personal agendas as they are more likely to 
be entrenched (Ryan Jr. & Wiggins III, 2001). Furthermore, from a social influence 
perspective, as executives with longer job tenure have greater social influence, they are 
more likely to be able to influence the board of directors (Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 
1990). Singh and Harianto (1989) find that the compensation level is higher if 
executives have a longer tenure. Core and Guay (1998) suggest that pay-performance 
sensitivity of a CEO is positively affected by tenure. Yermack (1995) indicates that 
CEOs with a shorter tenure receive more equity-based compensation. Following 
previous literature, tenure is defined, in this study, as the length of time that an 
executive has been in that position.  
4.8.1.8 Company Economic Characteristics 
This study caters for company characteristics including company size, age, risk, capital 
structure, and growth opportunity. Company size is a potentially important determinant 
of executive compensation. Researchers have found that there is a positive and 
significant relation between company size and the level of executive compensation (e.g. 
Murphy, 1985; Smith & Watt, 1992; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Firth, Lohne, Ropstad, & 
Sjo, 1996; Firth et al., 2007). The level of executive compensation increases as 
company size increases because larger companies may provide more complex jobs 
(Firth et al., 2007), require better managers (Conyon, 1997), and have a better ability to 
pay higher compensation for executives (Firth et al., 2007). In addition, an executive in 
a larger company potentially has a greater marginal revenue product (Firth et al., 1996). 
Moreover, the principal-agent conflicts between shareholders and managers might 
increase with company size (Barclay & Smith, 1995). Finally, executives in large 
companies might feel less constrained in seeking more compensation, due to the 
potentially weaker shareholder control resulting from widely dispersed ownership (Firth 
et al., 1996). Following Firth et al., (2007), this study employs the log transformation of 
the book value of total assets in a given fiscal year.  
Company age is also included as the control variable, given its influences on executive 
compensation as indicated in prior studies. Following prior literature such as Cordeiro, 
He, Conyon, and Shaw (2013), company age is measured as the number of years since 
the founding year.  
Company risk is also potentially crucial to executive compensation. The standard 
principal-agent model establishes an economic trade-off between inducing the 
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appropriate amount of unobservable effort by the agent and minimising the amount of 
risk the agent is required to bear (Aggarwal & Samwick, 1999). One of the rationales of 
compensation’s reaction to company risk is that risk-averse executives might ask for 
more compensation in companies which are more risky (Core et al., 1999). In addition, 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) suggest that executives in companies with more volatile 
stock prices will have less performance-based compensation. Firm risk is normally 
measured by stock return volatility in prior literature (e.g. Conyon & He, 2011; Cyert et 
al., 2002; Conyon, Core, & Guay, 2011). Consistent with Conyon et al. (2011), in this 
study, the stock return volatility is defined as the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns in the last fiscal year.  
Leverage captures a company’s capital structure and has been indicated to have a 
negative relation with executive compensation (e.g. Yermack, 1995; Conyon & He, 
2012). First of all, leverage might be an alternative governance mechanism to incentive 
pay (Harvey & Shrieves, 2001), because corporate debt may provide a mechanism for 
mitigating the potential principal-agent conflicts through cash-flow pay-out policies 
(Jensen, 1986). In addition, agency costs resulting from the interest conflicts between 
shareholders and creditors might also be crucial to explain the negative influence of 
leverage on executive compensation. John and John (1993) argue that compensation 
levels in a levered company might be less sensitive to firm performance, as it serves as a 
pre-commitment mechanism to minimise agency costs of debt. Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Firth, Leung, et al., 2010), this study defines leverage as total debts divided 
by total assets. 
Company growth opportunity is found to positively affect executive compensation in 
studies such as Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1995) and Conyon and He 
(2011). Growth opportunity increases resources under executives’ control and in turn 
increases executives’ power (Jensen, 1986). However, the difficulty for shareholders to 
monitor executives’ control over those resources might aggravate principal-agent 
conflicts between shareholders and executives, so that more incentive compensation is 
needed in companies with a greater growth opportunity (Smith & Watts, 1992). Firth et 
al., (2007) argue that executives should be awarded for their effort and success in 
developing growth opportunities for companies. Consistent with Cordeiro et al. (2013) 
and Conyon and He (2012), company growth opportunity is measured as the ratio of 
market to book value. 
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4.8.1.9 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Executive compensation and monitoring by shareholders and the board of directors are 
viewed as complementary mechanisms to mitigate agency problems associated with the 
separation of ownership and control (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; 
Hölmstrom, 1979; Core et al., 1999). In addition, the influence of executives over 
compensation schemes might be alleviated by effective monitoring (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, 
1989). Therefore, the effectiveness of monitoring, represented by the structure of the 
board and ownership, might be crucial to executive compensation.   
This study controls the effects arising from the structure of board, including board 
independence, duality of company CEO and chairman of the board of directors, size of 
the board of directors, and size of the supervisory board. More independent directors on 
the board are expected to result in less managerial opportunism and more efficient 
compensation contracts because they are more effective in monitoring (Conyon & He, 
2011). This monitoring is motivated by incentives of outside directors to develop their 
reputations in the internal and external labour markets (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Therefore, executives in companies with outsider-dominated boards may have a lower 
compensation level (Conyon & Peck, 1998). However, empirical findings regarding the 
relationship between board independence and executive compensation are mixed. Some 
scholars observe that compensation level decreases with the proportion of inside 
directors on the board (e.g. Lambert et al., 1993; Boyd, 1994; Core et al., 1999), while 
some scholars expose little or even no relationship between the percentage of outside 
directors and executive compensation (e.g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995; Conyon & Peck, 1998). In addition, Mehran (1995) observed that 
companies with a higher proportion of outside directors use more equity-based 
compensation for their executives. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that the likelihood of 
using equity-based incentives decreases as the percentage of insiders on the board 
increases in the U.S., while Conyon and He (2012) do not document any significant 
influences of the proportion of outside directors on the propensity of receiving equity-
based compensation in China. In this study, the control variable board independence is 
measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors.  
CEO duality captures the phenomenon that the positions of company CEO and 
chairman of the board of directors are concurrently held by one person. Jensen (1993) 
argues that separating the position of company CEO and board chairman is crucial to 
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the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring. In particular, concurrently holding the 
position of board chairman provides CEOs extensive power over the board (Boyd, 
1994). Therefore, CEO duality alleviates the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring, 
and in turn, results in higher executive compensation (Conyon & Peck, 1998). 
Consistent with previous literature (e.g. Conyon & Peck, 1998; Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 
2010; Conyon & He, 2011; 2012), CEO duality is measured in this study as a dummy 
variable equal to one if the company CEO and chairman of the board of directors are 
combined.  
The relationship between board size and the monitoring capacity of the board is 
debatable. Smaller boards might be short of advisors and experts in monitoring 
(Bushman et al., 2004), and more easily influenced by company executives (Sun & 
Cahan 2009; Sun et al., 2009). Therefore, the monitoring capability of a board is 
enhanced by an increase in board size. However, the benefits of having a large board 
might be overwhelmed when boards become too large. Singh and Harianto (1989) argue 
that the diversity of interests increases as the board size increases. In addition, a board 
which is too large may be associated with free-rider problems (Jensen, 1993), costs of 
slower decision-making, less-candid discussions of managerial performance, and biases 
against risk-taking (Yermack, 1996). Core et al., (1999) report a positive relationship 
between board size and the level of executive compensation, while Firth et al., (2007) 
observe that CEO compensation level is negatively influenced by board size. In addition, 
Yermack (1996) documents that CEO compensation is more sensitive to performance in 
companies with smaller boards. In terms of a supervisory board, Ding, Wu, Li, and Jia 
(2010) argue that the monitoring quality of the supervisory board is also affected by its 
size. Therefore, in this study, both the size of the board of directors and supervisory 
board size are included as control variables. Specifically, these two variables are 
measured as total number of directors on the board of directors and the total number of 
members serving on the supervisory board, respectively.  
In addition to board characteristics, ownership structure also has potential impacts on 
executive compensation. As Chinese listed firms have unique ownership structures 
(Firth et al., 2007), controlling effects of the ownership structure is important for this 
study. First of all, Chinese listed companies are featured with large state ownership 
(Allen et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2006; Chen, Liu, & Li, 2010). Conyon and He (2012) 
argue that, in contrast to privately-owned firms, state-owned firms have a relatively 
poor monitoring quality. Therefore, state-owned companies need more financial 
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incentives for executives, in order to supplement the weak monitoring. However, as the 
state might pursue political objectives rather than profit maximisation (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Shleifer, 1998), state controlled companies are less likely to adopt 
executive incentives focusing on maximising firm value (Conyon & He, 2011). 
Consistent with Firth et al., (2007), this study includes a dummy variable which is equal 
to one if the state is the largest shareholder, and to zero otherwise. 
Foreign ownership may also play an important role in designing executive 
compensation. First of all, a foreign investor might bring in international standards of 
executive compensation and corporate governance. As noted by Chen et al., (2010), the 
global compensation benchmark effects introduced by foreign investment result in the 
increase of executive compensation. In addition, foreign investors are more likely to 
pressurise companies to hire better qualified and internationally experienced executives 
who are able to negotiate higher levels of compensation (Firth et al., 2007). Finally, as 
foreign investors are normally too detached from companies, they might need more 
financial incentives to motivate executives to pursue profit-maximisation. Therefore, in 
this study, the effects of foreign ownership on executive compensation are controlled. 
Specifically, it is equal to the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. 
Chinese listed companies are also characterised by highly concentrated ownership. As 
noted by Firth et al., (2007) and Conyon and He (2011), almost all Chinese listed 
companies have a dominant shareholder who has potentially significant influences on 
executive compensation scheme. Firth et al., (2007) argue that shareholders in 
companies with concentrated ownership might have more incentives to secure their 
interests in their firms. Therefore, higher ownership concentration might result in better 
monitoring of shareholders on managerial actions. On the contrary, the free-rider 
problem arising from dispersed ownership might result in weak incentives for individual 
investors to monitor managerial behaviours (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Goldberg & Idson, 1995). Therefore, the opportunistic behaviour of managers is 
expected to increase with the decrease of ownership concentration (Goldberg & Idson, 
1995). Accordingly, entrenched executives can award themselves with high levels of 
compensation when ownership is less concentrated (Goldberg & Idson, 1995; Firth, 
Tam, & Tang, 1999; Cheung, Stouraitis, & Wong, 2005). Following Kato and Long 
(2006) and Conyon and He (2011; 2012), in this study, ownership concentration is 
measured by the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder.  
115 
 
4.8.1.10 Year Dummies and Industry Dummies 
As mentioned earlier, a set of year dummies are included to cater for year effects. Year 
dummies could also capture macroeconomic shocks (Conyon & He, 2011). Following 
Firth et al., (2007) and Conyon and He (2011), industry dummy variables are included 
to allow for cross-industry variation in the demand for managerial talent. Finally, 
following Conyon and He (2012), regional dummies are employed to control for the 
cross-region heterogeneity.  
4.8.2 Variables Included in Estimating the Causal Effect of Adopting Equity-based 
Compensation on Company Performance 
Table 4.3 presents variables involved in testing the causal effect of adopting equity-
based compensation on firm performance. Explanation of these variables is discussed 
below. 
4.8.2.1 Company Performance  
The dependent variable in the DID regression model is company performance. As 
mentioned earlier, there is no an agreement on how to measure company performance. 
Therefore, prior studies normally employ both the accounting-based performance and 
the stock market-based performance and compares estimations (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; 
Conyon & He, 2011, 2012). Following those studies, both types of performance 
measures are employed in this study. Specifically, the accounting-based performance is 
measured by ROA, and annual stock return is the proxy for the stock-market-based 
performance.  
4.8.2.2 Treated Dummy, After Dummy, and the Interaction Term 
A proper DID regression model commonly includes three important predictors: treated 
dummy, after dummy, and an interaction term treated*after. In this study, the variable 
treated dummy is equal to one if a company belongs to the treatment group (i.e. 
including companies which have started to adopt equity-based compensation between 
2006 and 2010), and to zero otherwise. The variable after dummy is equal to one if it is 
one year after adopting equity-based compensation. The interaction term is defined as 




Table 4.3  
Description of Variables Employed in Testing the Causal Effect of Adopting Equity-Based 
Compensation on Firm Performance 
 
Variable Name Code Definition 
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance 
Return on Asset ROA =Net profit / total assets 
Stock Return Stock Return 
Annualized stock returns calculated using 
monthly stock return 
Predictors: Adoption of Equity-based Compensation 
Treated*After Treated*After 
Interaction term; treated dummy times after 
dummy 
Treated Dummy Treated 
Dummy variable;  
=1 if the company has adopted equity-based 
compensation during the sample period;  
=0 otherwise 
After Dummy After 
Dummy variable;  
=1 if it is in the post-treatment year (i.e. one 
year after adopting equity-based pay) 
Control Variables 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size Firm Size Log transformation of total annual assets  
Firm Age Firm Age Established years for each company 
Leverage Leverage  Debt /Total assets 
Growth Opportunity Growth Opportunity Market-to-book Ratio 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Board Independence Board Independence 
Number of independent directors/ Total 
number of directors 
Duality Dummy Duality  
Dummy variable; 
=1 if CEO and chairman of the board of 
directors are combined; =0 otherwise 
Supervisory Board Size Supervisory Board 
Calculated by taking the natural logarithm of 
total number supervisors 
State Owned Dummy State Owned  
Dummy variable; 
=1 if the state is the largest shareholder;  




The percentage ownership of the largest 
shareholder 
Executive Ownership Executive Ownership 
Sum of executive shares divided by total 
shares of the company 
Year Dummy Year Dummy 
Dummy variable for each year during the 
period of 2006-2011 
Industry Dummy Industry Dummy 
Dummy variable for each industry; based on 
5 industries classified by CSRC, including 
Manufactory, Public Service, Real Estate, 
Conglomerate, and Commerce 
 
4.8.2.3 Company Characteristics 
One of the company characteristics controlled in the DID regression is company size. 
Larger companies might be characterized with diverse capabilities and advantages to 
exploit economies of scale (Majumdar, 1997) which may in turn generate better 
performance (Penrose, 1959). Moreover, larger companies are more likely to provide 
trainings to improve individual performance of non-owner managers (Westhead & 
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Storey, 1996). From the corporate governance perspective, larger firms might be 
associated with better corporate governance, and in turn, lead to better financial 
performance. For instance, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) find that the increase 
of company size is associated with the increase of board diversity, and board diversity 
results in improved financial performance. Following previous literature (e.g. Firth et al., 
2007), in this study, company size is measure by the log transformation of the book 
value of total assets in a given fiscal year. Company age is also included as a control 
variable. As noted by Hannan (1998), the ability of a company to survive has a close 
relationship with its age. As mentioned before, company age is measured as the number 
of years since the founding year. 
Effects of leverage are also controlled in the DID regression. Prior studies have not 
reached an agreement on the influence of leverage on company performance. On one 
hand, it has been suggested that higher leverage leads to better company performance. 
Jensen (1986) argues that interest payments in firms with higher debts motivate 
managers to invest in more effective projects with higher return. In addition, the 
interest-conflicts between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) may 
lead to underinvestment which do not benefit company performance (Myers, 1977). 
Following prior literature (e.g. Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Firth, Leung, et al., 2010), in this 
study, leverage is measured as the ratio of debt to assets.   
4.8.2.4 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Board independence is included as a control variable in the DID regression. Although 
the board will be more watchful if the proportion of independent directors on the board 
of directors is larger (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988), there is little empirical support for 
the positive influence of the board independence on company performance (e.g. Mehran, 
1995; Bhagat & Black, 2001). In this study, board independence is defined as the 
proportion of independent directors serving on the board of directors.  
The influence of CEO duality on company performance is controversial. Some scholars 
support that separating the positon of company CEO and chairman of the board of 
directors will reduce agency costs and improve firm performance (Rechner & Dalton, 
1991; Dayton, 1984), while some researchers argue that CEO duality can improve 
company performance as it provides the CEO with full authority and responsibility over 
the company (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994), mitigates the potential conflicts (Galbraith, 
1977), and accelerates the effective decision making (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). In 
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this study, duality is measured as a dummy variable which is equal to one if the position 
of company CEO and board chairman are combined.  
The relation of board size and company performance is fairly clear (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003). Specifically, it has been found that company performance decreases 
as board size increases (e.g. Yermack, 1996). The size of the board of directors and the 
supervisory board size are both included as control variables. Specifically, the former is 
defined as total number of directors on the board of directors, and the latter is measured 
as total number of members serving on the supervisory board. 
As mentioned early, Chinese listed companies are featured with large state ownership 
(Firth et al., 2006) and concentrated ownership (Conyon & He, 2011). In the DID 
regression, state ownership is measured as a dummy variable which is equal to one if 
state is the dominant shareholder, and to zero otherwise. Ownership concentration is 
defined as the sum of the squares of the shareholdings of each top 10 largest 
shareholders (i.e. Herfindahl_10). Finally, Yermack (1996) indicates that company 
performance has a significantly positive relation with executive ownership. In the DID 
estimation, executive ownership is defined as executive shares divided by total shares in 
the company.  
4.8.2.5 Year and Industry Dummies  
Like the FE-2SLS estimation, year dummies are also included in the DID regression, in 
order to account for year effects, as well as macroeconomic shocks (Conyon & He, 
2011). Industry dummies are included to allow for cross-industry variation. 
4.9 Data Source and Sample Selection 
Data about executive compensation, managerial attributes, firm economic variables and 
corporate governance characteristics including board and ownership structure are 
obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) 
provided by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company. CSMAR is the most 
complete database which covers almost all listed companies in China and has been 
widely used in prior literature (e.g. Conyon & He, 2012; Chen et al., 2011). In addition, 
the remuneration committee data, including the presence of the remuneration committee 
and total number of members serving on the remuneration committee, is manually 
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. Finally, information 
about whether a remuneration committee member is an insider is manually collected 
from annual reports and announcements. This information is used for calculating the 
proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee. 
In terms of samples included in estimations, two separate samples are selected to 
estimate determinants of executive compensation, and to test the causal effects of 
adopting equity-based compensation on company performance. 
4.9.1 Samples Included in Testing the Determinants of Executive Compensation 
In terms of samples for estimating determinants of executive compensation, this study 
chooses sample period 2006-2011 to reduce the sample selection biases, since Chinese 
listed companies are not required to disclose compensation for individual executives 
until the end of 2005. Between 2001 and 2005, the CSRC required all public companies 
to report the aggregated sum of total compensation for the three highest-paid executives 
and board members (Conyon & He, 2012).  
Executives have to satisfy the following criteria, in order to be included in the sample. 
First of all, executives should not be from companies in the financial sector as financial 
institutions have different financial and governance characteristics. In addition, 
executives have to be in companies which have been listed on either Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchange for at least two years before the end of 2006. One of the 
reasons for imposing this condition is that the regressions use one year lagged value of 
economic and corporate governance characteristics. In addition, this condition helps to 
ensure company economic factors, corporate governance characteristics, and executive 
compensation will not be affected by a new listing.  Moreover, executives should come 
from companies which have data over the full sample period, in order to keep balanced 
and consistent company data. Finally, executives should have been in the current 
company for no less than two years, due to the use of one year lagged value of company 
economic and corporate governance characteristics. After deleting observations with 
missed variables, the final sample includes 14,919 executive-level observations 
containing 2,626 executives from 979 companies over the period from 2006 to 2011.  
                                                          
10
 Annual reports are downloaded from http://www.nbdqw.com/.  
11
 Announcements are published on http://www.cninfo.com.cn/, an official website for Chinese listed 
firms to publish their announcements. 
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Only observations from companies in which the remuneration committee has been 
established are included in the sample, when testing the influences of the proportion of 
insiders on the remuneration committee and the size of the remuneration committee on 
executive compensation plans. This sample includes 12,790 executive-level 
observations consisting of 2,577 executives from 966 companies during the period from 
2006 to 2011. 
4.9.2 Samples Included in Testing the Causal Effect of Adopting Equity-based 
Compensation on Company Performance 
This study uses data on the adoption of equity-based compensation between 2006 and 
2010. Companies are divided into two groups in this study: a treatment group including 
companies which have started to adopt equity-based compensation between 2006 and 
2010, and a control group including companies which have never adopted equity-based 
compensation during the same period. Each company in the treatment group is matched 
with 10 companies from the control group, one year before adopting equity-based 
compensation. For instance, if a company firstly starts to implement equity-based 
compensation in year t, its matched controls are selected based on covariates in year t-1. 
Therefore, data regarding covariates (e.g. economic factors; corporate governance 
factors) in the PSM matching procedure covers the period from 2005 to 2009. In 
addition, performance data from one year after adopting equity-based compensation is 
employed, in order to estimate whether adopting equity-based compensation delivers 
better future performance. Therefore, the performance data spans from 2007 and 2011. 
The data timeline is described in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 
 Data Timeline 
 
Year t-1, matching based on covariates                                   Year t+1, performance consequences 
                 Pre-treatment                                                                                       Post-treatment 
                                                                         Treatment 
Year t, the year a company starts to adopt the equity-based Compensation 
Companies have to meet the following criteria in order to have an opportunity to be 
included in the final sample. First of all, companies should not be in the financial sector 
as financial institutions may have different economic and corporate governance 
characteristics. Secondly, companies have to be listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen 
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stock exchange at least two years before the end of 2006. One of the reasons for 
imposing this condition is the use of one year lagged values of economic and corporate 
governance characteristics in the PSM procedure. In addition, this condition helps to 
ensure economic factors, corporate governance characteristics and executive 
compensation plans will not be affected by a new listing. After dropping firms which do 
not meet the above criteria, the PSM method produces a final sample consisting of one 
treatment group and a matched control group covering 391 companies during the 
sample period. Specifically, the treatment group includes 41 companies, while the 
matched control group
12
 involves 350 companies.  
4.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the research philosophy of this study is the positivism epistemology with 
the objectivism ontological position, and the research paradigm in this study attaches to 
functionalist. In addition, this study relies on the deductive research approach as it 
develops hypotheses based on existing theories and previous literature in the fields of 
executive compensation. In order to test those hypotheses, panel data are collected from 
the secondary source (i.e. database, annual reports, announcements), and the mono 
quantitative method is employed.   
One methodological contribution of this study is that it employs the fixed-effect two-
stage least squares (FE-2SLS) instrumental variables (IV) estimator, when testing 
models regarding the determinant of compensation level and pay-performance link. An 
advantage of this method is that it accounts for endogeneity of company performance, 
as well as correlated unobserved heterogeneity (Semykina & Wooldridge, 2010). In 
addition, standard errors are clustered by companies, and year dummies are included, in 
order to account for the cross-sectional dependence and the time-series dependence. In 
terms of estimations regarding the determinants of the likelihood of receiving equity-
based compensation, this study employs logit models with year dummies and standard 
errors clustered by companies.  
Another methodological contribution in this study is that, the propensity score matching 
(PSM) method is combined with the difference-in-difference (DID) estimation, in order 
to test the causal effect of adopting equity-based compensation on company 
                                                          
12
 In order to reduce matching bias, this study employs the propensity score matching using the nearest 
neighbour matching algorithm without replacement. Therefore, one control firm can be matched to 
different treatment firms.  
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performance. Specifically, the PSM method matches companies in the treated group 
with companies in the control group. The treated group consists of companies which 
have started to adopt equity-based compensation during the period from 2006 to 2010, 
and the control group includes companies which have never adopted equity-based 
compensation during the same period. Based on the matched sample, the causal effect is 
estimated via the DID regression.   
The final sample includes 14,919 executive-level observations containing 2,626 
executives from 979 firms over the period from 2006 to 2011, when testing the 
influence of company performance, the presence of the remuneration committee, and 
hierarchical levels on compensation plans. The sample size is reduced when testing the 
influence of proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee and size of the 
remuneration committee on compensation plans, because only observations from 
companies with the remuneration committee are included. This sample includes 12,790 
individual-level observations containing 2,577 executives from 966 companies during 
the period from 2006 to 2011. Finally, there are 391 company-level observations 
consisting of 41 companies from the treated group and 350 companies from the control 
group, when estimating the causal effect of adopting equity-based compensation on 
company performance. Having explained models, estimators and samples in this study, 




Chapter 5: Compensation Level and Company 
Performance-Empirical Results 
 
“Well, I-- I-- I feel fine with people making a lot of money for doing a great job. I mean, 
you know, the people in your field that do a great job make a lot of money”. 





The research hypotheses and research methodology to test those hypotheses have been 
described in the previous chapter. This chapter moves on to the data analysis and 
empirical findings. Specifically, it presents empirical results for the first research 
question: has executive compensation been positively linked to firm performance in 
Chinese listed companies, as predicted by the principal-agent theory?  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics for executive compensation, company performance, executive 
attributes, firm attributes and economic characteristics, and corporate governance 
characteristics during the sample period together with the correlation matrix for key 
variables. Empirical evidence of pay-performance relation obtained from the normal 
OLS estimation, the fixed-effect model and the two-stage squares approach are 
compared in section 5.3. This chapter ends up with section 5.4, the conclusion section.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This section aims to provide the fundamental numerical information about the sample 
and variables used in estimating the pay-performance relation. Specifically, the 
descriptive statistics of executive compensation, managerial attributes, firm attributes 
and economic characteristics, as well as corporate governance characteristics are 
presented in this section.  
Table 5.1 quantitatively describes the data pattern for executive cash compensation, 
equity-based compensation, executive share ownership, executive age, tenure and 
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gender. In particular, the central tendency and dispersion are described by mean and 
standard deviation, respectively. As shown in table 5.1, the mean value of executive 
annual cash compensation increases year by year during the period 2006-2011. The 
average executive cash compensation dramatically increases from 233,108 Yuan in 
2006 to 324,090 Yuan in 2007, about 39 percent growth rate. The growth in pay is 
relatively slower between 2007 and 2009. Specifically, the average cash compensation 
is 349,513 Yuan and 388,427 Yuan in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The average level 
of executive compensation continues going up after 2009, and reaches to 471,714 Yuan 
in 2010. By the end of 2011, mean value of cash compensation for executives has 
increased to 526,577, more than two times the average compensation in 2006.  
However, Chen et al. (2011) argue that in spite of the dramatic increase, the level of 
executive compensation in China is still much lower than that in developed countries. 
For instance, a report provided by Davis and Mishel (2014) from the Economic Policy 
Institute shows that average compensation for CEOs in America is around 12,667,000 
dollars (approximately 69,705,780 Yuan), and a survey conducted in 2014 by MM&K 
limited, a leading independent consultancy, shows that in 2011, average compensation 






Table 5.1  
Descriptive Statistics: 











2151 2006 233.108 244.350 11.390 5,845.000 
2603 2007 324.090 377.299 17.618 7,105.300 
2513 2008 349.513 352.829 22.936 6,846.400 
2527 2009 388.427 371.365 16.600 5,200.000 
2556 2010 471.714 451.553 24.000 6,800.000 
2569 2011 526.577 540.050 27.610 9,577.400 
Total 14919  386.312 414.491 11.390 9,577.400 
Equity-based Pay 
(Dummy) 
2151 2006 0.036 0.186 0 1 
2603 2007 0.037 0.189 0 1 
2513 2008 0.047 0.212 0 1 
2527 2009 0.057 0.232 0 1 
2556 2010 0.058 0.233 0 1 
2569 2011 0.066 0.248 0 1 
Total 14919  0.050 0.219 0 1 
Share Ownership 
(%) 
2151 2006 0.100 1.000 0.000 24.700 
2603 2007 0.100 1.000 0.000 24.700 
2513 2008 0.100 1.000 0.000 24.700 
2527 2009 0.100 1.000 0.000 24.700 
2556 2010 0.100 1.000 0.000 29.700 
2569 2011 0.100 0.900 0.000 23.900 
Total 14919  0.100 1.000 0.000 29.700 
Age 
(Years) 
2151 2006 43.718 5.866 27 69 
2603 2007 44.393 5.862 28 70 
2513 2008 45.413 5.888 29 71 
2527 2009 46.486 5.863 30 72 
2556 2010 47.418 5.865 31 73 
2569 2011 48.452 5.861 32 74 
Total 14919  46.039 6.090 27 74 
Tenure 
(Years) 
2151 2006 5.257 2.173 2.003 17.175 
2603 2007 5.671 2.409 2.003 18.175 
2513 2008 6.648 2.432 2.003 19.178 
2527 2009 7.435 2.601 2.000 20.178 
2556 2010 8.209 2.793 2.014 21.178 
2569 2011 9.037 2.949 2.000 19.014 
Total 14919  7.089 2.902 2.000 21.178 
Female 
(Dummy) 
2151 2006 0.124 0.329 0 1 
2603 2007 0.126 0.332 0 1 
2513 2008 0.125 0.330 0 1 
2527 2009 0.126 0.332 0 1 
2556 2010 0.127 0.333 0 1 
2569 2011 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Total 14919  0.125 0.331 0 1 
 
The central tendency of executive cash compensation is more vividly described in figure 
5.1. Both the median and mean of executive cash compensation show a rising tendency 
in figure 5.1. In addition, as the mean is always larger than the median, the distribution 
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of executive cash compensation has a positive skew. Therefore, this study takes 
logarithm transformation for the independent variable, executive cash compensation, in 
order to satisfy the OLS assumption of normal distribution. It is worth noting that 




The proportion of executives who have been granted equity-based compensation is very 
low, although it experiences annual increases during the period 2006-2011. As shown in 
table 5.1 and figure 5.2, only 77 executives, about 3.6 percent of total executives, have 
been granted equity-based compensation in 2006, and the number of executives with 
equity-based compensation has risen to 169 by the end 2011, accounting for 
approximately 6.6 percent of the total executives in that fiscal year. Table 5.1 reveals 
that the executive share ownership remains stable low. Specifically, the average of 



























Figure 5.1  



























Figure 5.2  
Frequency Distribution of Executives with Equity-
based Compensation, 2006-2011 
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both tenure and age span widely during the sample period. In particular, executive 
tenure ranges from 2 years to more than 21 years, while the age difference between the 
youngest and the oldest executive is 47 years. Finally, the average proportion of female 
executive in the sample stays around 12.5 percent. 
Table 5.2  














2005 2.71 -14.75 4,426,000 9.99 0.52 0.11 0.73 
2006 3.89 69.61 5,086,900 10.99 0.53 0.12 1.38 
2007 5.44 172.72 7,002,100 12.00 0.52 0.20 3.51 
2008 3.46 -60.35 7,896,300 13.02 0.52 0.18 1.46 
2009 3.89 128.51 9,352,200 13.97 0.52 0.14 3.76 
2010 4.99 10.02 11,511,000 15.00 0.53 0.12 4.26 
2011 4.36 -35.85 13,428,000 16.00 0.54 0.10 3.58 
Average 4.11 38.56 8,386,071 13.00 0.53 0.14 2.67 
 
Table 5.2 presents mean values for company performance and other financial 
characteristics. According to table 5.2, average ROA increases from 2.71 percent to the 
peak in 2007. However, ROA dramatically declines from 5.44 percent in 2007 to 3.46 
percent in 2008. The average ROA starts to increase again after 2008. By the end of 
2011, the average ROA has risen to 4.36 percent. Overall, the average ROA during the 
whole period 2005-2011 is around 4.11 percent, consistent with Firth, Jin, and Zhang 
(2014) which reports that the average ROA between 2004 and 2009 is close to 4.00 
percent.  
Annual stock return of Chinese listed companies included in this sample fluctuates 
greatly during the period 2005-2011. Similar to the pattern of the average ROA, the 
average stock return rapidly rises between 2005 and 2007, but plunges during 2007-
2008. In particular, stock return increases from 69.61 percent in 2006 to 172.72 percent 
in 2007, but dramatically reduces by 233.07 percent from 2007 to the end of 2008, 
possibly due to the global financial crisis. The stock return inclines again after 2008, 
and reaches to 128.51 percent in 2009, nearly threefold from one year ago. Yet this high 
return does not last very long. By the end of 2011, the average annualized stock return 
has decreased to -35.85 percent.  
In terms of other firm financial characteristics and attributes, firm size (i.e. total assets) 
increases year by year during the period 2005-2011. By the end of 2011, the average of 
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firm total assets has increased to 13,428,000,000 Yuan, almost three times as much in 
2005. The average firm age is about 13 years, and the average leverage maintains 
between 0.52 and 0.54. The high volatility occurs between 2007 and 2008, probably 
because the shocks of global financial crisis. Specifically, the mean volatility is 0.20 
and 0.18 in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Finally, the mean growth opportunity is 
approximately 2.67, reflecting strong growth opportunities.  
Table 5.3  




2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Remuneration Committee 
(Dummy) 
0.61 0.69 0.90 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.88 
Board Independence (%) 35 35 36 36 36 36 37 36 
CEO and Chairman Duality 
(Dummy) 
0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Board Size 9.86 9.71 9.66 9.54 9.46 9.45 9.41 9.58 
Supervisory Board Size 4.22 4.17 4.15 4.12 4.09 4.07 4.05 4.12 
Largest Shareholding (%) 40.51 35.11 34.57 34.55 33.93 33.32 32.98 35.00 
State Owned (Dummy) 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.18 
Foreign Ownership (%) 4.06 4.03 4.05 3.79 3.35 3.06 2.92 3.26 
 
Table 5.3 above describes the evolution of corporate governance characteristics from 
2005 to 2011. The proportion of Chinese listed companies with the remuneration 
committee rapidly increases in 2007. This might be because of the “Corporate 
Governance Special Campaign” held in March, 2007. As mentioned in chapter 2, this 
special campaign effectively enhanced the corporate governance quality of individual 
firms. The proportion of independent directors serving on the board of directors 
stabilizes at around 36 percent, indicating that most of Chinese listed firms appear to 
comply with the “Guidance on Independent Directors”. According to the “Guidance on 
Independent Directors”, the board of directors should have at least one third 
independent directors (CSRC, 2001). With respect to the duality of company CEO and 
chairman of the board of directors, only about 13 percent of the companies have 
combined CEO and chairman, although the “Company Law” does not restrict 
companies to separate those two positions. The average size of the board of directors 
stabilizes at 9.58, while the mean value of the supervisory board size is 4.12. This is 
consistent with the “Company Law”, which requires that the board of directors shall 
consist of 5 to 19 members, while the supervisory board shall be composed of not less 
than 3 members (CSRC, 2006). 
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Table 5.3 also shows that ownership structure in Chinese listed companies has 
experienced significant changes between 2005 and 2011. Both the ownership 
concentration and the proportion of state-owned companies consistently decrease over 
the seven years, consistent with Conyon and He (2012). To be specific, the average 
shareholding of the largest shareholder at individual companies decreases from 40.51 
percent in 2005 to 32.98 percent in 2011. In addition, the proportion of companies in 
which the state is the largest shareholder drops from 26 percent in 2005 to only 2 
percent in 2011, indicating that Chinese government has gradually released their direct 
control over listed companies through company privatization. The reduced state 
ownership may also be influenced by the split-share reform (i.e. converting non-tradable 
shares to tradable shares) which was officially launched in 2005 (Yeh et al., 2009; 
Conyon & He, 2012). Foreign ownership is very low during the period 2005-2011. On 
average, only around 3.26 percent shares are owned by foreign investors. 
Table 5.4 reports the correlation matrix for variables regarding executive compensation, 
managerial attributes, company financial characteristics, and corporate governance 
characteristics, in order to explore the inter-correlation between variables. The level of 
executive cash compensation is positively correlated with ROA, but is negatively 
correlated with stock return. In terms of executive attributes, age, tenure and executive 
ownership are positively correlated with the level of cash compensation, while there is a 
negative correlation between female dummy and compensation level. Regarding 
company financial characteristics, both company size and leverage have positive 
correlations with the compensation level, while company age and volatility are 
negatively correlated with the compensation level. All of the corporate governance 
characteristics tend to be strongly correlated with the compensation level. Specifically, 
the level of compensation is positively correlated with the remuneration committee 
dummy, board size and independence, the duality of the company CEO and the board of 
directors, the size of supervisory board, and foreign ownership. However, it is 




Table 5.4  
Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Log(cash) 1            
2. Equity-based Pay 0.16*** 1           
3. ROA 0.29*** 0.11*** 1          
4. Stock Return -0.12*** -0.02*** 0.101*** 1         
5. Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.169*** 0.00326 0.01 -0.00 1        
6. Hierarchy 2 (Second-highest) -0.01 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 -0.68*** 1       
7. Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) -0.17*** -0.03*** -0.02** 0.0154* -0.17*** -0.61*** 1      
8. Age 0.18*** -0.03*** -0.02* -0.10*** 0.10*** 0.04*** -0.16*** 1     
9. Tenure 0.22*** 0.04*** -0.00 -0.17*** 0.04*** -0.03*** -0.01 0.34*** 1    
10. Female -0.06*** -0.01 0.02** -0.00 -0.11*** -0.00 0.12*** -0.10*** -0.02*** 1   
11. Executive Ownership 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.01 -0.01 0.15*** -0.09*** -0.03*** 0.01* -0.01 -0.03*** 1  
12. Firm Size 0.47*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.13*** -0.04*** 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.12*** 0.13*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 1 
13. Firm Age -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.11*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.07*** 
14. Leverage 0.17*** 0.04*** -0.06*** -0.12*** 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.14*** 0.28*** 0.05*** -0.09*** 0.12*** 
15. Volatility -0.02** 0.01 -0.08*** -0.12*** 0.01* -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02** 0.01 -0.03*** 
16. Growth Opportunity 0.00 0.02* 0.00 -0.05*** 0.02** -0.01 -0.01 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.00 0.00 -0.06*** 
17. Committee Dummy 0.20*** 0.04*** 0.01* -0.15*** 0.01 0.04*** -0.06*** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.01 0.01 0.14*** 
18. Duality 0.04*** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.02* 0.07*** -0.04*** 
19. Board Independence 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 0.02** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.001 0.00 -0.01 0.02** 0.03*** 
20. Board Size 0.14*** 0.01 0.02** -0.02* -0.04*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.01 0.00 -0.04*** -0.05*** 0.29*** 
21. Supervisory Board Size 0.03*** -0.06*** -0.01 0.02** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.03*** -0.05*** 0.20*** 
22. Ownership Concentration -0.02*** -0.13*** 0.08*** 0.02** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.07*** 0.00 -0.08*** -0.01* -0.09*** 0.20*** 
23. State Owned -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.02*** 0.08*** -0.02*** -0.00 0.03*** 0.02** -0.06*** -0.01 -0.03*** 0.06*** 
24. Foreign Ownership 0.14*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.00 -0.02** -0.01 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.00 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.10*** 




Table 5.4 Correlation Matrix (Continued) 
Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13. Firm Age 1            
14. Leverage 0.12*** 1           
15. Volatility 0.06*** 0.02** 1          
16. Growth Opportunity 0.01 0.09*** 0.06*** 1         
17. Committee Dummy 0.01 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 1        
18. Duality -0.02** 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01* 1       
19. Board Independence 0.02* 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02* 0.04*** 0.04*** 1      
20. Board Size 0.01 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** 0.07*** -0.06*** -0.27*** 1     
21. Supervisory Board  0.05*** 0.02** -0.01 -0.02*** 0.05*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 0.33*** 1    
22. Ownership Concentration -0.05*** -0.32*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.03*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 1   
23. State Owned 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.00 0.07*** 0.07***   
24. Foreign Ownership 0.01 0.08*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.02** 0.04*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 1 
         * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Explanation of the variables are presented in table 4.2 in Chapter 4.
132 
 
5.3 Regression Results 
This section aims to present the empirical results in relation to hypothesis 1. As mentioned 
in previous chapter, the potential multi-collinearity problem is examined by VIF tests. It 
might be problematic if the value of VIF is above 10 (Chen et al, 2003; Wooldridge, 2013). 
Table 5.5 presents the statistics obtained from the VIF test. The mean value of VIF for all 
independent variables in the regression model is 1.57, as shown in table 5.5, indicating that 
there is no potential multi-collinearity in regressions regarding the relation of 
compensation level and company performance.  
 Table 5.5  
VIF Test: Compensation Level and Company Performance Regression 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Year Dummy_2011 3.07 Board Size 1.37 
Year Dummy_2008 2.91 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2010 2.71 Committee Dummy 1.28 
Year Dummy_2009 2.69 Age 1.24 
Area Dummy_4 2.43 Supervisory Board  1.21 
Year Dummy_2007 2.05 Industry_4 1.14 
Ranking 1 2.01 Board Independence 1.14 
Ranking 2 1.97 Industry_3 1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.93 Industry_5 1.12 
Stock Return 1.85 State Owned  1.12 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Industry_2 1.11 
Firm Age 1.68 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Volatility 1.62 Leverage 1.08 
Area Dummy_6 1.60 ROA 1.08 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Firm Size 1.40 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Tenure 1.39 Female 1.05 
Area Dummy_5 1.39 Duality 1.04 
Mean VIF: 1.57 
 
Table 5.6 reports the relation of compensation level and company performance when 
performance is measured by ROA. Column (1), (2) and (3) in table 5.6 show the empirical 
results obtained from the pooled-sample OLS regression, the standard fixed-effect 
regression and the FE-2SLS estimator, respectively. In all three models, standard errors are 
clustered by companies, and year dummies are included, in order to allow for arbitrary 
within-company correlation, and arbitrary within-year correlation.  
The dependent variable is executive compensation, calculated by taking natural logarithm 
of total cash compensation for individual executives. The regressions use the value of ROA, 
age, gender, tenure, executive stock ownership and company age in the current fiscal year, 
while the lagged value of other financial and corporate governance variables is employed. 
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In addition to year dummies, industry and location dummies are included to control for 
cross industry and region heterogeneity (Conyon & He, 2012). 
Column (1) of Table 5.6 documents the pooled sample estimates using OLS regression. 
The F-statistic of the OLS method is 77.35 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level (i.e. 
Prob.>F=0.000). This indicates that the model is correctly specified. R-square of OLS 
regression shown in Column (1) of Table 5.6 suggests that 46.7% of the sample variation 
in Log(cash) is explained by independent variables included in the model. The OLS 
regression results show that the coefficient on ROA is 2.730 and statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level (i.e. p<0.01). This indicates that executive cash compensation increases by 
1433.29 percent (i.e. exp(2.730)-1) for a one-unit increase in ROA. The level of 
compensation is still significantly positively related to ROA when the fixed-effect 
regression is employed. The relation is still statistically significant at the 0.01 level (i.e. 
p<0.01), but the coefficient is much lower than that obtained from the normal OLS 
regression. Specifically, one unit change in ROA will positively result in a 154.21 percent 
(i.e. exp(0.933)-1) change in the level of compensation, as shown in column (2) of Table 
5.6.  
Column (3) in Table 5.6 presents the empirical results obtained from the FE-2SLS. In the 
first stage, ROA is regressed on the instrumental variable relative market share and all other 
independent variables. Column (3A) shows that the relative market share appears to be a 
significant predictor for ROA. In the second stage, the compensation level is regressed on 
the predicted value of ROA obtained from the first stage and a set of control variables. 
There is a significantly positive relation of the level of compensation and ROA, as shown 
in column (3B) in Table 5.6. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient of ROA is larger, 
comparing with the OLS estimates and the standard fixed-effect estimates. To be specific, 
executive cash compensation is expected to incline by 1587.78 percent (i.e. exp(2.826)-1) 
for a one-unit increase in ROA. The positive relation between the level of compensation 
and ROA is in line with the findings in previous studies in the context of China (e.g. Firth 
et al., 2010; Conyon & He, 2011).  
Table 5.6 also shows other determinants of executive cash compensation in Chinese listed 
companies. Consistent with prior studies, the level of compensation is shown to be 
positively related to company size (e.g. Firth et al., 1996; 2007), but to be negatively 
influenced by leverage (e.g. Yermack, 1995; Conyon & He, 2012). The positive relation of 
company age and compensation level obtained from the FE-2SLS shows that executives at 
older companies are more likely to get higher compensation. In terms of ownership 
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structure, both the OLS and the FE-2SLS estimates suggest that the level of compensation 
is lower in state-owned companies, but higher in companies with higher foreign ownership. 
These findings are in line with prior studies in the context of China (e.g. Chen et al., 2011; 
Conyon & He, 2012).  
The OLS regression results show other factors which affect the level of executive 
compensation in China. According to column (1) in Table 5.6, companies with the 
remuneration committee are more likely to offer higher compensation for executives, 
consistent with Conyon and He (2011; 2012). In addition, there is positive relation between 
executive ownership and cash compensation, indicating that executive might take 
advantage of their ownership power to influence board decisions to increase their 
compensation level (Lambert et al., 1993; Chen et al., 2011). Finally, the OLS results 
indicate that there is a positive relationship between the board size and the level of 
executive compensation, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Firth et al., 
2010). 
Table 5.7 reports the pay-performance relation when company performance is measured by 
annualized monthly stock return. In contrast to the significantly positive relationship 
between the level of compensation and accounting-based performance, the relation of 
executive cash compensation and company stock return is not shown to be statistically 
significant. This is consistent with Firth et al. (2007) which indicates that there is no 
significant relation between stock return and the level of compensation in Chinese listed 















 Stage (3A) 2
nd
 Stage(3B) 
Log(cash) Log(cash) ROA Log(cash) 
ROA 2.730*** 0.933***  2.826*** 
 (9.92) (5.44)  (3.17) 
Relative Market Share   0.024***  
   (4.47)  
Hierarchy1 0.617*** 0.218*** -0.011 0.241*** 
 (17.73) (5.48) (-1.42) (5.61) 
Hierarchy2 0.284*** 0.106*** -0.000 0.106*** 
 (10.01) (3.67) (-0.07) (3.66) 
Age 0.004** 0.050 0.020 0.035 
 (2.02) (0.55) (0.46) (1.64) 
Tenure 0.017*** -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 
 (3.38) (-0.92) (-0.21) (-0.77) 
Female -0.036    
 (-1.02)    
Executive Ownership 2.978** 3.570 0.678 2.351 
 (2.09) (1.06) (1.05) (0.67) 
Firm Size 0.260*** 0.084*** -0.044*** 0.140*** 
 (14.49) (3.60) (-9.19) (3.70) 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.106** 0.033* -0.168** 
 (-3.33) (-2.27) (1.68) (-2.39) 
Firm Age 0.000 0.095 -0.011 0.100*** 
 (0.02) (1.04) (-0.24) (4.96) 
Volatility 0.078 0.000 -0.014 0.021 
 (0.36) (0.00) (-0.74) (0.17) 
Growth Opportunity -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.15) (-0.93) (0.99) (-1.19) 
Committee Dummy 0.173*** 0.024 -0.002 0.034 
 (4.45) (1.05) (-0.65) (1.47) 
Duality 0.054 0.023 -0.009* 0.037 
 (0.99) (0.66) (-1.82) (1.07) 
Board Independence 0.168 0.237 0.007 0.221 
 (0.52) (1.11) (0.27) (1.04) 
Board Size 0.194** 0.101 -0.001 0.093 
 (2.10) (1.40) (-0.07) (1.34) 
Supervisory Board  -0.017 0.055 0.008 0.047 
 (-0.21) (0.85) (0.69) (0.72) 
Ownership Concentration -0.003* -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-1.90) (-1.32) (-0.08) (-1.25) 
State Owned -0.076* -0.055 0.005* -0.064* 
 (-1.69) (-1.63) (1.70) (-1.89) 
Foreign Ownership 0.669*** 0.248 -0.056** 0.338* 
 (4.73) (1.23) (-2.30) (1.71) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.385*** 6.627** 0.291 . 
 (12.38) (2.19) (0.21) . 
Observations 14919 14919 14919 14919 
R
2
 0.467 0.483 0.081 0.418 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.466 0.482 0.080 0.293 
F 77.35*** 83.83*** 14.21*** 387.95*** 















 Stage (3A) 2
nd
 Stage (3B) 
Log(cash) Log(cash) Stock Return Log(cash) 
Stock Return 0.011 -0.006  -0.021 
 (1.47) (-1.36)  (-0.25) 
Shareholding Transfer Dummy   0.131***  
   (3.01)  
Hierarchy1 0.639*** 0.208*** 0.027 0.208*** 
 (17.65) (5.02) (0.36) (5.02) 
Hierarchy2 0.298*** 0.107*** 0.027 0.107*** 
 (10.06) (3.55) (0.53) (3.57) 
Age 0.003 0.057 -0.064 0.056 
 (1.44) (0.42) (-0.25) (0.40) 
Tenure 0.018*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 (3.31) (-0.96) (-1.00) (-0.96) 
Female -0.022    
 (-0.57)    
Executive Ownership 3.150** 4.117 -9.080 3.976 
 (2.03) (1.19) (-1.25) (1.13) 
Firm Size 0.278*** 0.054** -0.402*** 0.048 
 (14.24) (2.37) (-7.53) (1.15) 
Leverage -0.218*** -0.072** 0.545*** -0.064 
 (-2.75) (-2.02) (3.62) (-1.09) 
Firm Age -0.003 0.092 -0.090 0.091 
 (-0.57) (0.67) (-0.36) (0.64) 
Volatility -0.065 -0.022 -2.184*** -0.054 
 (-0.28) (-0.18) (-6.99) (-0.24) 
Growth Opportunity 0.000 -0.000 0.005 -0.000 
 (0.13) (-0.55) (0.53) (-0.35) 
Committee Dummy 0.189*** 0.019 -0.071 0.018 
 (4.51) (0.80) (-0.99) (0.72) 
Duality 0.059 0.015 -0.027 0.015 
 (1.01) (0.44) (-0.50) (0.43) 
Board Independence -0.060 0.245 0.160 0.247 
 (-0.17) (1.13) (0.51) (1.15) 
Board Size 0.173* 0.105 0.018 0.106 
 (1.75) (1.40) (0.13) (1.41) 
Supervisory Board -0.033 0.059 -0.116 0.057 
 (-0.39) (0.87) (-0.69) (0.85) 
Ownership Concentration -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.24) (-1.29) (0.50) (-1.25) 
State Owned -0.084* -0.050 -0.022 -0.050 
 (-1.76) (-1.47) (-0.17) (-1.47) 
Foreign Ownership 0.706*** 0.201 -0.404 0.195 
 (4.53) (0.96) (-0.88) (0.91) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.307*** 7.000 13.098 . 
 (11.30) (1.54) (1.60) . 
Observations 14919 14919 14919 14919 
R
2
 0.413 0.467 0.495 0.466 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.411 0.466  0.494     0.351 
F 65.23*** 78.68*** 285.2*** 79.16*** 





This chapter presents and discusses empirical findings related to the relation of 
compensation level and company performance in China. Specifically, empirical results 
obtained from the OLS regression, the standard fixed-effect regression and the FE-2SLS 
estimator are reported and compared. Overall, all three estimators provide empirical 
evidence to support that the level of compensation is positively related to accounting-based 
performance in Chinese listed companies, although the coefficient obtained from the FE-
2SLS is larger. In particular, empirical results of the FE-2SLS show that executive 
compensation is expected to increase by 1587.78 percent for a one-unit increase in ROA. 
However, results also show that there is no significant relation between the level of cash 
compensation and company stock return. Therefore, the prediction of hypothesis 1 that the 
level of executive cash compensation is positively influenced by company performance is 
partly supported in this study. Consequently, it can be concluded that the level of executive 
compensation has been positively linked to company performance in China, consistent 
with the principal-agent theory. However, compensation is more robustly linked to 
accounting-based performance rather than stock-based performance. 
Empirical findings also indicate a positive relation between the level of cash compensation 
and hierarchical levels within the company. This drives next chapter to deeply explore how 
the compensation level, the pay-performance link and the likelihood of receiving equity-




Chapter 6: Executive Compensation and Hierarchical 
Level-Empirical Results 
 
“With respect to the setting of a corporate hierarchy, the strength of the implicit incentives 
is determined by the extent to which additional effort changes the probability of getting 





This chapter summarizes and discusses the empirical findings regarding the influence of 
hierarchical level on executive compensation. Specifically, it provides empirical evidence 
related to hypothesis 5-7 developed in chapter 4. Those three hypotheses reflect three 
related research questions: How does the level of executive compensation vary with 
hierarchical levels? How does pay-performance link differ across various hierarchical 
levels within the company? How does the adoption of equity-based compensation vary 
with executive hierarchical levels within the company? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reports the descriptive 
statistics. Section 6.3 presents and discusses empirical findings observed using the model 
and estimator introduced in chapter 4. Finally, the conclusion is summarized in Section 6.4. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 below describes the variation of total cash compensation by hierarchical levels 
and year. As shown in Table 6.1, the level of cash compensation increases with the 
hierarchical levels. Overall, during the whole period 2006-2011, cash compensation 
increases from 251,070 Yuan to 374,447 Yuan if one moves from hierarchy 3 (i.e. the 
lowest level) to hierarchy 2 (i.e. the middle level), and the compensation level grows to 
549,172 Yuan if the executive is promoted to hierarchy 1 (i.e. the highest level). This 
pattern is also applicable to individual year. For example, in 2006, pay rises from 160,589 
Yuan to 228,366 Yuan if one is promoted from hierarchy 3 to 2, and inclines to 344,097 
Yuan if the executive is further promoted to the highest level. Those descriptive statistics 
                                                          
14
 Ederhof, M. (2011).Incentive Compensation and Promotion-Based Incentives of Mid-Level Managers: 




are consistent with previous studies such as Lambert et al.(1993), Lin et al. (2009), and 
Chen et al. (2011), and provide the preliminary support for the hypothesis 5 that 
compensation level is positively related to hierarchical levels. 
In addition, Table 6.1 shows that the compensation differences between hierarchy 1 and 
hierarchy 2 is sustainably higher than compensation gaps between hierarchy 2 and 
hierarchy 3 over the six years, consistent with Chen et al. (2011). To be specific, during the 
whole period 2006-2011, moving up from hierarchy 3 to hierarchy 2 is associated with a 
123,377 Yuan increases in the level of compensation, while compensation will increase by 
174,725 Yuan if one is promoted from hierarchy 2 to hierarchy 1.  
Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics regarding the adoption of equity-based 
compensation, by position hierarchy and year. As can be seen from table 6.2, the 
proportion of executives with equity-based compensation is very low. Overall, only about 
5 percent executives have been offered equity-based compensation during the period 2006-
2011. However, the percentage of executives who have been provided equity-based 
compensation increases year by year. To be specific, only 3.6 percent and 3.7 percent 
executives have been offered equity-based compensation in 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
The proportion increases by 1 percent in 2008, and grows to 5.7 percent in 2009. There is a 
slow growth between 2009 and 2010. By the end of 2011, the proportion of executives 
which has been granted the equity-based compensation has grown to 6.6 percent. 
Table 6.3 also shows that the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation varies 
with hierarchical levels. Overall, the proportion of executives with equity-based 
compensation for hierarchy 2 is 0.1 percent higher than hierarchy 1, although both 
hierarchical levels have the percentage above the mean. In addition, as the lowest level, 
hierarchy 3 has the lowest percentage of executives with equity-based compensation. To be 
specific, only 3.6 percent executives at hierarchy 3 have been provided equity-based 





Table 6.1  
Descriptive Statistics: Variation of Executive Compensation by Hierarchical Level and Year  
 






Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 344.097 447.601 306 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 228.366 189.368 1473 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 160.589 153.301 372 
 Total 233.108 244.350 2151 
2007 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 456.855 635.812 387 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 316.760 318.020 1821 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 227.811 223.690 395 
 Total 324.091 377.299 2603 
2008 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 497.691 591.385 382 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 338.665 293.758 1791 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 240.175 190.760 340 
 Total 349.513 352.829 2513 
2009 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 520.110 524.182 418 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 381.646 343.719 1798 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 250.639 163.137 311 
 Total 388.427 371.365 2527 
2010 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 657.242 681.810 437 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 452.456 391.902 1831 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 312.633 222.507 288 
 Total 471.714 451.553 2556 
2011 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 725.160 826.810 472 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 498.919 454.262 1836 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 362.008 285.803 261 
 Total 526.578 540.050 2569 
2006-
2011 
    
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 549.172 653.984 2402 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 374.447 356.782 10550 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 251.070 216.405 1967 





Table 6.2  
Descriptive Statistics:  
Variation of Receiving Equity-based Compensation by Hierarchical Level and Year 
 






Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.039 0.194 306 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 0.037 0.190 1473 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 0.027 0.162 372 
 Total 0.036 0.186 2151 
2007 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.036 0.187 387 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 0.040 0.195 1821 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 0.028 0.165 395 
 Total 0.037 0.189 2603 
2008 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.052 0.223 382 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 0.048 0.213 1791 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 0.035 0.185 340 
 Total 0.047 0.212 2513 
2009 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.053 0.223 418 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 0.060 0.237 1798 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 0.048 0.214 311 
 Total 0.057 0.232 2527 
2010 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.062 0.241 437 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 0.060 0.238 1831 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 0.035 0.183 288 
Total  0.058 0.233 2556 
2011 
Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.064 0.244 472 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 0.069 0.254 1836 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 0.046 0.210 261 




Hierarchy 1 (Highest) 0.052 0.222 2402 
Hierarchy 2 (Middle) 0.053 0.224 10550 
Hierarchy 3 (Lowest) 0.036 0.185 1967 
   Total 0.050 0.219 14919 
 
6.3 Regression Results 
This section explores the relation of executive compensation and hierarchical levels. In 
particular, it focuses on empirical findings related to hypothesis 5, hypothesis 6 and 
hypothesis 7 which are developed in chapter 4. Table 6.3 presents the results of VIF test 
for independent variables included in examining the influence of hierarchical levels on the 
level of compensation, in order to identify whether there is a potential multi-collinearity 
problem. As seen in Table 6.3, the mean value of VIF is only 1.57, far less than 10, 




Table 6.3  
VIF Test: Compensation Level and Hierarchical Level Regression 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Year Dummy_2011 3.07 Board Size 1.37 
Year Dummy_2008 2.91 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2010 2.71 
Presence of Remuneration 
Committee 
1.28 
Year Dummy_2009 2.69 Age 1.24 
Area Dummy_4 2.43 Supervisory Board 1.21 
Year Dummy_2007 2.05 Industry_4 1.14 
Ranking 1 2.01 Board Independence 1.14 
Ranking 2 1.97 Industry_3 1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.93 Industry_5 1.12 
Stock Return 1.85 State Owned  1.12 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Industry_2 1.11 
Firm Age 1.68 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Volatility 1.62 Leverage 1.08 
Area Dummy_6 1.60 ROA 1.08 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Firm Size 1.40 Growth 1.05 
Tenure 1.39 Female 1.05 
Area Dummy_5 1.39 CEO and Board Chairman Duality 1.04 
Mean VIF: 1.57 
 
Table 6.4 shows the relationship between the level of cash compensation and executive 
hierarchical levels. To be specific, column (1) and (2) report the empirical results of the 
pooled sample OLS regression. Columns (3) and (4) present the results of the fixed-effect 
method. In addition, column (1) and (3) include the accounting-based performance 
measure, and column (2) and (4) use the stock-based performance measure. The dependent 
variable is executive compensation, defined as the log transformation of the total cash 
compensation. Independent variables include hierarchy dummies, managerial attributes, 
company economic and corporate governance characteristics. It is worth noting that one 
year lagged company performance is employed as a control variable in regressions. 
Following models in the last chapter, year dummies are included to allow for arbitrary 
within-year correlation. Finally, industry and location dummies are included to account for 
cross industry and region heterogeneity (Conyon & He, 2012). 
All models have F-statistics which are statistically significant at the 0.01 level (i.e. 
Prob.>F=0.000), indicating that the model is correctly specified. In addition, all models 
have R-square over than 0.4, suggesting that more than 40 percent of the sample variation 
in Log(cash) is explained by independent variables included in the model. On the whole, in 
all four models, both hierarchy 1 and hierarchy 2 have significantly positive coefficients, 
and the coefficient on hierarchy 1 is larger than that on hierarchy 2. Specifically, the 
pooled sample OLS estimate shown in column (1) suggest that compensation will increase 
143 
 
by 34 percent (i.e. 0.62-0.28) if an executive is promoted from hierarchy 2 to hierarchy 1, 
while compensation increases by 28 percent if an executive is promoted from hierarchy 3 
to hierarchy 2. Similar findings are obtained from the fixed-effect model, although the 
coefficients are relatively smaller. Column (3) in Table 6.4 shows that there will be an 11 
percent (i.e. 0.22-0.11)  increase in compensation if one is promoted from hierarchy 2 to 
hierarchy 1, while compensation will rise by 10 percent when an executive at hierarchy 3 
moves up to hierarchy 2. The findings are robust when stock market-based performance 
measure is employed. Therefore, the hypothesis 5 related to tournament theory’s prediction 
that the level of compensation is an increasing function of hierarchical levels is supported.   
It is worth noting that previous literature (e.g. Lambert et al., 1993; Conyon & Sadler, 2001) 
has suggested that the relationship between executive compensation and hierarchical levels 
is convex if the coefficients satisfy the following conditions. First of all, the coefficient on 
hierarchy 2 (namely, β2) must be positive. Secondly, the difference between the 
coefficients on hierarchy 1 (namely, β1) and hierarchy 2 must not be less than the 
coefficient on hierarchy 2. In other words, there will be a convex relationship between 
executive compensation and position hierarchy if  
1 2
2 0    . This condition is 
supported by empirical results shown in Table 6.4. Specially, when performance is 
measured by ROA, 
1 2
2   is 0.06 and 0.00 for OLS and the fixed-effect estimator, 
respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that the level of executive compensation is an 
increasing function of hierarchical levels in Chinese listed companies, consistent with the 
tournament theory. In addition, the relationship between executive compensation and 
hierarchical levels tends to be convex, according to the estimations controlling for the 





Regression Results: Compensation Level and Hierarchical Level 
 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Log(cash) 
Pooled OLS Fixed-effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hierarchy 1 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 
 (17.73) (17.65) (5.48) (5.02) 
Hierarchy 2 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (10.01) (10.06) (3.67) (3.55) 
Age 0.00** 0.00 0.05 0.06 
 (2.02) (1.44) (0.55) (0.42) 
Tenure 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (3.38) (3.31) (-0.92) (-0.96) 
Female -0.04 -0.02   
 (-1.02) (-0.57)   
Executive Ownership 2.98** 3.15** 3.57 4.12 
 (2.09) (2.03) (1.06) (1.19) 
ROA 2.73***  0.93***  
 (9.92)  (5.44)  
Stock Return  0.01  -0.01 
  (1.47)  (-1.36) 
Firm Size 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.08*** 0.05** 
 (14.49) (14.24) (3.60) (2.37) 
Leverage -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.11** -0.07** 
 (-3.33) (-2.75) (-2.27) (-2.02) 
Firm Age 0.00 -0.00 0.09 0.09 
 (0.02) (-0.57) (1.04) (0.67) 
Volatility 0.08 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.36) (-0.28) (0.00) (-0.18) 
Growth Opportunity -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.15) (0.13) (-0.93) (-0.55) 
Presence of Remuneration Committee 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.02 0.02 
 (4.45) (4.51) (1.05) (0.80) 
CEO and Board Chairman Duality 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 
 (0.99) (1.01) (0.66) (0.44) 
Board Independence 0.17 -0.06 0.24 0.25 
 (0.52) (-0.17) (1.11) (1.13) 
Board Size 0.19** 0.17* 0.10 0.11 
 (2.10) (1.75) (1.40) (1.40) 
Supervisory Board Size -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.06 
 (-0.21) (-0.39) (0.85) (0.87) 
Ownership Concentration -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.90) (-1.24) (-1.32) (-1.29) 
State Owned -0.08* -0.08* -0.05 -0.05 
 (-1.69) (-1.76) (-1.63) (-1.47) 
Foreign Ownership 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.25 0.20 
 (4.73) (4.53) (1.23) (0.96) 
Year/Indusry/Area Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 5.38*** 5.31*** 6.63** 7.00 
 (12.38) (11.30) (2.19) (1.54) 
Observations 14919 14919 14919 14919 
R
2
 0.467 0.413 0.483 0.467 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.466 0.411 0.482 0.466 
F 77.35*** 65.23*** 83.83*** 78.68*** 







Table 6.5  
VIF Test: Hierarchical Level and Pay-performance Link Regression 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Panel A 
ROA 9.12 Area Dummy_5 1.39 
Hierarchy2*ROA 8.52 Board Size 1.37 
Hierarchy1*ROA 3.08 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2011 2.9 Presence of Remuneration Committee 1.28 
Hierarchy 1 2.74 Age 1.24 
Year Dummy_2008 2.68 Supervisory Board 1.21 
Year Dummy_2010 2.66 Board Independence 1.14 
Hierachy2 2.64 Industry_4 1.14 
Year Dummy_2009 2.62 Industry_3 1.12 
Area Dummy_4 2.43 Industry_5 1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.92 State Owned  1.12 
Year Dummy_2007 1.89 Industry_2 1.11 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Firm Age 1.68 Leverage 1.06 
Volatility 1.62 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Area Dummy_6 1.6 Growth 1.05 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Female 1.05 
Firm Size 1.40 CEO and Board Chairman Duality 1.04 
Tenure 1.39 Mean VIF: 2.03  
Panel B 
Stock Return 11.3 Area Dummy_5 1.39 
Hierarchy2* Stock Return 8.82 Board Size 1.37 
Year Dummy_2011 3.07 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2008 2.91 Presence of Remuneration Committee 1.33 
Hierarchy1* Stock Return 2.81 Age 1.23 
Year Dummy_2010 2.70 Supervisory Board 1.21 
Year Dummy_2009 2.69 Board Independence 1.13 
Area Dummy_4 2.42 Industry_4 1.13 
Hierachy1 2.35 Industry_3 1.12 
Hierachy2 2.35 Industry_5 1.12 
Year Dummy_2007 2.05 State Owned  1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.93 Industry_2 1.11 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Firm Age 1.68 Leverage 1.07 
Volatility 1.62 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Area Dummy_6 1.6 Growth 1.05 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Female 1.05 
Tenure 1.39 CEO and Board Chairman Duality 1.04 
Firm Size 1.39 Mean VIF: 2.09  
 
Table 6.5 reports the results of VIF test for variables involved in estimating the influence 
of hierarchical levels on pay-performance link. Panel A includes the accounting-based 
performance measure, and panel B includes company stock return. The mean value of VIF 
is 2.03 in panel A, while the mean VIF shown in panel B is 2.09. Both values are less than 
10, although introducing interaction terms increases multi-collinearity, indicating that 
multi-collinearity may not be a serious problem in this estimation.  
Table 6.6 presents the influence of hierarchical levels on pay-performance link through 
introducing the interaction term. Specifically, hierarchy dummies are interacted with 
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performance measures. Following the estimations of pay-performance relation shown in 
chapter 5, empirical results obtained from pooled sample OLS regression, fixed-effect 
approach and the FE-2SLS estimator are reported and discussed. F-statistics are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the models are correctly specified. 
According to the estimates of FE-2SLS shown in column (3), when accounting-based 
performance is employed, both hierarchy 1 and hierarchy 2 have significantly higher pay-
performance link, comparing with hierarchy 3. Specifically, the estimated pay-performance 
link for executives at hierarchy 1 is 448 percent (i.e. 5.2-0.72), and for executives at 
hierarchy 2, it is 370 percent (i.e. 4.42-0.72). However, pay-performance lnik for 
executives at hierarchy 3 is not significant. Although these findings are not supported by 
pooled sample OLS regression and the fixed-effect model, this study relies on findings 
obtained from the FE-2SLS due to the potential endogenous problem. Since the significant 
difference of pay-performance link between hierarchical levels is not observed when 
annual stock return is employed, hypothesis 6 that the level of compensation and company 
performance are more aligned at the higher hierarchical level is partly supported. To be 
specific, the level of compensation and company accounting-based performance are more 





Regression Results: Pay-performance Link and Hierarchical Level 
 
Variable 













Hierarchy1 0.58*** 0.20*** 0.02 0.64*** 0.21*** 0.22* 
 (13.28) (4.72) (0.21) (17.25) (5.01) (1.80) 
Hierarchy2 0.27*** 0.10*** -0.10 0.30*** 0.10*** 0.06 
 (7.23) (3.20) (-1.09) (9.97) (3.46) (0.57) 
ROA 2.29*** 0.79*** -0.72    
 (4.64) (2.84) (-0.67)    
Hierarchy1*ROA 0.80 0.40 5.20***    
 (1.36) (1.25) (2.62)    
Hierarchy2*ROA 0.44 0.11 4.42**    
 (0.79) (0.38) (2.48)    
Stock Return    0.02* -0.01 -0.09 
    (1.93) (-1.49) (-0.56) 
Hierarchy1* Stock Return    -0.01 0.00 -0.07 
    (-0.80) (0.20) (-0.34) 
Hierarchy2* Stock Return    -0.01 0.01 0.08 
    (-1.31) (1.00) (0.56) 
Managerial Attribute Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14919 14919 14919 14919 14919 14919 
R
2
 0.467 0.483 0.341 0.413 0.467 0.431 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.466 0.482 0.199 0.411 0.466 0.309 
F 73.68*** 78.17*** 102.6*** 62.33*** 73.90*** 73.61*** 






Regression Results:  Equity-based Compensation and Hierarchical Level 
 
Variable  
Dependent Variable: Equity-based Pay (Dummy)  
Odds Ratio Coefficient 
Hierarchy1 1.44 0.36 
 (1.30) (1.30) 
Hierarchy2 1.47 0.39 
 (1.57) (1.57) 
Age 0.96*** -0.04*** 
 (-2.93) (-2.93) 
Tenure 1.04 0.04 
 (1.41) (1.41) 
Female 0.75 -0.29 
 (-1.22) (-1.22) 
Executive Ownership 5.71 1.74 
 (0.32) (0.32) 
ROA 594.66*** 6.39*** 
 (4.28) (4.28) 
Annual Stock Return 1.04 0.04 
 (0.58) (0.58) 
Firm Size 1.75*** 0.56*** 
 (3.81) (3.81) 
Leverage 0.26** -1.36** 
 (-2.33) (-2.33) 
Firm Age 0.95 -0.05 
 (-1.03) (-1.03) 
Volatility 0.98 -0.02 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) 
Growth Opportunity 1.01** 0.01** 
 (2.45) (2.45) 
Liquidity Constraints 0.88 -0.13 
 (-0.52) (-0.52) 
 Committee Dummy 1.68 0.52 
 (0.87) (0.87) 
CEO and Board Chairman Duality 0.66 -0.42 
 (-1.05) (-1.05) 
Board Independence 0.01*** -5.22*** 
 (-2.66) (-2.66) 
Board Size 0.73 -0.32 
 (-0.51) (-0.51) 
Supervisory Board Size 0.41 -0.88 
 (-1.34) (-1.34) 
Ownership Concentration 0.95*** -0.05*** 
 (-5.34) (-5.34) 
State Owned 0.45** -0.79** 
 (-2.17) (-2.17) 
Foreign Ownership 0.54 -0.62 
 (-0.69) (-0.69) 

















Table 6.7 reports the empirical results on the relation of equity-based compensation 
and executive hierarchical levels. Both the coefficient and odd ratios are reported. 
The results are obtained through estimating the logistic regression model with 
clustered standard errors by companies. The dependent variable is equity-based 
compensation dummy which is equal to one if the executive has been granted equity-
based compensation in the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Following the 
compensation level model, the logistic model includes independent variables such as 
hierarch dummies, firm economic and corporate governance characteristics, and 
managerial attributes. Year, industry and location dummies are also included. 
Following prior studies (e.g. Conyon & He, 2012), firm economic and corporate 
governance variables are lagged by one year to mitigate the potential endogenous 
problem resulting from the two-way causality. 
As can be seen from table 6.7, executives at hierarchy 1 or hierarchy 2 are more 
likely to receive equity-based compensation (i.e. coefficient>0), in contrast to 
executives at hierarchy 3, but the difference is not significant. Therefore, the 
prediction of hypothesis 7 that executives at the higher hierarchical level are more 
likely to receive equity-based compensation is not supported. One potential reason 
might be equity-based compensation is emerging in China. Table 6.7 also shows 
other important determinants of the likelihood of receiving equity-based 
compensation. For instance, older executives are less likely to receive equity-based 
compensation, consistent with Conyon and He (2012). This indicates that executives 
with short time horizon may require short-term incentive compensation. In terms of 
company economic characteristics, executives in Chinese listed companies with 
larger size, higher accounting-based performance, and lower leverage are more likely 
to be granted equity-based compensation. In addition, the propensity of receiving 
equity-based compensation is greater for executives in companies with higher 
growth opportunities. This is consistent with prior studies such as Smith and Watts 
(1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Kole (1997) who suggest that the more growth 
opportunities the company has, the more likely it is to adopt equity-based 
compensation. In terms of ownership structure, executives in companies with higher 
ownership concentration are less likely to be granted equity-based compensation. 
This might be because the higher ownership concentration might result in better 
monitoring of shareholders on managerial actions (Firth et al., 2007), and as argued 
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by Jensen and Warner (1998), shareholder monitoring may work as an alternative 
governance mechanism to incentive compensation. Finally, executives at state-
owned companies have lower propensity of being offered equity-based pay. This 
indicates that there might be other alternative mechanisms that could explain 
incentive schemes in Chinese listed companies, in addition to the economic 
considerations based on the classical principal-agent theory (Conyon & He, 2012). 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explores how the compensation level, the pay-performance link, and the 
likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation vary with hierarchical levels 
within Chinese listed companies. Specifically, the level of executive compensation is 
found to be an increasing function of hierarchical levels, consistent with the 
hypothesis 5 developed from the tournament perspective. In addition, the relation of 
compensation level and hierarchical levels tends to be convex. In terms of pay-
performance link, it is found that the level of compensation and accounting-based 
performance are more aligned at the higher hierarchical level, but the relation of 
compensation level and stock return does not significantly vary with hierarchical 
levels. Finally, this study does not find a significant influence of hierarchical levels 
on the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation to support the prediction of 
hypothesis 7. Consequently, it can be concluded that Chinese listed companies have 
started to motivate executives through the tournament prize in the internal labour 
market. They have also balanced promotion opportunities and the incentive 
compensation when design compensation plans for individual executives at various 
hierarchical levels. However, the financial incentive for higher level executives with 
less promotion opportunities are mainly contributed by accounting performance 




Chapter 7: Executive Compensation and 
Remuneration Committee-Empirical Results 
 
“As a practical matter, his rate of pay is also influenced by the significant and 
highly convenient role the executive plays in establishing it; much that accrues to the 
senior corporate executive is in response to his own inspired generosity” 
-John Kenneth Galbraith, 1983, “The Anatomy of Power”15 
7.1 Introduction 
Empirical findings regarding the role of the remuneration committee in determining 
executive compensation are reported and discussed in this chapter. Those empirical 
results are related to hypothesis 2-4 and hypothesis 8-13 developed in chapter 4. 
Specifically, hypothesis 2-4 are about the influence of the presence of the 
remuneration committee on compensation level, pay-performance link, and the 
adoption of equity-based compensation, while hypothesis 8-13 are related to the role 
of managerial power, reflected by the composition and size of the remuneration 
committee, in determining compensation level, pay-performance relation, and the 
likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Descriptive statistics are reported in 
section 7.2. Regression results regarding the role of the remuneration committee in 
setting executive compensation are presented and discussed in section 7.3, followed 
by a conclusion in Section 7.5.  
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 compares the mean and standard deviation for executive compensation 
between companies with the remuneration committee and companies without the 
remuneration committee by year and for the whole sample period. According to 
Table 7.1, the mean of cash pay for executives from firms which have adopted the 
remuneration committee tends to be always higher than those in firms in which the 
remuneration committee has not been established. Specifically, the mean of 
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executive cash compensation for companies with the remuneration committee is 
about 408,421 Yuan during the period 2006-2011, almost 161,454 Yuan higher than 
that of firms without the remuneration committee. In addition, for the whole sample, 
the proportion of executives with equity-based compensation for companies with the 
remuneration committee is 2.8 percent higher than that of companies without the 
remuneration committee. Table 7.1 also shows that as more and more Chinese listed 
companies has started to establish the remuneration committee following the “Code 
of Corporate Governance”, the number of observations in this group increases year 
by year, whereas the number of observations from companies without the 
remuneration committee significantly decreases. 
Table 7.1  
Descriptive Statistics: Comparison of Executive Compensation- 













Pay (000s Yuan) 204.142 184.307 251.741 274.616 
Equity-based Pay 0.033 0.179 0.037 0.190 
Observations 842 1309 
2007 
Pay (000s Yuan) 250.838 226.294 357.540 424.801 
Equity-based Pay 0 .001 .035 0.054 0.226 
Observations 816 1787 
2008 
Pay (000s Yuan) 329.972 430.079 351.768 342.839 
Equity-based Pay 0 0 0.052 0.223 
Observations 260 2253 
2009 
Pay (000s Yuan) 286.450 209.049 390.738 373.931 
Equity-based Pay 0.142 0.353 0.055 0.228 
Observations 56 2471 
2010 
Pay (000s Yuan) 344.472 201.012 473.531 453.892 
Equity-based Pay 0.222 0.422 0.055 0.228 
Observations 36 2520 
2011 
Pay (000s Yuan) 416.558 242.398 528.008 542.724 
Equity-based Pay 0.242 0.435 0.063 0.244 
Observations 33 2536 
2006-2011 
Pay (000s Yuan) 246.967 250.987 408.421 430.701 
Equity-based Pay 0.026 0.159 0.054 0.227 
Observations 2043 12876 
 
Table 7.2 reports the t-statistic for mean differences and the z-statistic for median 
differences in the level of cash compensation and the likelihood of being granted 
equity-based pay for companies without the remuneration committee and companies 
with the remuneration committee. As shown in Table 7.2, the two groups of 
companies differ significantly at the 0.01 level on the level of cash compensation and 
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the proportion of executives with the equity-based compensation. Specifically, 
companies which have already adopted the remuneration committee reward their 
executives higher cash pay and are more likely to provide equity-based 
compensation for their executives, comparing with companies without the 
remuneration committee. 
Table 7.2  
T-statistic and Z-statistic for Differences of Executive Compensation:  
Firms without a Remuneration Committee vs. Firms with a Remuneration Committee 
 
Variable  
T-statistic for Mean 
Differences 
Mann-Whitney Z-statistic 
for Median Differences 
Level of Cash Compensation 
a 
-24.71*** -24.03*** 
Adoption of Equity-based Pay 
b 
-5.45*** -5.44*** 
Number of Observations 14919 
          * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
         a: Measured by the log tranformation of cash compensation  
         b: Dummy variable, equal to one if an executive has been offered equity-based compensation in the 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 7.3 describes the evolution of the size and the composition of the remuneration 
committee in Chinese listed companies between 2005 and 2010. Both the number of 
members and the proportion of insiders serving on the remuneration committee 
generally decrease year by year, although the changes are not obvious. However, 
both of them have a wide difference between the minimum and maximum values.  In 
general, the number of committee members ranges from 2 to 12 in this sample, and 





Table 7.3  
Descriptive Statistics: Size and Composition of the Remuneration Committee 
 
Year 
Number of Members  Proportion of Insiders 
Mean  SD Min  Max  Mean  SD Min  Max  
2005 3.91 1.15 2 7 38% 11% 0 83% 
2006 3.88 1.14 2 12 38% 11% 0 80% 
2007 3.82 1.10 2 9 37% 11% 0 83% 
2008 3.80 1.10 2 8 36% 11% 0 83% 
2009 3.79 1.09 2 8 35% 11% 0 83% 
2010 3.79 1.11 2 8 35% 11% 0 100% 
2005-2010 3.82 1.11 2 12 36% 11% 0 100% 
 
7.3 Regression Results 
This section aims to analyse the influence of the presence of the remuneration 
committee and managerial power, represented by the composition of the 
remuneration committee, on executive compensation plans. To be specific, the 
empirical findings are related to hypothesis 2-4 and hypothesis 8-13 developed in 
chapter 4.  
7.3.1 Presence of the Remuneration Committee and Compensation Plans 
Table 7.4 gives the results of VIF test for independent variables included in testing 
the influence of the presence of the remuneration committee on pay level, in order to 
identify whether there is a potential multi-collinearity problem in the regression 
analysis. As seen in table 7.4, the mean value of VIF is only 1.57, far less than 10, 





Table 7.4  
VIF Test: Remuneration Committee Presence and Compensation Level Regression 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Year Dummy_2011 3.07 Board Size 1.37 
Year Dummy_2008 2.91 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2010 2.71 Committee Dummy 1.28 
Year Dummy_2009 2.69 Age 1.24 
Area Dummy_4 2.43 Supervisory Board 1.21 
Year Dummy_2007 2.05 Industry_4 1.14 
Ranking 1 2.01 Board Independence 1.14 
Ranking 2 1.97 Industry_3 1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.93 Industry_5 1.12 
Stock Return 1.85 State Owned  1.12 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Industry_2 1.11 
Firm Age 1.68 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Volatility 1.62 Leverage 1.08 
Area Dummy_6 1.60 ROA 1.08 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Firm Size 1.40 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Tenure 1.39 Female 1.05 
Area Dummy_5 1.39 Duality 1.04 
Mean VIF: 1.57 
 
Table 7.5 reports the empirical results of the test of hypothesis 2, based on the 
regression equation 4.2 given in chapter 4. Column (1), column (2) and column (3) 
present the results obtained from the OLS, the fixed-effect and the FE-2SLS 
estimator, respectively. The dependent variable is the level of executive cash 
compensation, calculated by taking natural logarithm of total cash compensation for 
individual executives. The predictor is the remuneration committee dummy equal to 
one if the company has established the remuneration committee in the last fiscal year. 
Other independent variables include managerial attributes, company economic and 
corporate governance characteristics. Following models in previous chapters, year 
dummies are included to allow for arbitrary within-year correlation, while industry 
and location dummies are included to account for cross industry and region 
heterogeneity. Table 7.5 shows that all three models have F-statistics statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level (i.e. Prob.>F=0.000), suggesting that the models are 






Regression Results:  
Compensation Level and Presence of the Remuneration Committee 
 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Log(cash) 
OLS FE FE-2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) 
Committee Dummy 0.172*** 0.025 0.036 
 (4.45) (1.07) (1.43) 
Managerial Attribute Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Board Structure Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership Structure Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Area Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14919 14919 14919 
R
2
 0.467 0.483 0.413 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.466 0.482 0.286 
F 76.24*** 80.75*** 154.8*** 
         t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Consistent with prior studies in the context of both western countries (e.g. Main & 
Johnston, 1993; Conyon & Peck, 1998) and China (e.g. Conyon & He, 2011; 2012), 
the OLS regression results reported in column (1) suggest that the level of executive 
cash compensation tends to be significantly higher for companies with remuneration 
committee, comparing with companies without the remuneration committee. 
Specifically, executives from companies with the remuneration committee, on 
average, receive cash compensation 18.8 percent (i.e. exp(0.172)-1) higher than 
executives at companies without the remuneration committee, holding other control 
variables constant. This is opposite to the hypothesis 2 which predicts that the level 
of cash compensation will be lower in companies with the remuneration committee. 
The coefficient of presence of the remuneration committee remains positive when 
fixed-effect and 2SLS estimators are employed, but the significance disappears. 
Therefore, the hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
However, the purpose of the remuneration committee may not be specifically to hold 
down or boost the level of compensation (Main & Johnston, 1993). As suggested by 
Conyon (1997), the remuneration committee should be a forum to consider the 
appropriate design of the compensation structure for executives rather than being 
regarded simply as an organisational device for checking the growth in executive 
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compensation. This drives the analysis of the role of the remuneration committee in 
designing compensation structure in the next sections.  
The mean value of VIF shown in panel A and panel B of Table 7.6 is 1.86 and 1.95, 
respectively, far less than the upper limit value 10. This indicates that there is no 
serious collinearity problem among independent variables, although adding the 
interaction term boosts the VIF value of performance measure and remuneration 
committee dummy.  
Table 7.7 examines the influence of the presence of the remuneration committee on 
pay-performance relation. The dependent variable is the log of total cash 
compensation of individual executive. Performance is interacted with the 
remuneration committee dummy in order to explore the moderation effect. Column 
(1) to (3) report the results when firm performance is measured by ROA, while 
column (4) to (6) present the empirical findings when stock return is employed. In 
addition, results shown in column (1) and (4) are gained from the pooled sample 
OLS regression, column (2) and (5) presents the fixed-effect estimates, and the FE-
2SLS estimates are shown in column (3) and (6).  Table 7.6 shows that all the 
models have F-statistics statistically significant at the 0.01 level (i.e. Prob.>F=0.000) 




Table 7.6  
VIF Test: Presence of the Remuneration Committee and Pay-performance Link 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Panel A 
Committee*ROA 7.11 Tenure 1.39 
ROA 6.78 Area Dummy_5 1.39 
Year Dummy_2011 2.91 Board Size 1.37 
Year Dummy_2008 2.68 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2010 2.66 Age 1.24 
Year Dummy_2009 2.62 Supervisory Board 1.21 
Area Dummy_4 2.43 Industry_4 1.14 
Hierarchy 1 2.01 Board Independence 1.14 
Hierarchy 2 1.97 Industry_3 1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.92 Industry_5 1.12 
Year Dummy_2007 1.89 State Owned  1.12 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Industry_2 1.11 
Firm Age 1.68 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Volatility 1.62 Leverage 1.07 
Area Dummy_6 1.60 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Committee Dummy 1.59 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Female 1.05 
Firm Size 1.39 Duality 1.04 
Mean VIF: 1.86 
Panel B 
Committee*Stock Return 8.30 Firm Size 1.39 
Stock Return 7.64 Area Dummy_5 1.39 
Year Dummy_2011 3.10 Board Size 1.37 
Year Dummy_2008 2.92 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2010 2.72 Age 1.23 
Year Dummy_2009 2.69 Supervisory Board 1.21 
Area Dummy_4 2.43 Board Independence 1.13 
Year Dummy_2007 2.08 Industry_4 1.13 
Hierarchy 1 2.01 Industry_3 1.12 
Hierarchy 2 1.97 State Owned 1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.93 Industry_5 1.11 
Committee Dummy 1.79 Industry_2 1.11 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Firm Age 1.68 Leverage 1.07 
Volatility 1.62 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Area Dummy_6 1.60 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Female 1.05 
Tenure  1.39 Duality 1.04 







Regression Results:  
Presence of the Remuneration Committee and Pay-performance Link 
 
Variable 
 Dependent Variable: Log(cash) 
OLS FE FE-2SLS OLS FE FE-2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (5) (4) (6) 
Committee Dummy 0.140*** 0.007 -0.037 0.172*** 0.006 -0.068 
 (3.26) (0.30) (-0.51) (3.84) (0.24) (-0.46) 
Committee*ROA 0.793 0.454* 1.762    
 (1.25) (1.80) (0.98)    
ROA 2.058*** 0.550** 1.249    
 (3.51) (2.47) (0.76)    
Committee*Stock Return    0.019 0.015 0.090 
    (1.09) (1.29) (0.60) 
Stock Return    -0.005 -0.018 -0.086 
    (-0.32) (-1.61) (-0.77) 
Hierarchy1 0.617*** 0.219*** 0.244*** 0.639*** 0.207*** 0.205*** 
 (17.70) (5.53) (5.75) (17.64) (5.01) (4.84) 
Hierarchy2 0.284*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.298*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (10.03) (3.70) (3.86) (10.06) (3.55) (3.51) 
Age 0.004** 0.046 0.021 0.003 0.057 0.056 
 (2.01) (0.51) (0.81) (1.44) (0.41) (0.40) 
Tenure 0.017*** -0.004 -0.003 0.018*** -0.004 -0.004 
 (3.38) (-0.87) (-0.60) (3.31) (-0.96) (-0.91) 
Female -0.036   -0.022   
 (-1.01)   (-0.57)   
Executive Ownership 2.981** 3.520 2.230 3.145** 4.107 4.042 
 (2.10) (1.04) (0.62) (2.02) (1.18) (1.14) 
Firm Size 0.260*** 0.080*** 0.122*** 0.279*** 0.054** 0.052 
 (14.53) (3.52) (3.18) (14.25) (2.37) (1.18) 
Leverage -0.139*** -0.098** -0.136** -0.218*** -0.072** -0.072 
 (-3.44) (-2.36) (-2.03) (-2.77) (-2.05) (-1.13) 
Firm Age -0.000 0.099 0.116*** -0.003 0.093 0.098 
 (-0.04) (1.09) (4.84) (-0.58) (0.67) (0.70) 
Volatility 0.077 0.002 0.026 -0.068 -0.027 -0.062 
 (0.36) (0.02) (0.23) (-0.29) (-0.22) (-0.28) 
Growth Opportunity -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.16) (-0.93) (-1.16) (0.10) (-0.63) (-0.59) 
Duality 0.054 0.024 0.043 0.059 0.016 0.018 
 (0.99) (0.71) (1.22) (1.01) (0.46) (0.50) 
Board Independence 0.170 0.232 0.204 -0.061 0.246 0.250 
 (0.53) (1.11) (1.01) (-0.18) (1.14) (1.16) 
Board Size 0.194** 0.100 0.090 0.171* 0.105 0.104 
 (2.10) (1.41) (1.36) (1.74) (1.40) (1.41) 
Supervisory Board  -0.018 0.058 0.058 -0.034 0.060 0.064 
 (-0.22) (0.89) (0.88) (-0.40) (0.88) (0.93) 
Ownership Concentration -0.003* -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.91) (-1.31) (-1.21) (-1.26) (-1.31) (-1.30) 
State Owned -0.074* -0.054 -0.061* -0.084* -0.050 -0.047 
 (-1.67) (-1.62) (-1.88) (-1.75) (-1.45) (-1.29) 
Foreign Ownership 0.666*** 0.252 0.350* 0.707*** 0.199 0.189 
 (4.73) (1.25) (1.75) (4.54) (0.96) (0.88) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14919 14919 14919 14919 14919 14919 
R2 0.468 0.483 0.419 0.413 0.467 0.461 
Adjusted- R2 0.466 0.482 0.294 0.411 0.466 0.344 
F 75.24*** 80.82*** 6250.6*** 63.58*** 75.57*** 76.66*** 





Coefficients of the interaction term Committee*ROA are positive in all three 
estimation, but only the FE estimator provides a coefficient statistically significant at 
the 0.1 level. As shown in column (2) in Table 7.6, for executives from firms in 
which the remuneration committee has established, cash compensation will increase 
by 172.92 percent (i.e. exp (0.454+0.55)-1) if ROA increase by one unit, while cash 
compensation of executives in companies without the remuneration committee 
increases by 73.33 percent (i.e. exp (0.55)-1) for an one-unit growth in ROA. 
Therefore, the relation of pay and accounting-based performance for companies with 
the remuneration committee is significantly higher than that in firms without the 
remuneration committee, holding other controls constant. However, the positive 
influence of the remuneration committee presence on company performance is not 
supported when annual stock return is employed.  
Table 7.8  
VIF Test: Presence of the Remuneration Committee and Equity-based Compensation 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Year Dummy_2008 3.01 Board Size 1.37 
Year Dummy_2010 2.92 Ownership Concentration 1.33 
Year Dummy_2011 2.92 Committee Dummy 1.28 
Year Dummy_2009 2.72 Age 1.24 
Area Dummy_4 2.43 ROA 1.23 
Hierarchy 1 2.01 Supervisory Board 1.21 
Year Dummy_2007 1.98 Leverage  1.18 
Hierarchy 2 1.97 Board Independence  1.14 
Area Dummy_2 1.93 Industry_4 1.13 
Stock Return 1.87 State Owned  1.12 
Area Dummy_3 1.72 Industry_3 1.12 
Volatility 1.7 Industry_5 1.12 
Firm Age 1.68 Industry_2 1.11 
Area Dummy_6 1.61 Foreign Ownership 1.09 
Area Dummy_7 1.52 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Firm Size 1.43 Female 1.05 
Tenure 1.39 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Area Dummy_5 1.39 Duality 1.04 
Mean VIF: 1.59 
 
Table 7.8 tests the VIF value for independent variables involved in estimating the 
influence of the remuneration committee presence on the likelihood of receiving 
equity-based compensation. Like exhibited in prior sections, the mean value of VIF 
is about 1.59, far less than the ceiling limit value 10. Therefore, independent 
variables in the logit do not suffer from the collinearity problem. 
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Table 7.9 examines the influence of the remuneration committee existence on the 
likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation. The dependent variable is the 
equity-based pay dummy equal to 1 if the executive has been granted equity-based 
compensation. The propensity of being granted equity-based compensation for 
executives from companies with the established remuneration committee does not 
significantly differ from executives at companies without such committees, 
demonstrated by the non-significant coefficient of the remuneration committee 
dummy. This is inconsistent with Conyon and He (2012) who observe that CEOs in 
Chinese listed companies with the remuneration committee are more likely to 
receive equity-based pay. One potential reason for the difference is that Conyon and 
He (2012) focus on CEOs only and employ the logit model with robust standard 
errors, while the current study includes executives across different hierarchies and 
relies on the logit regression with clustered standard errors to allow for within cluster 
dependence. When running a logit regression with robust standard errors for CEOs, 
this study finds that CEOs in companies with the remuneration committee are more 
likely to receive equity-based compensation, consistent with Conyon and He (2012).  
Table 7.9 
Regression Results:  
Presence of the Remuneration Committee and Equity-based Compensation 
 
Variable  
Dependent Variable: Equity-based Pay (Dummy) 
Odds Ratio Coefficient 
Committee Dummy 1.68 0.52 
 (0.87) (0.87) 
Managerial Attribute Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes 
Board Structure Yes 
Ownership Structure Yes 
Year Dummies Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes 

















7.3.2 Managerial Power and Compensation Plans 
Table 7.10 tests the VIF value for independent variables involved in the regression 
about the role of managerial power in determining pay level, where managerial 
power is denoted by the proportion of insiders serving on the remuneration 
committee and the size of this committee. The mean value of VIF is 1.62, far less 
than 10, indicating that the regressions do not suffer from the collinearity problem.  
Table 7.10 
VIF Test: Managerial Power and Compensation Level 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Year Dummy_2011 3.53 Ownership Concentration 1.31 
Year Dummy_2008 3.30 Committee Size  1.29 
Year Dummy_2010 3.12 Age 1.23 
Year Dummy_2009 3.09 Supervisory Board 1.22 
Area Dummy_4 2.40 Committee Insiders 1.21 
Year Dummy_2007 2.21 Board Independence 1.15 
Hierarchy 1 2.10 Industry_4 1.14 
Hierarchy 2 2.04 Industry_3 1.13 
Area Dummy_2 1.90 State Owned 1.11 
Stock Return 1.82 Industry_5 1.11 
Area Dummy_3 1.74 Foreign Ownership 1.11 
Firm Age 1.68 Industry_2 1.11 
Volatility 1.63 Leverage 1.09 
Area Dummy_6 1.58 ROA 1.09 
Area Dummy_7 1.51 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Board Size 1.47 Female 1.05 
Firm Size 1.42 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Area Dummy_5 1.42 Duality 1.04 
Tenure 1.36 Mean VIF: 1.62 
 
Regression results regarding the influence of managerial power on the level of 
executive cash compensation are reported in Table 7.11. Column (1), (2) and (3) 
present results obtained from the pooled sample OLS, the fixed-effect and the 2SLS, 
respectively. Hypothesis 8 and 11 expect a positive relation of managerial power and 
compensation level. Specifically, hypothesis 8 predicts that the level of executive 
pay is higher when the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is 
higher, while hypothesis 11 predicts that smaller remuneration committees are 
associated with higher compensation. However, there is no significant relation 
between the level of cash compensation and those two variables, as shown in Table 
7.11. Therefore, this study finds little evidence to support the positive relation 
between managerial power and the level of executive pay. This is consistent with 
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prior studies such as Conyon and He (2004) who also find little evidence for this 
phenomenon. 
Regression results regarding the influence of managerial power on compensation 
level are reported in Table 7.11. Column (1), (2) and (3) present results obtained 
from the pooled sample OLS, the fixed-effect and the FE-2SLS, respectively. 
Hypothesis 8 and 11 expect a positive relation of managerial power and 
compensation level. Specifically, hypothesis 8 predicts that the level of executive 
pay is higher when the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is 
higher, while hypothesis 11 predicts that smaller remuneration committee is 
associated with higher compensation. However, there is no significant relation 
between the level of cash compensation and those two variables, as shown in Table 
7.11. Therefore, this study finds little evidence to support the positive relation 
between managerial power and the level of executive compensation. This is 
consistent with prior studies such as Conyon and He (2004) who also find little 





Regression Results:  
Managerial Power and Compensation Level 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Log(cash) 
OLS Fixed-effect FE-2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) 
Committee Insider -0.209 -0.030 0.044 
 (-1.30) (-0.22) (0.29) 
Committee Size 0.004 -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.21) (-0.71) (-0.51) 
Hierarchy 1 0.624*** 0.218*** 0.255*** 
 (17.20) (4.82) (4.47) 
Hierarchy 2 0.295*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 
 (9.65) (3.66) (3.57) 
Age 0.004* 0.115*** 0.077 
 (1.84) (2.69) (0.60) 
Tenure 0.018*** -0.002 0.003 
 (3.59) (-0.37) (0.41) 
Female -0.040   
 (-1.11)   
Executive Ownership 3.510*** 2.926 2.926 
 (2.59) (0.84) (0.66) 
ROA 2.899*** 0.933*** 3.505** 
 (9.88) (5.07) (1.98) 
Stock Return -0.014 -0.010 0.156 
 (-1.06) (-1.42) (1.00) 
Firm Size 0.256*** 0.083*** 0.227** 
 (13.72) (3.28) (2.24) 
Leverage -0.112*** -0.062* -0.208 
 (-3.09) (-1.66) (-1.44) 
Firm Age 0.001 0.030 0.079 
 (0.22) (0.72) (0.60) 
Volatility 0.196 0.013 0.362 
 (0.87) (0.10) (0.99) 
Growth Opportunity -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.19) (-0.98) (-1.22) 
  Duality 0.057 0.009 0.039 
 (1.00) (0.24) (0.88) 
Board Independence 0.134 0.244 0.251 
 (0.40) (1.24) (1.09) 
Board Size 0.138 0.048 0.043 
 (1.36) (0.69) (0.58) 
Supervisory Board 0.003 0.051 0.079 
 (0.03) (0.66) (0.89) 
Ownership Concentration -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.78) (-0.39) (-0.47) 
State Owned -0.070 -0.046 -0.041 
 (-1.52) (-1.36) (-0.96) 
Foreign Ownership 0.713*** 0.247 0.467 
 (4.83) (0.97) (1.52) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Area Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12790 12790 12790 
R
2
 0.460 0.451 0.131 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.458 0.450 -0.091 
F 53.85*** 59.64*** 50.77*** 




Table 7.12 reports the VIF values for independent variables involved in testing the 
influence of managerial power on pay-performance relation. The mean values of VIF 
are far less than 10, although adding the interaction significantly increases the VIF 
value for firm performance variables.  
Table 7.12  
VIF Test: Managerial Power and Pay-performance Link  
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Panel A 
Insider*ROA 25.53 Board Size 1.47 
ROA 23.04 Area Dummy_5 1.43 
Size*ROA 17.53 Firm Size 1.42 
Year Dummy_2011 3.34 Tenure 1.36 
Year Dummy_2010 3.06 Ownership Concentration 1.32 
Year Dummy_2008 3.04 Age 1.23 
Year Dummy_2009 3.03 Supervisory Board 1.22 
Area Dummy_4 2.41 Board Independence 1.15 
Hierarchy 1 2.10 Industry_4 1.14 
Year Dummy_2007 2.09 Industry_3 1.13 
Hierarchy 2 2.04 Foreign Ownership 1.12 
Area Dummy_2 1.90 State Owned  1.12 
Committee Size 1.89 Industry_5 1.11 
Committee Insiders 1.84 Industry_2 1.11 
Area Dummy_3 1.75 Leverage 1.07 
Firm Age 1.68 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Volatility 1.63 Female 1.05 
Area Dummy_6 1.58 Duality 1.05 
Area Dummy_7 1.50 Growth Opportunity 1.04 
Mean VIF: 3.25 
Panel B 
Stock Return 20.52 Area Dummy_5 1.42 
Size*SR 17.25 Firm Size 1.41 
Insider*SR 14.36 Tenure 1.36 
Year Dummy_2011 3.56 Committee Insiders 1.34 
Year Dummy_2008 3.33 Ownership Concentration 1.31 
Year Dummy_2010 3.12 Age 1.23 
Year Dummy_2009 3.10 Supervisory Board 1.22 
Area Dummy_4 2.40 Board Independence 1.15 
Year Dummy_2007 2.23 Industry_4 1.13 
Hierarchy 1 2.10 Industry_3 1.13 
Hierarchy 2 2.04 State Owned 1.11 
Area Dummy_2 1.90 Foreign Ownership 1.11 
Area Dummy_3 1.74 Industry_5 1.11 
Firm Age 1.67 Industry_2 1.10 
Volatility 1.63 Leverage 1.07 
Area Dummy_6 1.58 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Area Dummy_7 1.50 Female  1.05 
Board Size 1.48 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Committee Size 1.44 Duality 1.04 
Mean VIF: 2.88 
 
Hypothesis 9 and 12 relate to the role of managerial power in determining pay 
structure. The empirical tests of those two hypotheses are reported in Table 7.13. The 
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dependent variable is the log transformation of cash compensation. Performance 
variable is interacted with the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee 
and the size of the remuneration committee, separately, in order to observe the 
influence of managerial power on pay-performance link. Estimates of pooled sample 
OLS, the fixed-effect and the FE-2SLS are presented in column (1), (2) and (3), 
respectively.  Like the estimates shown in previous sections, Table 7.13 shows that 
all models have F-statistics statistically significant at the 0.01 level (i.e. 
Prob.>F=0.000), indicating that the models are correctly specified.  
Hypothesis 9 predicts that executive compensation is less aligned with company 
performance when the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is 
higher. This hypothesis is supported by the OLS and fixed-effect estimates shown in 
column (1) and (2), separately, demonstrated by the significantly negative coefficient 
of the interaction term Committee Insider*ROA. Specifically, the OLS estimates 
show that the coefficient of Committee Insider*ROA is -6.937 and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. Economically, the relation of pay and ROA is 481.60 
percent when the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is 0, and this 
relation decreases to 231.87 percent (i.e. 4.816-6.937*0.36) when the proportion of 
insiders increases to 33.33 percent (i.e. the mean value in this sample). When the 
proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee increases to 1 (i.e. the 
maximum value in this sample), the relation of pay and ROA even becomes negative 
(i.e. 4.816-6.937*1). In terms of the fixed-effect approach, the coefficient of 
Committee Insider*ROA remains to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level, 
although it reduces to -2.135. However, the phenomenon that the relation of 
executive compensation and firm performance decreases as the proportion of insiders 
on the remuneration committee increases is not supported when the FE-2SLS 





Regression Results:  
 Managerial Power and Pay-performance Link 
 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Log(cash) 
OLS FE FE-2SLS OLS FE FE-2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROA 4.816*** 0.226 -8.142    
 (3.83) (0.27) (-1.37)    
Committee Insider*ROA -6.937*** -2.135* -16.066    
 (-2.77) (-1.68) (-1.47)    
Committee Size*ROA 0.158 0.399* 4.695**    
 (0.62) (1.95) (2.11)    
Stock Return    -0.021 -0.004 0.232 
    (-0.68) (-0.14) (0.87) 
Committee Insider*SR    0.069 -0.070* -0.180 
    (1.31) (-1.81) (-0.54) 
Committee Size*SR    0.003 0.008 -0.032 
    (0.37) (1.18) (-0.46) 
Committee Insider 0.050 0.085 0.850 -0.260 -0.002 0.082 
 (0.28) (0.63) (1.52) (-1.44) (-0.01) (0.43) 
Committee Size -0.003 -0.029 -0.182** 0.008 -0.017 -0.003 
 (-0.13) (-1.41) (-2.30) (0.39) (-0.90) (-0.08) 
Managerial Attribute Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12790 12790 12790 12790 12790 12790 
R
2
 0.462 0.453 0.006 0.399 0.436 0.390 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.460 0.452 -0.191 0.397 0.435 0.234 
F 51.85*** 60.58*** 41.29*** 43.54*** 54.77*** 51.37*** 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Based on the managerial power perspective, hypothesis 12 predicts that the positive 
pay-performance link decreases as the size of the remuneration committee decreases, 
holding other controls constant. This is supported by the estimates of the FE-2SLS 
shown in column (3) in Table 7.13, as well as the fixed-effect estimation shown in 
column (2). In particular, when the 2SLS approach is in use, the coefficient of 
Committee Size*ROA is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, as 
shown in column (3). Specifically, when the number of directors serving on the 
remuneration committee is equal to 12 (i.e. the maximum value in this sample), the 
correlation of pay and ROA is about 4819.80 percent. Pay-performance link 
deceases to 12.80 percent when the number of the remuneration committee member 
reduces to 2 (i.e. the minimum value in this sample). Coefficient of Committee 
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Size*ROA is still positive in the fixed-effect model, but the significance level 
reduces to 0.1.  
The significant role of managerial power in determining compensation structure is 
less supported when annual stock return is employed to measure company 
performance. The coefficient of Committee Insider*SR is only significant when the 
fixed-effect approach is employed, indicating that the level of compensation and 
stock-based performance is less aligned when the proportion of insiders on the 
remuneration committee is higher.  However, the size of the remuneration committee 
does not tend to have significant influence on the relation of the compensation level 
and company stock return. 
The mean value of VIF shown in table 7.14 is 1.62, far less than the upper limit 
value 10. Therefore, multi-collinearity is not a serious problem among independent 
variables involved in estimating the influence of managerial power on the propensity 
of receiving equity-based compensation. 
Table 7.14 
VIF Test: Managerial Power and Equity-based Compensation 
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Year Dummy_2011 3.53 Ownership Concentration 1.31 
Year Dummy_2008 3.3 Committee Size  1.29 
Year Dummy_2010 3.12 Age 1.23 
Year Dummy_2009 3.09 Supervisory Board 1.22 
Area Dummy_4 2.4 Committee Insider 1.21 
Year Dummy_2007 2.21 Board Independence 1.15 
Hierarchy 1 2.1 Industry_4 1.14 
Hierarchy 2 2.04 Industry_3 1.13 
Area Dummy_2 1.9 State Owned 1.11 
Stock Return 1.82 Industry_5 1.11 
Area Dummy_3 1.74 Foreign Ownership 1.11 
Firm Age 1.68 Industry_2 1.11 
Volatility 1.63 Leverage 1.09 
Area Dummy_6 1.58 ROA 1.09 
Area Dummy_7 1.51 Executive Ownership 1.06 
Board Size 1.47 Female 1.05 
Firm Size 1.42 Growth Opportunity 1.05 
Area Dummy_5 1.42 Duality 1.04 





Table 7.15  
Regression Results: Managerial Power and Equity-based Compensation  
 
Variable 
Dependent Variable: Equity-based Pay (Dummy) 
Coefficient  Odds Ratio 
(1) (1) 
Committee Insider 0.327 1.386 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Committee Size 0.146 1.158 
 (1.08) (1.08) 
Hierarchy 1 0.366 1.441 
 (1.30) (1.30) 
Hierarchy 2 0.362 1.437 
 (1.47) (1.47) 
Age -0.049*** 0.953*** 
 (-3.55) (-3.55) 
Tenure 0.040 1.040 
 (1.26) (1.26) 
Female -0.307 0.736 
 (-1.27) (-1.27) 
Executive Ownership 3.776 43.638 
 (0.71) (0.71) 
ROA 6.786*** 885.099*** 
 (5.10) (5.10) 
Stock Return 0.043 1.044 
 (0.68) (0.68) 
Firm Size 0.581*** 1.788*** 
 (4.09) (4.09) 
Leverage -1.202*** 0.300*** 
 (-3.21) (-3.21) 
Firm Age -0.031 0.969 
 (-0.65) (-0.65) 
Volatility 0.022 1.023 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Growth Opportunity 0.009* 1.009* 
 (1.87) (1.87) 
Duality -0.775** 0.461** 
 (-2.26) (-2.26) 
Board Independence -4.708** 0.009** 
 (-2.38) (-2.38) 
Board Size -0.580 0.560 
 (-0.82) (-0.82) 
Supervisory Board -0.867 0.420 
 (-1.26) (-1.26) 
Ownership Concentration -0.058*** 0.943*** 
 (-5.29) (-5.29) 
State Owned -1.008*** 0.365*** 
 (-2.86) (-2.86) 
Foreign Ownership -0.844 0.430 
 (-0.93) (-0.93) 
Year Dummies Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes 













              t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Hypothesis 10 and 13 relate to the role of managerial power in determining the 
likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation. Specifically, hypothesis 10 
predicts that executives are less likely to receive equity-based compensation when 
the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is higher, and the 
prediction of hypothesis 13 is that executives are less likely to be granted equity-
based compensation when the size of the remuneration committee is smaller. 
However, the logit regression provides little evidence to support these two 
hypotheses. 
7.4 Conclusion  
This chapter reports and discusses the role of the remuneration committee in 
determining executive compensation settings from both the classic principal-agent 
perspective and managerial power perspective. First of all, it tests the influence of 
the remuneration committee presence on the level of pay, pay-performance relation, 
and the likelihood of receiving equity-based pay, based on principal-agent theory. 
The empirical results suggest that there is no significant difference in the level of pay 
between companies with the remuneration committee and companies without such a 
committee. Similarly, the propensity of receiving equity-based compensation for 
executives in companies with the remuneration committee does not significantly 
differ from firms in which the remuneration committee has not established. However, 
pay is more tied to accounting-based performance when companies have established 
the remuneration committee.  
This chapter also explores the role of managerial power, denoted by the proportion 
of insiders on the remuneration committee and the size of the remuneration 
committee, in affecting executive compensation plans. It finds that managerial power 
plays an important role in determining pay-performance relation, although its impact 
on the level of compensation and the likelihood of receiving equity-based pay is not 
significant. Specifically, the level of executive compensation and company 
accounting-based performance are less aligned when the proportion of insiders on 
the remuneration committee is higher, and when the number of directors serving on 




This chapter together with last two chapters have examined the determinants of 
executive compensation in Chinese listed companies from the principal-agent, 
tournament and managerial power perspective. The next chapter aims to explore 
whether financial incentives indeed motivate executives to boost company 
performance through testing the causal effect of adopting equity-based compensation 




Chapter 8: The Causal Effect of Adopting Equity-
based Compensation on Company Performance-
Empirical Results 
 
“One day Deng Xiaoping decided to take one of his grandsons to visit Mao Tse-tung. 
“Call me Granduncle," Mao offered warmly. "Oh, I certainly couldn't do that, 
Chairman Mao," the awe-struck child replied. “Why don't you give him an apple?” 
suggested Deng. No sooner had Mao done so than the boy took a healthy bite out of 
it, then happily chirped, “Oh, thank you, Granduncle.” ”You see,” said Deng, “what 
incentives can achieve.” 
-Pico Iyer, 1984, “China: Capitalism in the Marketing”16 
8.1 Introduction 
Empirical evidence in relation to the determinants of equity-based compensation has 
been reported and discussed in the last three chapters. This chapter aims to analyse 
whether adopting equity-based compensation in Chinese listed companies indeed 
produces better future performance, as predicted in the principal-agent literature. 
Empirical results relate to hypothesis 14 show that firm performance is positively 
related to the adoption of equity-based pay. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix are reported in section 8.2, followed by VIF test and regression 
results in section 8.3. Section 8.4 provides the conclusion.  
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8.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Figure 8.1 presents the annual number of firms starting to offer equity-based pay and 
the annual total number of firms with equity-based pay for each year during the 
period 2006-2011. Firms with equity-based pay are limited before 2010, as shown in 
Figure 8.1. Specifically, 15 companies have adopted equity-based compensation in 
2006. On average, there were 10 firms started to offer equity-based compensation for 
their executives per year between 2007 and 2009. By the end of 2009, total number 
of firms with equity-based compensation has risen to 48. Number of firms started to 
adopt equity-based pay significantly increased in 2010 and 2011, according to Figure 
8.1. Specifically, there were 40 and 57 firms started to motivate their executives 
using equity-based compensation in 2010 and 2011, respectively. There have been 
total 147 companies in which equity-based pay has put into practice, by the end of 
2011.  
Table 8.1 reports the mean value of financial variables and corporate governance 
characteristic for control group and treatment group, respectively. As shown in table 
3, the size of firms in the treatment group is relatively larger than firm size in the 
control group, but the growth opportunity is relatively smaller in the treatment group. 
In addition, the treatment group has lower ownership concentration and is less state 
controlled, but has relatively higher executive ownership. 
 
15 6 





























Figure 8.1: Adoption of Equity-based Compensation in 
China, 2006-2011 
Companies Starting to Adopt Equity-based Compensation
Total Number of Companies with Equity-based Compensation
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Table 8.1  
Descriptive Statistics: Economic and Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Variable  
Control Group Treatment Group 
Mean  Mean  
ROA (%) 4% 6% 
Stock Return (%) 75% 65% 
Firm Size (000s Yuan) 6,610,000 1,390,000 
Firm Age 12.78 12.09 
Leverage  .51 .52 
Growth Opportunity 3.06 2.63 
State Owned Dummy .08 .04 
Executive Ownership (%) 0.3% 0.8% 
Ownership Concentration .15 .13 
Duality Dummy .85 .84 
Board Independence (%) 35% 35% 
Number of Supervisors 3.64 3.71 
Observations 700 82 
 
Table 8.2 presents the correlation matrix for the key variables in this study. Table 4 
shows that the treated dummy (i.e. the adoption of equity-based compensation) is 
positively related to the percentage of equity incentive and firm size. In addition, 
ROA is positively related to firm size but negatively related to leverage. Annualized 
stock return has negative relationship with both the firm size and state ownership. 








Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1. Treated 1              
2. ROA 0.05 1             
3. Stock Return -0.03 -0.05 1            
4. Equity 0.75*** 0.05 -0.02 1           
5. Firm Size 0.09* 0.09* -0.11** -0.03 1          
6. Firm Age -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.11** 0.28*** 1         
7. Leverage 0.02 -0.27*** 0.02 -0.02 0.34*** 0.21*** 1        
8. Growth Opportunity -0.01 -0.05 0.13*** -0.01 -0.09* 0.00 -0.00 1       
9. State Owned  -0.05 -0.01 -0.10** -0.07* 0.04 -0.12*** -0.01 -0.04 1      
10. Executive Ownership 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.08* -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 1     
11. Ownership Concentration -0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.13*** -0.36*** 0.02 -0.05 0.38*** -0.05 1    
12. Duality -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.12*** 0.03 0.18*** -0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.10** 1   
13. Board Independence -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.08* 0.14*** 0.05 0.06 -0.07 -0.01 -0.17*** -0.08* 1  
14. Supervisory Board  0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.16*** 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.16*** -0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.05 1 




8.3 Regression Results 
Table 8.3 reports the VIF test for independent variables involved in testing the causal 
effect of adopting equity-based pay on company performance. Table 8.3 shows that the 
mean value of VIF is 1.72, far less than the upper value 10, indicating that independent 
variables do not suffer from potential collinearity problems. 
Table 8.3 
VIF Test: Adopting Equity-based Pay and Company Performance  
 
Variable Name VIF Variable Name VIF 
Year Dummy_2011 3.56 Firm Size 1.58 
Year Dummy_2009 3.13 Industry_4 1.34 
Year Dummy_2007 2.78 Industry_3 1.33 
Treated*After 2.12 Leverage 1.23 
Treated 2.03 Industry_5 1.22 
Year Dummy_2010 1.92 Industry_2 1.18 
After 1.91 Board Independence 1.12 
Ownership Concentration 1.89 Supervisory Board  1.12 
Firm Age 1.88 Duality 1.10 
State Owned  1.80 Growth Opportunity 1.04 
Year Dummy_2008 1.76 Executive Ownership  1.04 
Year Dummy_2006 1.58 Mean VIF 1.72 
 
Table 8.4 presents the results from the difference-in-difference (DID) estimation when 
firm performance is measured by ROA and annual stock return, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered by firms to allow for non-independence. It considers a window from 
one year before to one year after the adoption of equity-based compensation, while the 
year of adopting equity-based compensation is omitted from the estimation to control 
for the endogeneity of compensation.  
The coefficient of the interaction term Treated*After measures the difference between 
treated firms and control firms after the adoption of equity-based compensation, and it 
is the main coefficient of interest in this study. It can be seen from Table 8.4 that the 
coefficient of the interaction term Treated*After is always positive and statistically 
significant at the .1 level (i.e. p<0.1) when company performance is measured by ROA, 
suggesting that the adoption of equity-based compensation improves firm accounting-
based performance. Specifically, the column (5) of Table 8.4 shows that ROA of firms 
with equity-based compensation is 2.1 percent higher than that of firms without equity-
based compensation, one year after adopting equity incentives. It is worth noting that R-
square significant increases from 1.6 percent shown in column (2) to 12.3 percent 
shown in column (3) after adding firm financial characteristics, suggesting that those 
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financial variables have strong predicting power for firm performance. In particular, 
firm size has a significantly positive effect on firm performance, while the influence of 
leverage on company accounting-based performance is significant and negative. 
However, corporate governance mechanisms do not tend to significantly influence firm 
performance. This might be because the little change of corporate governance structure 
in the short term.  
However, Table 8.5 shows that the coefficient of the interaction term Treated*After is 
not significant when performance is measured by annual stock return, indicating that 
there is not any significant difference between treated firms and control firms after 
adopting equity-based compensation. One interpretation for this might be that the 
practitioners normally use the accounting-based performance measure when setting 
exercise conditions for equity-based compensation. Goergen and Renneboog (2011) 
argue that equity-based compensation only plays the incentive role in increasing firm 
performance when the granting of those equities depends on a relevant firm 









Dependent Variable: ROA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treated 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (1.33) (1.37) (0.49) (0.43) (0.39) 
After  -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
 (-1.48) (-1.33) (-1.50) (-1.42) (-1.42) 
Treated* After 0.025* 0.025* 0.020* 0.020* 0.021* 
 (1.85) (1.86) (1.72) (1.72) (1.71) 
Firm Size   0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
   (3.47) (3.38) (3.12) 
Firm Age   -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
   (-0.91) (-0.71) (-0.68) 
Leverage   -0.196*** -0.196*** -0.195*** 
   (-4.91) (-4.92) (-4.77) 
Growth Opportunity   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.36) 
State Owned Dummy    -0.006 -0.007 
    (-0.41) (-0.43) 
Executive Ownership    0.064 0.066 
    (0.53) (0.54) 
Ownership Concentration    0.007 0.010 
    (0.27) (0.36) 
Duality      -0.004 
     (-0.50) 
Board Independence     0.017 
     (0.26) 
Supervisory Board      0.002 
     (0.13) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.049*** 0.051*** -0.296** -0.297** -0.303** 
 (14.63) (9.20) (-2.56) (-2.52) (-2.50) 
Observations 782 782 782 782 782 
R
2
 0.005 0.016 0.123 0.123 0.123 
Adjusted- R
2
 0.001 0.000 0.104 0.100 0.097 
F 2.102* 1.740** 4.736*** 4.025*** 3.559*** 
 
  t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 Note: treated is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to the treatment group (i.e. companies with 
equity-based compensation), and 0 otherwise; after is a dummy variable equal to 1 if it is in the period one year after 
adopting equity-based compensation, and 0 otherwise;  Treated* After is the interaction term. Explanations of all the 






Regression Results: The Causal Effect of Adopting Equity-based Compensation on Company 
Performance (Stock Return)  
 
Variable  
Dependent Variable: Stock Return 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treated -0.056 -0.002 0.025 0.035 0.040 
 (-0.30) (-0.01) (0.22) (0.31) (0.35) 
After 0.082 0.029 0.030 0.022 0.029 
 (0.91) (0.37) (0.37) (0.27) (0.35) 
Treated* After -0.092 -0.189 -0.183 -0.185 -0.193 
 (-0.34) (-0.98) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-1.00) 
Firm Size   -0.048* -0.058** -0.063** 
   (-1.70) (-2.00) (-2.10) 
Firm Age   0.204** 0.242** 0.231** 
   (2.13) (2.37) (2.24) 
Leverage   0.334** 0.332** 0.315** 
   (2.35) (2.34) (2.22) 
Growth Opportunity   0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
   (3.63) (3.64) (3.67) 
State Owned     -0.043 -0.041 
    (-0.46) (-0.44) 
Executive Ownership    -0.440 -0.438 
    (-0.78) (-0.83) 
Ownership Concentration    0.393* 0.345 
    (1.79) (1.57) 
Duality      0.135* 
     (1.78) 
Board Independence     -0.437 
     (-1.06) 
Supervisory Board      0.075 
     (0.51) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.705*** -0.163*** 0.266 0.342 0.386 
 (12.06) (-4.42) (0.43) (0.56) (0.63) 
Observations 782 782 782 782 782 
R
2
 0.002 0.603 0.614 0.615 0.617 
Adjusted- R
2
 -0.002 0.596 0.605 0.605 0.605 
F 0.490 148.2*** 119.5*** 111.1*** 99.97*** 
 
t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 Note: treated is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to the treatment group (i.e. companies with 
equity-based compensation), and 0 otherwise; after is a dummy variable equal to 1 if it is in the period one year after 
adopting equity-based compensation, and 0 otherwise;  Treated* After is the interaction term. Explanations of all the 







Based on matched sample using the propensity score matching (PSM), this chapter 
empirically examines whether adopting equity-based compensation delivers better 
future firm performance in China using difference-in-difference (DID) estimator. 
Empirical results suggest the adoption of equity-based compensation does positively 
affect firm accounting-based performance in China, but is not effective in improving 
stock-based performance. Therefore, hypothesis 14 that adopting equity-based pay 












Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
“Our goal is for executive compensation to be well aligned with stockholders’ interests, 
and the company is firm in its commitment to using executive compensation programs 
that are equitable and closely connected to the company’s performance”. 




Executive compensation has long been a controversial topic which captures much 
attention of both scholars and practitioners. In particular, more attention has been paid 
to the structure of pay not just the amount of pay (e.g. Yermack, 1995; Jensen & 
Murphy, 2010). Most studies on executive compensation rely on the standard principal-
agent theory, although some literature has attempted to supplement this theory with 
insights gained from other theories. Among these studies, a small amount of them is in 
the context of regions outside developed countries. This study aims to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the determinants of executive compensation in China, 
one of the largest emerging markets in the world, by supplementing the classical 
principal-agent theory with insights gained from the tournament theory and the 
managerial power theory, and to test whether adopting equity-based compensation 
following the example of western countries leads to better future firm performance in 
China.  
Specifically, the following related questions have been addressed. First of all, has 
executive compensation been positively tied to company performance in China, as 
predicted in principal-agent literature? Moreover (and secondly), how does executive 
position hierarchy influence pay level, pay-performance link and the adoption of equity-
based compensation in Chinese listed firms? Thirdly, how does managerial power, 
represented by remuneration committee size and the proportion of insiders serving on 
remuneration committee, influence pay level, pay-performance link, and the adoption of 
equity-based compensation for executives in Chinese listed companies? Finally, does 
the adoption of equity-based compensation lead to better firm performance in China?    
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9.2 Summary of Contributions  
As noted in Chapter 1, this study contributes to the executive compensation literature 
from different aspects. The first contribution of this study is that it examines the 
executive compensation in emerging markets, in order to explore whether the theories 
and practices of executive pay in emerging markets are in line with developed countries. 
In particular, this study chooses samples from China, one of the largest emerging 
markets in the world, due to China’s unique corporate governance and the evolution of 
executive compensation during the economic reform in the past decades. 
In addition, this study differs from previous literature by supplementing the classic 
principal-agent theory with knowledge gained from the tournament theory and the 
managerial power theory, in order to provide a more comprehensive view of the 
determinants of executive compensation in Chinese listed firms. In addition to the 
positive and significant link between executive pay and company accounting-based 
performance, empirical findings also support that executive pay practices in China are 
significantly influenced by executive position hierarchy and managerial power. 
Thirdly, this study provides a novel contribution to the compensation literature by 
testing the influence of remuneration committee size and the proportion of insiders 
serving on the remuneration committee on executive compensation practice in the 
context of China from the managerial power perspective. To be specific, in this study, 
the influences of managerial power on pay settings are considered to be higher if the 
proportion of independent directors serving on remuneration committee is higher, and if 
the size of remuneration committee is larger.  
Moreover, this study involves equity-based compensation which has been omitted by 
most prior literature in the context of China except Conyon and He (2012) who estimate 
the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the likelihood of being granted 
equity-based pay for CEOs in Chinese listed companies. This study differs from 
Conyon and He (2012) by empirically focusing on the role of position hierarchy and 
managerial power in determining the propensity of receiving equity-based 
compensation for executives in Chinese listed firms. 
In addition to the determinants of equity-based compensation, this study also makes a 
novel contribution through combining the propensity score matching with the 
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difference-in-difference regression to test whether adopting equity-based pay produces 
better firm performance in China. 
Sixthly, the improved pay disclosure system after 2005 enables this study to use data of 
individual executives. Most prior Chinese literature normally measures executive 
compensation as the pay of the highest-paid executive or the average pay of the top 
three highest-paid executives, due to data limitation. However, these approaches might 
result in biased estimation as they are not able to control for the potential influence of 
individual managerial attributes on compensation (Conyon & He, 2012), especially 
when those highest paid executives change yearly (Conyon & Sadler, 2001) 
Furthermore, the sample included in this study consists of both the CEOs and non-CEO 
executives. Including non-CEO executives have two advantages. On one hand, it 
enables this study to provide a more comprehensive view of compensation for the 
executive team. On the other hand, it allows this study to test the variation of pay 
practices within the executive team. To my best knowledge, this is the first study on the 
variation of pay structure across executive position hierarchies within Chinese listed 
firms.  
Finally, the potential endogeneity problem caused by the two-way causality of pay and 
performance is normally ignored by prior compensation literature. This study 
contributes to the literature by employing valid instrumental variables and the two-stage 
least squares estimator to address the endogeneity of pay and performance.  
9.3 Summary of Key Findings 
As has been noted, one of the objectives of this study is to explore the determinants of 
executive pay in emerging markets by developing hypotheses from classical principal-
agent, tournament and managerial power perspective and by selecting samples from 
Chinese listed companies. It also examines whether financial incentives indeed motivate 
executives to improve firm performance, as predicted in agency literature. In general, 
empirical findings suggest that company performance together with promotion 
opportunities for executives, the presence of remuneration committee and its size and 
composition play important roles in determining executive compensation in Chinese 
listed firms. In addition, company accounting-based performance is improved one year 
after adopting equity-based compensation. Hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 and 
empirical findings are summarised in Table 9.1. 
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Holding other controls constant, executive compensation and firm performance are more aligned in companies 





Holding other controls constant, executives are more likely to receive equity-based compensation in companies 
with the remuneration committee 
Principal-
agent  
Not supported, no 
significant relation 
5:  





Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation and company performance are more aligned 




Holding other controls constant, executives at the higher hierarchical level are more likely to receive equity-
based compensation 
Tournament  
Not supported, no 
significant relation 
8:  
Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation is positively influenced by the proportion of 
insiders on the remuneration committee 
Managerial 
Power  
Not supported, no 
significant relation 
9:  
Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation and company performance are less aligned 












Holding other controls constant, executives are less likely to receive equity-based compensation when the 
proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee is higher  
Managerial 
Power  
Not supported, no 
significant relation 
11:  
Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation is negatively influenced by the size of 
remuneration committee  
Managerial 
Power  
Not supported, no 
significant relation 
12:  
Holding other controls constant, the level of executive compensation and company performance are less aligned 





Holding other controls constant, executives are less likely to receive equity-based compensation when the 
remuneration committee is smaller 
Managerial 
Power  
Not supported, no 
significant relation 
14:  
Holding other controls constant, adopting equity-based compensation delivers better future financial performance 







The first question in this study is about the relation of pay level and company 
performance. Based on the principal-agent theory, hypothesis 1 predicts that the level of 
executive compensation is positively related to firm performance, holding other controls 
constant. Empirical results reported in Chapter 5 suggest that pay level is positively 
related to accounting-based performance in Chinese listed companies. However, there is 
no significant relation between executive cash compensation and company annual stock 
return. Consequently, it can be conclude that executive compensation is more robustly 
linked to accounting-based performance rather than stock-based performance in Chinese 
listed companies. 
The second sets of questions relate to the role of hierarchical levels in determining 
executive compensation. Specifically, the following three questions are addressed: 
1. What is the relation of compensation level and hierarchical level?  
2. How does pay-performance link vary with hierarchical levels?  
3. How does the likelihood of receiving equity-based compensation vary with 
hierarchical levels?  
These questions relate to hypotheses 5 to 7 shown in Table 9.1. Based on tournament 
theory, hypothesis 5 predicts that the level of pay is an increasing function of executive 
hierarchical level, holding other controls constant. This is supported by the empirical 
finding shown in Chapter 6. Empirical results also indicate that the relationship between 
pay level and position hierarchy tends to be convex in Chinese listed companies. 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that the positive pay-performance link increases as position 
hierarchy increases, holding other control variables constant. Empirical results suggest 
that the link of pay and accounting-based performance is getting greater as moving up 
the hierarchical levels within Chinese listed companies, but the relation of pay and stock 
return does not significantly differ between hierarchical levels. Hypothesis 7 predicts 
that executives at higher position hierarchy are more likely to receive equity-based pay. 
However, this hypothesis is not supported in this study as empirical results show that 
hierarchical level does not significantly increase the likelihood of receiving equity-
based pay.  
The third set of questions concerning the role of the remuneration committee in 
determining executive compensation settings. On one hand, this study generates 
questions in relation to the influence of remuneration committee presence on the level 
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of pay, pay-performance and the likelihood of receiving equity-based pay, based on 
principal-agent theory. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the level of pay is lower in companies 
with a remuneration committee holding other controls constant. However, this 
hypothesis is not supported since empirical results shown in Chapter 7 suggest that the 
level of executive compensation in companies with a remuneration committee does not 
significantly differ from companies without such a committee. Hypothesis 4 predicts 
that executive compensation and company performance are more aligned in firms with a 
remuneration committee. This is empirically supported. Specifically, pay is more tied to 
accounting-based performance when firms have established a remuneration committee, 
although this phenomenon is not supported when firm performance is measured by 
annual stock return. Hypothesis 5 predicts that executives are more likely to receive 
equity-based compensation in firms with a remuneration committee, comparing with 
companies in which the remuneration committee has not established. This hypothesis is 
also not supported as results show that there is no significant difference in the 
propensity of receiving equity-based compensation between those two types of 
companies.  
On the other hand, from the managerial power perspective, this study develops 
hypotheses relative to the role of size and composition of remuneration committee in 
determining pay level, pay-performance relation and the propensity of receiving equity-
based pay. Hypotheses 8 and 11 predict that the level of executive compensation is 
positively related to the proportion of insiders on the remuneration committee, and 
negatively related to the size of remuneration committee. However, these hypotheses are 
not supported and there is little evidence that executives are rewarded excessive 
amounts of compensation when the proportion of insiders on remuneration committee is 
high, and when the size of remuneration committee is small. In addition, hypotheses 10 
and 12 predict that pay and performance are less aligned when the proportion of insiders 
on the remuneration committee is high, and when the size of remuneration committee is 
small. These hypotheses are empirically supported when accounting-based performance 
is in use. Finally, hypotheses 11 and 13 predict that the likelihood of receiving equity-
based compensation is negatively related to the proportion of insiders on remuneration 
committee, and positively related to the size of remuneration committee. However, this 
study finds little empirical evidence to support these phenomena. Consequently, 
remuneration committee tends to be subject to the influence of managerial power to set 
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a pay structure favourable to executives, although it does not appear to have a tendency 
on executives’ part to compensate large amounts of cash.  
The final question in this study relates to the performance consequences of adopting 
equity-based pay in China. Based on principal-agent theory, hypothesis 14 predicts that 
firm performance is positively related to the adoption of equity-based pay. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the accounting performance of Chinese listed firms is 
significantly improved one year after adopting equity-based compensation. 
9.4 Implications 
The empirical findings summarised in this last section provide several important 
academic and practical implications.  
9.4.1 Theoretical and Academic Implications 
The empirical findings suggest that the level of executive compensation is determined 
by company performance together with executive promotion opportunities within 
Chinese listed companies. In addition, the presence of a remuneration committee and its 
size and composition play important roles in determining executive pay structure in 
Chinese listed firms. Therefore, the classical principal-agent theory should be 
supplemented with insights gained from tournament theory and managerial power 
approach in order to provide a comprehensive view of the determinants of executive 
compensation in the context of China. 
The significant influence of hierarchical level on pay level suggests that executive 
position hierarchy is an important explanatory variable. Therefore, prior literature using 
average compensation of the top three highest-paid executives as the dependent variable 
without controlling for the effects of position hierarchy may provide biased estimates.  
9.4.2 Policy and Practical Implications  
This study offers some implications which are of importance for policy makers, the 
board of directors, remuneration committee and other practitioners who are interested in 
executive pay practices. First of all, this study finds that executive compensation has 
been positively linked to company performance in China, but the level of pay is more 
robustly linked to accounting-based performance rather than annual stock return. 
Therefore, the board of directors and its remuneration committee in Chinese listed 
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companies should take account of stock-based performance when setting compensation 
contracts for executives.  
In addition, as mentioned earlier, as argued by Gibbs (1995), within-job pay for 
performance should vary individualistically with differences in promotion opportunities. 
Specifically, to compensate for the lost promotion opportunities at higher hierarchical 
levels, compensation needs to be tied more closely to company performance (i.e. greater 
financial incentives) to provide an incentive for effort (Ortín-Angel & Salas-Fumás, 
1998; Conyon & Sadler, 2001; Boschmans, 2008). 
Thirdly, this study observes that the level of executive compensation and company 
performance are more aligned in Chinese companies with a remuneration committee. 
This result supports calls for the established remuneration committee by the CSRC. As 
establishing a remuneration committee is not compulsory for Chinese listed firms, 
policy makers may need to follow developed countries to implement legal compulsion 
for constructing a remuneration committee through enacting laws.  
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the empirical evidence that compensation and company 
performance are less aligned when the proportion of insiders on the remuneration 
committee is larger, and when the size of remuneration committee is smaller suggests 
that pay settings are more favourable to executives when the remuneration committee 
are subject to the influence of managerial power in Chinese listed companies. This 
conclusion provides useful information for the board of directors to take account of the 
appropriate proportion of insiders and total number of members serving on the 
remuneration committee, in order to alleviate the influence of managerial power on pay 
practices. Although the “Code of Corporate Governance” advocates Chinese listed 
companies to establish a remuneration committee in which independent directors shall 
constitute the majority, this has not been legally supported by the current “Company 
Law”. In addition, both the “Code of Corporate Governance” and the “Company Law” 
do not provide a clear requirement for the number of members on the remuneration 
committee. Therefore, policy makers may need to improve the “Company Law” to 
provide a clear and strong legal support for the appropriate composition and size of the 
remuneration committee. In addition, Chinese listed companies should pay more 
attention to the decision-making processes of their remuneration committees. 
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Furthermore, the adoption of equity-based compensation has just formally started in 
China after 2005 and its implementation is far from prevalent. This study has observed 
that Chinese listed companies tend to benefit from adopting equity-based compensation 
as firm accounting-based performance could be effectively improved one year after 
adopting equity-based compensation. In addition, literature in the context of developed 
countries has suggested including appropriate proportion of equity incentives in 
executive compensation portfolios could better motivate executives to work for the best 
interests of shareholders (e.g. Mehran, 1995; Frye, 2004). Therefore, the board of 
directors need to take account of the use of equity-based compensation when designing 
executive compensation contracts. Policy makers in China and perhaps other emerging 
markets need to introduce more regulations to guide and encourage listed firms to adopt 
equity-based compensation in order to motivate executives to act for the best interests of 
shareholders in a better way.  
Finally, the disclosure of executive compensation is still lack of transparency in China, 
although the CSRC has issued the “Regulations on Listed Companies’ Information 
Disclosure” in 2007 to further improve the disclosure system. In practice, Chinese listed 
companies are only required to disclose the total amount of cash compensation for an 
individual executive rather than each component in executive compensation package. In 
terms of equity-based compensation, firms only need to disclose its type and 
implementation in the fiscal year. The lack of transparency creates difficulties for 
studies on executive compensation in China and may also mislead shareholders’ 
understanding of the compensation process. Consequently, policy makers need to 
strengthen the compensation disclosure in China further, in order to increase the 
transparency of the compensation process at Chinese listed companies, to force the 
board of directors to monitor executives more effectively, and to prevent executives 
from self-seeking through setting their own pay (Faulkender & Yang, 2012).  
9.5 Potential Limitations  
Although this study has identified research gaps via reviewing a wide range of literature, 
attempted to fill up these research gaps by developing a set of hypotheses based on 
multiple theories and trying to use the most appropriate research methods, and provided 
some informative empirical findings and important academic and practical implications, 
there is no doubt that there are potential limitations in this study. This section aims to 
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outline some potential limitations in this study from different angles, and to provide 
recommendations for future research. 
9.5.1 Theoretical Limitations 
One of the potential limitations in this study is the theoretical limitation. Although this 
study has attempted to provide a more comprehensive view of the determinants of 
executive compensation in China by supplementing the classical principal-agent theory 
with insights gained from the tournament theory and the managerial power theory, there 
are some influential theories in the fields of executive compensation in which this study 
has not taken into account. For instance, as a typical sociological perspective, the 
stewardship theory differs from the above three theories by assuming that executives are 
good stewards. These stewards can operate and work closely with the principal to 
achieve a ‘goal alignment’ (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). As managers are 
trustworthy and work diligently to achieve high corporate profit and shareholders’ 
returns (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Donaldson & Davis, 1994), incentive pay is not 
believed to drive motivation and flat compensation packages is expected (Andreas et al., 
2012). The weak relation between executive pay and stock-based performance that has 
been found in this study calls for future research to analyse executive compensation in 
China from the stewardship perspective.  
9.5.2 Methodological Limitations 
There are also some potential limitations in methodology. First of all, the weak 
information disclosure system only allows this study to measure the level of pay as the 
reported total cash compensation including basic salary, bonus, and stipends. However, 
like most prior literature in the context of China (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; Conyon & He, 
2012), it excludes the value of equity-based compensation and other deferred 
compensation due to the data limitation. In addition, as just mentioned, the data 
limitation does not allow this study to calculate the value of equity-based compensation 
so that it could only employs a dummy variable to measure the adoption of equity-based 
compensation. The weak relation of pay and stock-based performance may potentially 
result from the exclusion of the value of equity-based compensation. Future study may 
attempt to estimate the pay-performance sensitivity in China using more comprehensive 
measure of compensation if data is available. However, this calls for further improved 
disclosure requirements for Chinese listed companies. 
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In addition, as equity-based incentives have just been introduced after 2005 and is far 
from prevalent in China, the sample size is very small when estimating the causal 
effects of adopting equity-based compensation on firm performance. In addition,  this 
study only tests the performance consequences one year after adopting equity-based 
compensation as it only has performance data by the end of 2011 so that estimating long 
term performance consequences will make the sample size even smaller. Therefore, 
future research may attempt to test long term performance consequences by extending 
the sample period. 
Moreover, this study relies on a quantitative method and takes advantage of secondary 
data to empirically examine the determinants of executive compensation in China. 
However, as both quantitative and qualitative methods have their own strengths and 
weaknesses in data collection and analysis procedures (Smith, 1975; Saunders et al., 
2009), future research may contribute to the executive compensation literature by 
combining a quantitative method with a qualitative method. For instance, future 
research can construct interviews with executives, the board of directors, policy makers 
and other practitioners to identify the most important issues on compensation, and then 
empirically examine these issues.  
9.6 Recommendations for Future Research  
This study also provides the following recommendations for future research. First of all, 
“shareholder theory” and “stakeholder theory” are two major streams in the fields of 
corporate governance. The former is based on extensively studied principal-agency 
relationships and develops a series of well-defined incentive and control mechanisms to 
protect shareholders against expropriation by managers, and the latter treats corporate 
governance in a broader context through considering the interests of other stakeholders 
(e.g. employees and communities) and encourages companies to undertake more social 
responsibilities (Kang et al, 2008). This study concerns the protection of shareholder 
interests and focuses on the financial incentives for the executives in China. However, 
Chinese government and companies are paying increasing attention to corporate social 
responsibility in order to maintain a sustainable economic development and to enhance 
their competitiveness in the global market. Future research may examine the relation of 
corporate governance and social responsibility from the stakeholder perspective.  
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Another interesting topic is the role of compensation consultants in pay practices. As 
the expert on remuneration committee, the role of compensation consultants includes 
making professional recommendations on appropriate pay levels and designing 
incentive pay packages which can effectively optimise shareholder interests (Murphy & 
Sandino, 2010). However, their roles are controversial among prior literature in the 
context of western countries. On one hand, researchers have found that compensation 
consultants play effective roles in setting executive compensation (e.g. Voulgaris, 
Stathopoulos, & Walker, 2010). On the other hand, some scholars argue that 
compensation consultants do not effectively perform their duties. For instance, they may 
be influenced by the managerial power to set pay contracts to benefit executives at the 
expense of shareholders (e.g. Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). The “Code of Corporate 
Governance” in China suggests that “each specialised committee may engage 
intermediary institutions to provide professional opinions” and some Chinese listed 
companies have reported the use of experts on the remuneration committee. Therefore, 
for future research, it is worth testing the role of compensation consultants in pay 
practices in China.   
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, this study finds that there are a small number of 
executives who are not paid by the current company. Instead, they are paid by 
controlling shareholders, controlling shareholders’ other subsidiaries or the current 
listed firms’ subsidiaries. It is of interest for future research to investigate this group of 
executives and their companies as those executives may not have effective financial 
incentive to improve performance of current listed firms in which they are holding 
positions.  
Finally, this study focuses on executive compensation in the context of China. Although 
China is following developed countries to improving corporate governance, Chinese 
listed companies still differ from developed countries in terms of ownership structure 
and pay settings. For example, in contrast to the U.K. where institutional ownership is 
large (Goergen & Renneboog, 2001), large state ownership is widespread in China 
(Allen et al., 2005). In addition, a number of Chinese listed firms have dominant 
shareholders with measurable power and influence over the firm through their large 
share ownership, while the U.S. companies normally have more diffuse ownership 
(Conyon & He, 2011). In terms of pay practices, executives in Chinese listed companies 
receive few equity-based pay compared to the U.S. and European countries (Conyon & 
He, 2012). Consequently, the big differences in pay practices and ownership structure 
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encourage future research to deeply compare pay settings in China with other emerging 
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Matching in 2005 
Covariates 















Firm Size 21.03 21.23 0.456 21.03 20.98 0.847 
Firm Age 2.13 2.25 0.208 2.13 2.19 0.652 
Leverage 0.48 0.59 0.742 0.48 0.47 0.859 
Growth Opportunity 0.84 0.78 0.927 0.84 1.09 0.717 
State Owned 0.07 0.37 0.017** 0.07 0.10 0.682 
Executive Ownership 0.00 0.00 0.928 0.00 0.00 0.358 
Duality Dummy 0.80 0.88 0.315 0.80 0.86 0.551 
Board Independence  0.33 0.35 0.174 0.33 0.33 0.983 
Supervisory Board  1.54 1.61 0.298 1.54 1.51 0.634 
Ownership Concentration 0.14 0.22 0.028** 0.14 0.15 0.666 
Manufactory 0.67 0.58 0.496 0.67 0.58 0.538 
Public Service  0.07 0.09 0.779 0.07 0.08 0.825 
Real Estate 0.13 0.09 0.522 0.13 0.17 0.743 
Conglomerate 0.07 0.16 0.324 0.07 0.08 0.825 
Commerce 0.07 0.09 0.787 0.07 0.08 0.825 
     * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Matching in 2006 
Covariates 















Firm Size 22.44 21.30 0.135 22.44               22.05                 0.748 
Firm Age 1.99 2.36 0.112 1.99                2.28                 0.145 
Leverage 0.55 0.60 0.962 0.55                0.59                 0.757 
Growth Opportunity 0.45 0.78 0.983 0.45                1.17                 0.210 
State Owned 0.50 0.25 0.405 0.50                0.85                 0.227 
Executive Ownership 0.00 0.00 0.889 0.00                0.00                     1
Duality Dummy 1.00 0.88 0.595 1.00                1.00                     1
Board Independence  0.33 0.35 0.563 0.33                0.34                 0.804 
Supervisory Board  1.84 1.60 0.162 1.84                1.62                 0.314 
Ownership Concentration 0.52 0.17 0.000*** 0.52 0.43 0.230 
Manufactory 0.50 0.58 0.820 0.50 0.75                 0.465 
Public Service  0.00 0.09 0.662 0.00                0.00                     1
Real Estate 0.50 0.09 0.038** 0.50 0.25                 0.465 
Conglomerate 0.00 0.16 0.537 0.00                0.00                     1
Commerce 0.00 0.09 0.664 0.00                0.00                     1
      * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 




Matching in 2007 
Covariates 















Firm Size 21.80 21.48 0.369 21.80               21.77                 0.916 
Firm Age 2.32 2.45 0.172 2.32                2.33                 0.927 
Leverage 0.52 0.60 0.881 0.52                0.52                 0.933 
Growth Opportunity 3.12 3.86 0.828 3.12                3.21                 0.925 
State Owned 0.00 0.18 0.136 0.00                0.00                     1 
Executive Ownership 0.03 0.00 0.000*** 0.03                0.00                 0.057 
Duality Dummy 0.90 0.86 0.718 0.90                0.93                 0.714 
Board Independence  0.34 0.36 0.169 0.34                0.34                 0.823 
Supervisory Board  1.51 1.59 0.323 1.51                1.52                 0.873 
Ownership Concentration 0.11 0.17 0.155 0.11 0.12 0.877 
Manufactory 1.00 0.58 0.007*** 1.00                1.00                     1 
Public Service  0.00 0.09 0.327 0.00                0.00                     1 
Real Estate 0.00 0.09 0.332 0.00                0.00                     1 
Conglomerate 0.00 0.16 0.167 0.00                0.00                     1 
Commerce 0.00 0.09 0.330 0.00                0.00                     1 
     * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
     Matching in 2008 
Covariates 















Firm Size 23.17               21.55                 0.008*** 23.17 22.40 0.225 
Firm Age 2.75                2.54                 0.124 2.75 2.77 0.893 
Leverage 0.55                0.76                 0.933 0.55 0.53 0.881 
Growth Opportunity 1.58                1.29                 0.889 1.58 1.87 0.689 
State Owned 0.00                0.14                 0.414 0.00 0.00 1 
Executive Ownership 0.00                0.00                 0.842 0.00 0.00 0.331 
Duality Dummy 1.00                0.87                 0.432 1.00 1.00 1 
Board Independence  0.34                0.36                 0.509 0.34 0.36 0.394 
Supervisory Board  1.49                1.58                 0.453 1.49 1.49 0.996 
Ownership Concentration 0.06 0.17 0.071* 0.06 0.11 0.253 
Manufactory 0.50                0.58                 0.742 0.50 0.33 0.522 
Public Service  0.00                0.09                 0.536 0.00 0.00 1 
Real Estate 0.25                0.09                 0.244 0.25 0.33 0.745 
Conglomerate 0.00                0.16                 0.387 0.00 0.00 1 
Commerce 0.25                0.09                 0.249 0.25  0.33 0.745 




Matching in 2009 
Covariates 















Firm Size 22.46               21.67                 0.056 22.46 21.83 0.099* 
Firm Age 2.49                2.62                 0.111 2.49 2.63 0.130 
Leverage 0.56                0.75                 0.890 0.56 0.53 0.741 
Growth Opportunity 1.92               -2.43                 0.948 1.92 3.89 0.205 
State Owned 0.00                0.09                 0.311 0.00 0.00 1 
Executive Ownership 0.00 0.00                 0.931 0.00 0.00 0.835 
Duality Dummy 0.70                0.86                 0.132 0.70 0.70 0.983 
Board Independence  0.37                0.36                 0.503 0.37 0.37 0.855 
Supervisory Board 1.47 1.57                 0.161 1.47 1.53 0.414 
Ownership Concentration 0.11 0.16 0.190 0.11 0.13 0.670 
Manufactory 0.30                0.58                 0.072 0.30 0.32 0.905 
Public Service  0.10                0.09                 0.890 0.10 0.20 0.456 
Real Estate 0.10                0.09                 0.875 0.10 0.01 0.053* 
Conglomerate 0.40                0.16                 0.038**         0.40 0.37 0.871 
Commerce 0.10                0.09                 0.875 0.10 0.10 0.991 
   * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
